Publications

Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link

Mezei, P., Kretschmer, M., Margoni, T., Peukert, A. & Quintais, J.

IIC, 2026

Abstract

The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching. 1. The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”. 2. The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works. Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.

Links

Copyright

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mezei, P.
AU  - Kretschmer, M.
AU  - Margoni, T.
AU  - Peukert, A.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-18
T1  - Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)
JO  - IIC
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6
AB  - The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.

1.
The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”.

2.
The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)},
	author = {Mezei, P. and Kretschmer, M. and Margoni, T. and Peukert, A. and Quintais, J.},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-18},
	journal = {IIC},
	abstract = {The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.

1.
The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”.

2.
The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.},
	keywords = {Copyright},
}

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Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond external link

Izyumenko, E.

IIC, 2026

Abstract

This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.

Links

Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-12
T1  - Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond
JO  - IIC
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4
AB  - This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Political speech
K1  - Trademark law
ER  -

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-12},
	journal = {IIC},
	abstract = {This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.},
	keywords = {Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law},
}

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Streaming Without Copying: The CJEU Redefines Private Use in Stichting de Thuiskopie (C-496/24) external link

Quintais, J.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2026

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/streaming-without-copying-the-cjeu-redefines-private-use-in-stichting-de-thuiskopie-c-49624/

Copyright, private use, streaming services

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Between Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: Sports Piracy and the Privatization of Copyright Enforcement in the EU external link

Quintais, J. & Aznar, M.

2026

Abstract

This article examines the adequacy of EU copyright law in addressing the unauthorized dissemination of live sporting events, with particular focus on the audiovisual exploitation of football. It advances two principal arguments. First, despite the absence of copyright protection for sporting events as such, EU intellectual property law provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of their audiovisual exploitation. Secondly, recent developments in enforcement practices, while enhancing effectiveness, give rise to significant risks, notably in relation to proportionality and the increasing privatization of enforcement.

Links

Copyright, Fundamental rights, piracy

RIS

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Between Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: Sports Piracy and the Privatization of Copyright Enforcement in the EU},
	author = {Quintais, J. and Aznar, M.},
	url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6674479},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6674479},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-04-10},
	abstract = {This article examines the adequacy of EU copyright law in addressing the unauthorized dissemination of live sporting events, with particular focus on the audiovisual exploitation of
football. It advances two principal arguments. First, despite the absence of copyright protection for sporting events as such, EU intellectual property law provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of their audiovisual exploitation. Secondly, recent developments in enforcement practices, while enhancing effectiveness, give rise to significant risks, notably in relation to proportionality and the increasing privatization of enforcement.},
	keywords = {Copyright, Fundamental rights, piracy},
}

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Op-Ed: “Pelham II and the Notion of Pastiche in EU Copyright Law: Is the Court of Justice Finally Giving Creative Reuse Some Breathing Space?” external link

Izyumenko, E.

EU Law Live, 2026

Links

https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-pelham-ii-and-the-notion-of-pastiche-in-eu-copyright-law-is-the-court-of-justice-finally-giving-creative-reuse-some-breathing-space/

Copyright, pastiche

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Infrastructures of Media Freedom: Expanding Journalism’s Ethical Horizon

Helberger, N.

Digital Journalism, 2026

Abstract

This commentary argues that some technology choices are editorial and ultimately contribute to the quality of our public information ecosystem. Building on freedom of expression theory, I propose expanding the horizon of journalism’s professional ethics to also include the responsible selection of recommender systems, virtual agents, clouds, social networks, and generative AI tools—the very infrastructures of media freedom.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2026.2652342

Journalism, Media law

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EU copyright law roundup – first trimester of 2026 external link

Trapova, A. & Quintais, J.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2026

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/eu-copyright-law-roundup-first-trimester-of-2026/

Copyright

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Book review: Elisabeth Steindl (2025) A Datafied Mind. Untangling EU Regulation of Emotion Technology and Neurotechnology external link

Valk, E.G.

Law, Technology and Humans, vol. 8, iss. : 1, pp: 140-141, 2026

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Wege zur KI-Grundvergütung für Kreative – Die Verzahnung individueller und kollektiver Vergütungsmodelle download

Senftleben, M.

Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM), vol. 30, iss. : 3, pp: 183-189, 2026

Abstract

Zur Sicherstellung einer angemessenen Vergütung für die Nutzung urheberrechtlich geschützter Werke zur Entwicklung von generativen KI-Modellen werden sowohl individuelle Lizenzmodelle als auch kollektive Vergütungslösungen vorgeschlagen. Der folgende Beitrag bespricht den Stand der Diskussion und kontrastiert den aktuellen Trend zu individuellen Lizenzvereinbarungen mit potenziellen Vorzügen kollektiver Ansätze. Eine Beurteilung der verschiedenen Regelungsoptionen im Licht gesellschaftlicher Belange und gesetzgeberischer Zielsetzungen schließt die Diskussion ab.

Links

Wege zur KI-Grundvergütung

Artificial intelligence, Copyright

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Wege zur KI-Grundvergütung für Kreative – Die Verzahnung individueller und kollektiver Vergütungsmodelle},
	author = {Senftleben, M.},
	url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publications/wege-zur-ki-grundvergutung-fur-kreative-die-verzahnung-individueller-und-kollektiver-vergutungsmodelle/wege-zur-ki-grundvergutung/},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-04-14},
	journal = {Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM)},
	volume = {30},
	issue = {3},
	pages = {183-189},
	abstract = {Zur Sicherstellung einer angemessenen Vergütung für die Nutzung urheberrechtlich geschützter Werke zur Entwicklung von generativen KI-Modellen werden sowohl individuelle Lizenzmodelle als auch kollektive Vergütungslösungen vorgeschlagen. Der folgende Beitrag bespricht den Stand der Diskussion und kontrastiert den aktuellen Trend zu individuellen
Lizenzvereinbarungen mit potenziellen Vorzügen kollektiver Ansätze. Eine Beurteilung der verschiedenen Regelungsoptionen im Licht gesellschaftlicher Belange und gesetzgeberischer Zielsetzungen schließt die Diskussion ab.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Copyright},
}

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Europa moet uit het AI-slop: Maar we moeten het niet hebben van de Digitale Omnibusverordening download

van Daalen, O.

Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), iss. : 12, num: 644, pp: 942-945, 2026

Abstract

Terwijl de wereld in razend tempo de AI-revolutie omarmt, worstelt de Europese Unie met de vraag hoe zij haar plek moet opeisen tussen technologische grootmachten als de VS en China. De analyse van Draghi legt pijnlijk bloot hoe ver Europa achterop is geraakt — en hoe regelgeving, ooit een bron van trots, nu vooral als rem wordt gezien. De nieuwe Digitale Omnibusverordening moet daar verandering in brengen, maar laat vooral zien hoe moeilijk het voor Brussel is om een toekomstgerichte visie op AI en data te ontwikkelen.

Links

njb12_europa-moet-uit-het-ai-slop

Artificial intelligence, Digitale Omnibusverordening, Europe

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Europa moet uit het AI-slop: Maar we moeten het niet hebben van de Digitale Omnibusverordening},
	author = {van Daalen, O.},
	url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publications/europa-moet-uit-het-ai-slop-maar-we-moeten-het-niet-hebben-van-de-digitale-omnibusverordening/njb12_europa-moet-uit-het-ai-slop/},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-04-03},
	journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
	issue = {12},
	number = {644},
	pages = {942-945},
	abstract = {Terwijl de wereld in razend tempo de AI-revolutie omarmt, worstelt de Europese Unie met de vraag hoe zij haar plek moet opeisen tussen technologische grootmachten als de VS en China. De analyse van Draghi legt pijnlijk bloot hoe ver Europa achterop is geraakt — en hoe regelgeving, ooit een bron van trots, nu vooral als rem wordt gezien. De nieuwe Digitale Omnibusverordening moet daar verandering in brengen, maar laat vooral zien hoe moeilijk het voor Brussel is om een toekomstgerichte visie op AI en data te ontwikkelen.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Digitale Omnibusverordening, Europe},
}

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