Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Digital trade and data

Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Digital trade and data external link

2021

Abstract

Oral testimony on the UK House of Commons International Trade Committee. The Committee has launched an inquiry into digital trade and data. Digital trade refers to digitally enabled, or digitally delivered, trade in goods and services. Such trade involves the movement of data. The Committee’s inquiry will explore a range of issues, including: • Digital trade and data provisions in Free Trade Agreements • Concerns around the security and privacy of data • The environmental impact of digital trade • Relevant legal frameworks

Links

https://committees.parliament.uk/event/3859/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/

frontpage, gegevensbescherming, handel, Privacy

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Evaluatie 2020: Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017 external link

Jones-Bos, R.V.M., Bot, Th. P.L., Dommering, E., van den Herik, L.J., Jacobs, B.P.F., Nagtegaal, W. & Zijlstra, S.E. (Evaluatiecommissie Wiv 2017)

2021

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Rapport_Evaluatie_2020_Wet_op_de_inlichtingen-_en_veiligheidsdiensten_2017.pdf https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2021Z01039&did=2021D02502

evaluatie, frontpage, Telecommunicatierecht, Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv)

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Annotatie bij EHRM 8 oktober 2019 (Szurovecz / Hongarije) external link

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, vol. 2021, num: 4, pp: 230-231, 2021

Abstract

Deze zaak gaat over de vrijheid van nieuwsgaring. Een journalist kreeg geen toegang tot vreemdelingencentra in Hongarije. Het EHRM achtte dat in de gegeven omstandigheden in strijd met artikel 10 EVRM.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2021_13.pdf

Annotaties, Art. 10 EVRM, frontpage, Mediarecht, Vrijheid van meningsuiting, vrijheid van nieuwsgaring

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EU Consumer Protection 2.0: Structural Asymmetries in Digital Consumer Markets external link

Helberger, N., Lynskey, O., Micklitz, H.-W., Rott, P., Sax, M. & Strycharz, J.

2021

Links

https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2021-018_eu_consumer_protection.0_0.pdf

Consumer law, Data protection, manipulation, unfair commercial practices

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Annotatie bij EHRM 30 januari 2020 (Breyer/ Duitsland) external link

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, num: 51/52, pp: 7926-7929, 2021

Abstract

In deze uit Duitsland afkomstige zaak staat centraal de uitleg die het Bundesverfassungsgericht (hierna: BVerfG) aan de Duitse telecommunicatiewetgeving heeft gegeven met betrekking tot de opslag van persoonlijke communicatiegegevens. Het gaat om het opslaan van persoonsgegevens op Simkaarten. De zaak vertoont daarom verwantschap met de uitspraak van het HvJEU in de Spaanse zaak Ministerio Fiscal (HvJEU 2 oktober 2018, NJ 2020, nr 232 m. nt. E.J. Dommering), die het EHRM ook onder het relevante recht vermeldt.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2020_431.pdf

Annotaties, frontpage, Personal data, telecommunciatierecht

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Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price? download

Poort, J. & Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.

pp: 174-189, 2021

Abstract

An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.

Links

algorithms, frontpage, GDPR, gegevensbescherming, Personalisation, Price discrimination, Privacy

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Poort, J.
AU  - Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021-03-04
T1  - Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price?
SP  - 174-189
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publications/personalised-pricing-the-demise-of-the-fixed-price/personalised-pricing-the-demise-of-the-fixed-price/
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108891325.014
AB  - An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.
K1  - algorithms
K1  - frontpage
K1  - GDPR
K1  - gegevensbescherming
K1  - Personalisation
K1  - Price discrimination
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Poort2021,
	title = {Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price?},
	author = {Poort, J. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108891325.014},
	year = {2021},
	date = {2021-03-04},
	pages = {174-189},
	abstract = {An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.},
	keywords = {algorithms, frontpage, GDPR, gegevensbescherming, Personalisation, Price discrimination, Privacy},
}

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AI Regulation in the European Union and Trade Law: How can accountability of AI and a high level of consumer protection prevail over a trade law discipline on source code?, study commissioned by the Vzbv, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, 2021 external link

Irion, K.

2021

Abstract

The Federation of German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale Bun-desverband – vzbv) has commissioned this study from the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam, in order to shed light on the cross-border supply of AI technology and its impact on EU consumer rights. In the current negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU supports the introduction – in the legal text – of a clause which prohibits the participating countries to introduce – in their national laws – measures that require access to, or transfer of, the source code of software, with some exceptions. This is a cause for concern for experts and rights advocates, as such a clause – if not carefully conditioned – can prevent future EU regulation of AI that may be harmful to consumers. This study concludes that the source code clause within trade law indeed restricts the EU’s right to regulate in the field of AI governance in several important ways.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/irion_study_ai_and_trade_21-01-26-2/

accountability, application programming interfaces, Artificial intelligence, auditability, Electronic commerce, EU consumer protection, frontpage, GATS, source code, transpareny, WTO law

RIS

TY  - GEN
AU  - Irion, K.
PY  - 0126
DA  - 2021-01-26
T1  - AI Regulation in the European Union and Trade Law: How can accountability of AI and a high level of consumer protection prevail over a trade law discipline on source code?, study commissioned by the Vzbv, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, 2021
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/irion_study_ai_and_trade_21-01-26-2/
AB  - The Federation of German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale Bun-desverband – vzbv) has commissioned this study from the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam, in order to shed light on the cross-border supply of AI technology and its impact on EU consumer rights. In the current negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU supports the introduction – in the legal text – of a clause which prohibits the participating countries to introduce – in their national laws – measures that require access to, or transfer of, the source code of software, with some exceptions. This is a cause for concern for experts and rights advocates, as such a clause – if not carefully conditioned – can prevent future EU regulation of AI that may be harmful to consumers. This study concludes that the source code clause within trade law indeed restricts the EU’s right to regulate in the field of AI governance in several important ways.
K1  - accountability
K1  - application programming interfaces
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - auditability
K1  - Electronic commerce
K1  - EU consumer protection
K1  - frontpage
K1  - GATS
K1  - source code
K1  - transpareny
K1  - WTO law
ER  -

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Bibtex

Other{Irion2021,
	title = {AI Regulation in the European Union and Trade Law: How can accountability of AI and a high level of consumer protection prevail over a trade law discipline on source code?, study commissioned by the Vzbv, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, 2021},
	author = {Irion, K.},
	year = {0126},
	date = {2021-01-26},
	abstract = {The Federation of German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale Bun-desverband – vzbv) has commissioned this study from the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam, in order to shed light on the cross-border supply of AI technology and its impact on EU consumer rights. In the current negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU supports the introduction – in the legal text – of a clause which prohibits the participating countries to introduce – in their national laws – measures that require access to, or transfer of, the source code of software, with some exceptions. This is a cause for concern for experts and rights advocates, as such a clause – if not carefully conditioned – can prevent future EU regulation of AI that may be harmful to consumers. This study concludes that the source code clause within trade law indeed restricts the EU’s right to regulate in the field of AI governance in several important ways.},
	keywords = {accountability, application programming interfaces, Artificial intelligence, auditability, Electronic commerce, EU consumer protection, frontpage, GATS, source code, transpareny, WTO law},
}

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Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential external link

Sax, M. & Ausloos, J.

Interactive Entertainment Law Review, vol. 4, num: 1, 2021

Abstract

This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices – which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future – we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764489

Consumer law, Data protection law, Fortnite, manipulation, Platforms, video games

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sax, M.
AU  - Ausloos, J.
PY  - 0301
DA  - 2021-03-01
T1  - Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential
JO  - Interactive Entertainment Law Review
VL  - 4
NV  - 1
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764489
AB  - This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices – which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future – we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.
K1  - Consumer law
K1  - Data protection law
K1  - Fortnite
K1  - manipulation
K1  - Platforms
K1  - video games
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{SaxAusloos2021,
	title = {Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential},
	author = {Sax, M. and Ausloos, J.},
	year = {0301},
	date = {2021-03-01},
	journal = {Interactive Entertainment Law Review},
	volume = {4},
	number = {1},
	abstract = {This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices – which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future – we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.},
	keywords = {Consumer law, Data protection law, Fortnite, manipulation, Platforms, video games},
}

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Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments external link

Sax, M.

Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 23, num: 3, pp: 345-361, 2021

Abstract

Mobile health applications (‘health apps’) that promise the user to help her with some aspect of her health are very popular: for-profit apps such as MyFitnessPal, Fitbit, or Headspace have tens of millions of users each. For-profit health apps are designed and run as optimization systems. One would expect that these health apps aim to optimize the health of the user, but in reality they aim to optimize user engagement and, in effect, conversion. This is problematic, I argue, because digital health environments that aim to optimize user engagement risk being manipulative. To develop this argument, I first provide a brief analysis of the underlying business models and the resulting designs of the digital environments provided by popular for-profit health apps. In a second step, I present a concept of manipulation that can help analyze digital environments such as health apps. In the last part of the article, I use my concept of manipulation to analyze the manipulative potential of for-profit health apps. Although for-profit health can certainly empower their users, the conditions for empowerment also largely overlap with the conditions for manipulation. As a result, we should be cautious when embracing the empowerment discourse surrounding health apps. An additional aim of this article is to contribute to the rapidly growing literature on digital choice architectures and the ethics of influencing behavior through such choice architectures. I take health apps to be a paradigmatic example of digital choice architectures that give rise to ethical questions, so my analysis of the manipulative potential of health apps can also inform the larger literature on digital choice architectures.

Links

autonomy, choice architectures, health apps, manipulation, mhealh

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sax, M.
PY  - 0103
DA  - 2021-01-03
T1  - Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments
JO  - Ethics and Information Technology
VL  - 23
NV  - 3
SP  - 345-361
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-020-09576-6
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09576-6
AB  - Mobile health applications (‘health apps’) that promise the user to help her with some aspect of her health are very popular: for-profit apps such as MyFitnessPal, Fitbit, or Headspace have tens of millions of users each. For-profit health apps are designed and run as optimization systems. One would expect that these health apps aim to optimize the health of the user, but in reality they aim to optimize user engagement and, in effect, conversion. This is problematic, I argue, because digital health environments that aim to optimize user engagement risk being manipulative. To develop this argument, I first provide a brief analysis of the underlying business models and the resulting designs of the digital environments provided by popular for-profit health apps. In a second step, I present a concept of manipulation that can help analyze digital environments such as health apps. In the last part of the article, I use my concept of manipulation to analyze the manipulative potential of for-profit health apps. Although for-profit health can certainly empower their users, the conditions for empowerment also largely overlap with the conditions for manipulation. As a result, we should be cautious when embracing the empowerment discourse surrounding health apps. An additional aim of this article is to contribute to the rapidly growing literature on digital choice architectures and the ethics of influencing behavior through such choice architectures. I take health apps to be a paradigmatic example of digital choice architectures that give rise to ethical questions, so my analysis of the manipulative potential of health apps can also inform the larger literature on digital choice architectures.
K1  - autonomy
K1  - choice architectures
K1  - health apps
K1  - manipulation
K1  - mhealh
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Sax2021,
	title = {Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments},
	author = {Sax, M.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09576-6},
	year = {0103},
	date = {2021-01-03},
	journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
	volume = {23},
	number = {3},
	pages = {345-361},
	abstract = {Mobile health applications (‘health apps’) that promise the user to help her with some aspect of her health are very popular: for-profit apps such as MyFitnessPal, Fitbit, or Headspace have tens of millions of users each. For-profit health apps are designed and run as optimization systems. One would expect that these health apps aim to optimize the health of the user, but in reality they aim to optimize user engagement and, in effect, conversion. This is problematic, I argue, because digital health environments that aim to optimize user engagement risk being manipulative. To develop this argument, I first provide a brief analysis of the underlying business models and the resulting designs of the digital environments provided by popular for-profit health apps. In a second step, I present a concept of manipulation that can help analyze digital environments such as health apps. In the last part of the article, I use my concept of manipulation to analyze the manipulative potential of for-profit health apps. Although for-profit health can certainly empower their users, the conditions for empowerment also largely overlap with the conditions for manipulation. As a result, we should be cautious when embracing the empowerment discourse surrounding health apps. An additional aim of this article is to contribute to the rapidly growing literature on digital choice architectures and the ethics of influencing behavior through such choice architectures. I take health apps to be a paradigmatic example of digital choice architectures that give rise to ethical questions, so my analysis of the manipulative potential of health apps can also inform the larger literature on digital choice architectures.},
	keywords = {autonomy, choice architectures, health apps, manipulation, mhealh},
}

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Artikel 18-23 DSM-richtlijn: Exploitatiecontracten external link

Hugenholtz, P.B.

AMI, vol. 2020, num: 6, pp: 187-192, 2020

Abstract

De DSM-richtlijn van 17 april 2019 bevat een zestal bepalingen op het gebied van het auteurscontractenrecht. Artikelen 18 tot en met 23 hebben niet alleen betrekking op de ‘billijke vergoeding van auteurs en uitvoerende kunstenaars in exploitatiecontracten’, zoals het opschrift van titel IV, hoofdstuk 3 van de richtlijn belooft, maar ook op transparantie, geschillenbeslechting en het recht op herroeping van verleende rechten. Hoewel de meeste van deze onderwerpen reeds een plaats hebben gevonden in hoofdstuk 1a van de huidige Auteurswet, noopt de richtlijn op een aantal punten tot wetswijziging. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de transparantieplicht, die in de huidige wet niet voorkomt. In deze bijdrage, onderdeel van een reeks van AMI-artikelen over de DSM-richtlijn, worden de auteurscontractenrechtelijke bepalingen van de richtlijn en de omzetting ervan besproken.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/AMI_2020_6.pdf

Auteursrecht, DSM-richtlijn, exploitatiecontracten, frontpage

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
PY  - 1218
DA  - 2020-12-18
T1  - Artikel 18-23 DSM-richtlijn: Exploitatiecontracten
JO  - AMI
VL  - 2020
NV  - 6
SP  - 187-192
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/AMI_2020_6.pdf
AB  - De DSM-richtlijn van 17 april 2019 bevat een zestal bepalingen op het gebied van het auteurscontractenrecht. Artikelen 18 tot en met 23 hebben niet alleen betrekking op de ‘billijke vergoeding van auteurs en uitvoerende kunstenaars in exploitatiecontracten’, zoals het opschrift van titel IV, hoofdstuk 3 van de richtlijn belooft, maar ook op transparantie, geschillenbeslechting en het recht op herroeping van verleende rechten. Hoewel de meeste van deze onderwerpen reeds een plaats hebben gevonden in hoofdstuk 1a van de huidige Auteurswet, noopt de richtlijn op
een aantal punten tot wetswijziging. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de transparantieplicht, die in de huidige wet niet voorkomt. In deze bijdrage, onderdeel van een reeks van AMI-artikelen over de DSM-richtlijn, worden de auteurscontractenrechtelijke bepalingen van de richtlijn en de omzetting ervan besproken.
K1  - Auteursrecht
K1  - DSM-richtlijn
K1  - exploitatiecontracten
K1  - frontpage
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Hugenholtz2020h,
	title = {Artikel 18-23 DSM-richtlijn: Exploitatiecontracten},
	author = {Hugenholtz, P.B.},
	year = {1218},
	date = {2020-12-18},
	journal = {AMI},
	volume = {2020},
	number = {6},
	pages = {187-192},
	abstract = {De DSM-richtlijn van 17 april 2019 bevat een zestal bepalingen op het gebied van het auteurscontractenrecht. Artikelen 18 tot en met 23 hebben niet alleen betrekking op de ‘billijke vergoeding van auteurs en uitvoerende kunstenaars in exploitatiecontracten’, zoals het opschrift van titel IV, hoofdstuk 3 van de richtlijn belooft, maar ook op transparantie, geschillenbeslechting en het recht op herroeping van verleende rechten. Hoewel de meeste van deze onderwerpen reeds een plaats hebben gevonden in hoofdstuk 1a van de huidige Auteurswet, noopt de richtlijn op
een aantal punten tot wetswijziging. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de transparantieplicht, die in de huidige wet niet voorkomt. In deze bijdrage, onderdeel van een reeks van AMI-artikelen over de DSM-richtlijn, worden de auteurscontractenrechtelijke bepalingen van de richtlijn en de omzetting ervan besproken.},
	keywords = {Auteursrecht, DSM-richtlijn, exploitatiecontracten, frontpage},
}

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