Publications

This chapter argues that European trademark law increasingly operates as a system of expression regulation and should therefore be reconstructed in light of Article 10 ECHR. Trademark law no longer merely protects consumers against deception: through anti-dilution protection, expansive infringement standards, and morality-based registration rules, it increasingly governs the circulation of cultural and political meanings attached to trademarks, which themselves have become communicative resources used in parody, artistic appropriation, political criticism, activism, journalism, and public debate. The chapter first identifies the two principal contexts in which these tensions arise: restrictions on expressive reuse of trademarks and refusals to register allegedly immoral or offensive signs. It then analyses the Article 10 principles most relevant to trademark law, focusing on the listener-oriented structure of freedom of expression and its implications for confusion-based and anti-dilution protection; the constitutional treatment of commercial speech and the dangers of overly broad conceptions of “commerciality”; the heightened protection afforded to speech on matters of public interest; the protection of artistic expression, satire, and humour; the broader tolerance required for criticism of powerful corporate actors; and the contextual protection of offensive or provocative expression. Building on this framework, the chapter argues that freedom of expression should not remain an external defence applied only after infringement has been established. Instead, Article 10 values should shape trademark doctrine internally, including the interpretation of use in the course of trade, use in relation to goods or services, anti-dilution protection, due cause, and morality or public-order exclusions. It concludes that trademark law can retain its legitimate market-regulating role only if Article 10 ECHR becomes part of its internal doctrinal structure.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6805099

Art. 10 EVRM, Freedom of expression, Trademark law

RIS

TY  - UNPD
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-20
T1  - Trademark Law as Regulation of Expression: Why Article 10 ECHR Should Become the Internal Grammar of European Trademark Law
AB  - This chapter argues that European trademark law increasingly operates as a system of expression regulation and should therefore be reconstructed in light of Article 10 ECHR. Trademark law no longer merely protects consumers against deception: through anti-dilution protection, expansive infringement standards, and morality-based registration rules, it increasingly governs the circulation of cultural and political meanings attached to trademarks, which themselves have become communicative resources used in parody, artistic appropriation, political criticism, activism, journalism, and public debate.

The chapter first identifies the two principal contexts in which these tensions arise: restrictions on expressive reuse of trademarks and refusals to register allegedly immoral or offensive signs. It then analyses the Article 10 principles most relevant to trademark law, focusing on the listener-oriented structure of freedom of expression and its implications for confusion-based and anti-dilution protection; the constitutional treatment of commercial speech and the dangers of overly broad conceptions of “commerciality”; the heightened protection afforded to speech on matters of public interest; the protection of artistic expression, satire, and humour; the broader tolerance required for criticism of powerful corporate actors; and the contextual protection of offensive or provocative expression. Building on this framework, the chapter argues that freedom of expression should not remain an external defence applied only after infringement has been established. Instead, Article 10 values should shape trademark doctrine internally, including the interpretation of use in the course of trade, use in relation to goods or services, anti-dilution protection, due cause, and morality or public-order exclusions. It concludes that trademark law can retain its legitimate market-regulating role only if Article 10 ECHR becomes part of its internal doctrinal structure.
K1  - Art. 10 EVRM
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Trademark law
ER  -

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Bibtex

Working paper{nokey,
	title = {Trademark Law as Regulation of Expression: Why Article 10 ECHR Should Become the Internal Grammar of European Trademark Law},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6805099},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-20},
	abstract = {This chapter argues that European trademark law increasingly operates as a system of expression regulation and should therefore be reconstructed in light of Article 10 ECHR. Trademark law no longer merely protects consumers against deception: through anti-dilution protection, expansive infringement standards, and morality-based registration rules, it increasingly governs the circulation of cultural and political meanings attached to trademarks, which themselves have become communicative resources used in parody, artistic appropriation, political criticism, activism, journalism, and public debate.

The chapter first identifies the two principal contexts in which these tensions arise: restrictions on expressive reuse of trademarks and refusals to register allegedly immoral or offensive signs. It then analyses the Article 10 principles most relevant to trademark law, focusing on the listener-oriented structure of freedom of expression and its implications for confusion-based and anti-dilution protection; the constitutional treatment of commercial speech and the dangers of overly broad conceptions of “commerciality”; the heightened protection afforded to speech on matters of public interest; the protection of artistic expression, satire, and humour; the broader tolerance required for criticism of powerful corporate actors; and the contextual protection of offensive or provocative expression. Building on this framework, the chapter argues that freedom of expression should not remain an external defence applied only after infringement has been established. Instead, Article 10 values should shape trademark doctrine internally, including the interpretation of use in the course of trade, use in relation to goods or services, anti-dilution protection, due cause, and morality or public-order exclusions. It concludes that trademark law can retain its legitimate market-regulating role only if Article 10 ECHR becomes part of its internal doctrinal structure.},
	keywords = {Art. 10 EVRM, Freedom of expression, Trademark law},
}

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Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link

Mezei, P., Kretschmer, M., Margoni, T., Peukert, A. & Quintais, J.

IIC, 2026

Abstract

The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching. 1. The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”. 2. The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works. Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.

Links

Copyright

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mezei, P.
AU  - Kretschmer, M.
AU  - Margoni, T.
AU  - Peukert, A.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-18
T1  - Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)
JO  - IIC
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6
AB  - The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.

1.
The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”.

2.
The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Comment of the European Copyright Society on the Request for Preliminary Ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)},
	author = {Mezei, P. and Kretschmer, M. and Margoni, T. and Peukert, A. and Quintais, J.},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01717-6},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-18},
	journal = {IIC},
	abstract = {The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.

1.
The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of “chatbot”, “large language model”, and “search engine”.

2.
The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.},
	keywords = {Copyright},
}

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Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond external link

Izyumenko, E.

IIC, 2026

Abstract

This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.

Links

Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-12
T1  - Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond
JO  - IIC
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4
AB  - This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Political speech
K1  - Trademark law
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01719-4},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-12},
	journal = {IIC},
	abstract = {This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.},
	keywords = {Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law},
}

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Streaming Without Copying: The CJEU Redefines Private Use in Stichting de Thuiskopie (C-496/24) external link

Quintais, J.

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/streaming-without-copying-the-cjeu-redefines-private-use-in-stichting-de-thuiskopie-c-49624/

Copyright, private use, streaming services

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Between Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: Sports Piracy and the Privatization of Copyright Enforcement in the EU external link

Quintais, J. & Aznar, M.

2026

Abstract

This article examines the adequacy of EU copyright law in addressing the unauthorized dissemination of live sporting events, with particular focus on the audiovisual exploitation of football. It advances two principal arguments. First, despite the absence of copyright protection for sporting events as such, EU intellectual property law provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of their audiovisual exploitation. Secondly, recent developments in enforcement practices, while enhancing effectiveness, give rise to significant risks, notably in relation to proportionality and the increasing privatization of enforcement.

Links

Copyright, Fundamental rights, piracy

RIS

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Between Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: Sports Piracy and the Privatization of Copyright Enforcement in the EU},
	author = {Quintais, J. and Aznar, M.},
	url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6674479},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6674479},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-04-10},
	abstract = {This article examines the adequacy of EU copyright law in addressing the unauthorized dissemination of live sporting events, with particular focus on the audiovisual exploitation of
football. It advances two principal arguments. First, despite the absence of copyright protection for sporting events as such, EU intellectual property law provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of their audiovisual exploitation. Secondly, recent developments in enforcement practices, while enhancing effectiveness, give rise to significant risks, notably in relation to proportionality and the increasing privatization of enforcement.},
	keywords = {Copyright, Fundamental rights, piracy},
}

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Op-Ed: “Pelham II and the Notion of Pastiche in EU Copyright Law: Is the Court of Justice Finally Giving Creative Reuse Some Breathing Space?” external link

Izyumenko, E.

EU Law Live, 2026

Links

https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-pelham-ii-and-the-notion-of-pastiche-in-eu-copyright-law-is-the-court-of-justice-finally-giving-creative-reuse-some-breathing-space/

Copyright, pastiche

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