Publications

Environmental sensors measure and capture data about natural phenomena like gas, light and temperature. Traditionally core to scientific research and environmental governance, they have become strategic tools for climate action as they have advanced technologically. The European Union leverages data as a catalyst for the green transition policies of the European Green Deal (‘twin transition’). At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights recently recognised states’ positive obligations to mitigate the harmful effects of climate change for the effective protection of the right to private life. Whereas increasingly sophisticated environmental sensing, data capture and processing could be defended under Article 8, these systems could also be invasive of privacy. This paper explores and conceptualises these different relationships of the right to private life under Article 8 and how they apply to environmental sensing technologies. Building on this, the paper identifies potential ways in which the relationship between privacy and climate action could evolve further in the future.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2025.2593770

Privacy

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Zeybek, B.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-27
T1  - What environmental sensing means for the scope of the right to private life
JO  - Law, Innovation & Technology
UR  - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17579961.2025.2593770
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2025.2593770
AB  - Environmental sensors measure and capture data about natural phenomena like gas, light and temperature. Traditionally core to scientific research and environmental governance, they have become strategic tools for climate action as they have advanced technologically. The European Union leverages data as a catalyst for the green transition policies of the European Green Deal (‘twin transition’). At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights recently recognised states’ positive obligations to mitigate the harmful effects of climate change for the effective protection of the right to private life. Whereas increasingly sophisticated environmental sensing, data capture and processing could be defended under Article 8, these systems could also be invasive of privacy. This paper explores and conceptualises these different relationships of the right to private life under Article 8 and how they apply to environmental sensing technologies. Building on this, the paper identifies potential ways in which the relationship between privacy and climate action could evolve further in the future.
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {What environmental sensing means for the scope of the right to private life},
	author = {Zeybek, B.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2025.2593770},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-27},
	journal = {Law, Innovation & Technology},
	abstract = {Environmental sensors measure and capture data about natural phenomena like gas, light and temperature. Traditionally core to scientific research and environmental governance, they have become strategic tools for climate action as they have advanced technologically. The European Union leverages data as a catalyst for the green transition policies of the European Green Deal (‘twin transition’). At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights recently recognised states’ positive obligations to mitigate the harmful effects of climate change for the effective protection of the right to private life. Whereas increasingly sophisticated environmental sensing, data capture and processing could be defended under Article 8, these systems could also be invasive of privacy. This paper explores and conceptualises these different relationships of the right to private life under Article 8 and how they apply to environmental sensing technologies. Building on this, the paper identifies potential ways in which the relationship between privacy and climate action could evolve further in the future.},
	keywords = {Privacy},
}

Save .bib

The AI Act/Copyright Interface – A Success Formula for Reconciling the Societal Interest in Culturally Diverse AI With Copyright Values? download

Senftleben, M.

In: E. Arezzo (ed.), Navigating the (Legal) Challenges of the Artificial Intelligence Era – Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Corporate Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2026, pp: 41-78

AI Act, Copyright

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link

Mezei, P., Kretschmer, M., Margoni, T., Peukert, A. & Quintais, J.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2026

Copyright

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Text and Data Mining, Generative AI, and the Copyright Three-Step Test external link

Senftleben, M.

IIC, vol. 57, iss. : 1, pp: 67–107, 2026

Abstract

In the debate on copyright exceptions permitting text and data mining (“TDM”) for the development of generative AI systems, the so-called “three-step test” has become a centre of gravity. The test serves as a universal yardstick for assessing the compatibility of domestic copyright exceptions with international copyright law. However, it is doubtful whether the international three-step test is applicable at all. Arguably, TDM copies fall outside the scope of the international right of reproduction and go beyond the ambit of the test’s operation. Only if national or regional copyright legislation declares the test applicable, the question arises whether copyright exceptions supporting TDM for AI training constitute certain special cases that do not conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and do not unreasonably prejudice legitimate author or rightsholder interests. As the following analysis will show, rules permitting TDM for AI training can satisfy all test criteria. An opt-out opportunity for copyright owners bans the risk of a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and an unreasonable prejudice from the outset. A clear focus on specific policy goals, such as the objective to support scientific research, adds conceptual contours that dispel concerns about incompliance. In the case of TDM provisions covering commercial AI development, equitable remuneration regimes can be introduced as a counterbalance to avoid an unreasonable prejudice.

Links

Copyright, Generative AI, Text and Data Mining (TDM), three-step test

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Senftleben, M.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-13
T1  - Text and Data Mining, Generative AI, and the Copyright Three-Step Test
JO  - IIC
VL  - 57
IS  - 1
SP  - 67–107
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5373903
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01680-2
AB  - In the debate on copyright exceptions permitting text and data mining (“TDM”) for the development of generative AI systems, the so-called “three-step test” has become a centre of gravity. The test serves as a universal yardstick for assessing the compatibility of domestic copyright exceptions with international copyright law. However, it is doubtful whether the international three-step test is applicable at all. Arguably, TDM copies fall outside the scope of the international right of reproduction and go beyond the ambit of the test’s operation. Only if national or regional copyright legislation declares the test applicable, the question arises whether copyright exceptions supporting TDM for AI training constitute certain special cases that do not conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and do not unreasonably prejudice legitimate author or rightsholder interests. As the following analysis will show, rules permitting TDM for AI training can satisfy all test criteria. An opt-out opportunity for copyright owners bans the risk of a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and an unreasonable prejudice from the outset. A clear focus on specific policy goals, such as the objective to support scientific research, adds conceptual contours that dispel concerns about incompliance. In the case of TDM provisions covering commercial AI development, equitable remuneration regimes can be introduced as a counterbalance to avoid an unreasonable prejudice.
K1  - Copyright
K1  - Generative AI
K1  - Text and Data Mining (TDM)
K1  - three-step test
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Text and Data Mining, Generative AI, and the Copyright Three-Step Test},
	author = {Senftleben, M.},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-026-01680-2},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-026-01680-2},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-13},
	journal = {IIC},
	volume = {57},
	issue = {1},
	pages = {67–107},
	abstract = {In the debate on copyright exceptions permitting text and data mining (“TDM”) for the development of generative AI systems, the so-called “three-step test” has become a centre of gravity. The test serves as a universal yardstick for assessing the compatibility of domestic copyright exceptions with international copyright law. However, it is doubtful whether the international three-step test is applicable at all. Arguably, TDM copies fall outside the scope of the international right of reproduction and go beyond the ambit of the test’s operation. Only if national or regional copyright legislation declares the test applicable, the question arises whether copyright exceptions supporting TDM for AI training constitute certain special cases that do not conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and do not unreasonably prejudice legitimate author or rightsholder interests. As the following analysis will show, rules permitting TDM for AI training can satisfy all test criteria. An opt-out opportunity for copyright owners bans the risk of a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and an unreasonable prejudice from the outset. A clear focus on specific policy goals, such as the objective to support scientific research, adds conceptual contours that dispel concerns about incompliance. In the case of TDM provisions covering commercial AI development, equitable remuneration regimes can be introduced as a counterbalance to avoid an unreasonable prejudice.},
	keywords = {Copyright, Generative AI, Text and Data Mining (TDM), three-step test},
}

Save .bib

Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link

Mezei, P., Kretschmer, M., Margoni, T., Peukert, A. & Quintais, J.

2026

Abstract

The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching. (1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’. (2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works. Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD. In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.

Links

https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ecs-comment-on-the-like-company-reference.pdf

Copyright

RIS

TY  - BLOG
AU  - Mezei, P.
AU  - Kretschmer, M.
AU  - Margoni, T.
AU  - Peukert, A.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-03-03
T1  - Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6333539
AB  - The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution.
While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.
(1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’.
(2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive).
If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD.
In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Online publication{nokey,
	title = {Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)},
	author = {Mezei, P. and Kretschmer, M. and Margoni, T. and Peukert, A. and Quintais, J.},
	url = {https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ecs-comment-on-the-like-company-reference.pdf},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-03-03},
	abstract = {The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution.
While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.
(1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’.
(2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive).
If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD.
In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.},
	keywords = {Copyright},
}

Save .bib

De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht download

Hugenholtz, P.B.

Auteursrecht, iss. : 1, pp: 5-10, 2026

Abstract

De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.

AI Act, Artificial intelligence, code of practice, Copyright

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-26
T1  - De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht
JO  - Auteursrecht
IS  - 1
SP  - 5-10
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/de-ai-verordening-de-code-of-practice-en-het-auteursrecht/auteursrecht_2026_1/
AB  - De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.
K1  - AI Act
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - code of practice
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Annotatie bij Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 8 juli 2025 (Google / Rusland) download

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, iss. : 6, num: 52, pp: 1192-1194, 2026

Abstract

Google weigert bepaalde YouTube-video’s te verwijderen en een geblokkeerd YouTube-kanaal te herstellen. De Russische autoriteiten leggen daarop een zeer hoge boete op, alsmede een last onder dwangsom. De rechterlijke beslissingen in de daarop volgende procedure zijn onvoldoende gemotiveerd. Schending vrijheid van meningsuiting (art. 10 EVRM) en eerlijk proces (art. 6 EVRM).

Case notes, Freedom of expression

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt? download

Hugenholtz, P.B.

Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), iss. : 6, num: 299, pp: 442-450, 2026

Abstract

Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?

Auteursrecht, deepfake, wet op de naburige rechten

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-13
T1  - Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt?
JO  - Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)
IS  - 6
NV  - 299
SP  - 442-450
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/een-naburig-deepfake-recht-echt/njb06_een-naburig-deepfake-recht/
AB  - Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?
K1  - Auteursrecht
K1  - deepfake
K1  - wet op de naburige rechten
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt?},
	author = {Hugenholtz, P.B.},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-13},
	journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
	issue = {6},
	number = {299},
	pages = {442-450},
	abstract = {Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?},
	keywords = {Auteursrecht, deepfake, wet op de naburige rechten},
}

Save .bib

Top Keywords

RIS

Bibtex

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

Links

RIS

Bibtex

RIS

Bibtex

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

Links

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

Links

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

RIS

Bibtex

Abstract

RIS

Bibtex