Publications - Page 2 of 270

Fundamental Rights Aspects of EU Media Regulation: Not Just an Act

In: The Cambridge Handbook of Media Law and Policy in Europe, Cambridge University Press , 2026, pp: 21-60, ISBN: 9781009568159

Abstract

This chapter traces how contemporary media pass through different regulatory zones and examines the different rules that govern each zone and how the zones relate to each other. It briefly charts the recent and ongoing evolution of the media, from analogue roots to generative AI futures, and notes the fundamental rights and regulatory ramifications of technology-driven innovations. It draws an analytical line from these conceptualisations through to the contemporary threats to media freedom that regulation urgently needs to address.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009568159.004

Fundamental rights, Media law, Regulation

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Rethinking European Media Law and Policy

Rucz, M., Irion, K. & Senftleben, M.

In: The Cambridge Handbook of Media Law and Policy in Europe, Cambridge University Press , 2026, pp: 1-18, ISBN: 9781009568159

Abstract

This introduction outlines the key players, instruments and dilemmas that shape the overall framework of European media law and policy. Turning to the structure of the handbook, we will introduce and summarize the individual contributions addressing elements of the legal patchwork that together make up the body of regulatory interventions, policy rationales and underlying assumptions. Lastly, we will identify the overarching themes and trends that emerge from these essays, proposing improvements of regulatory responses and providing a compass for a principle-based, integrated approach to European media law and a more resilient media policy.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009568159.002

Media law

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The Cambridge Handbook of Media Law and Policy in Europe

Senftleben, M., Irion, K., McGonagle, T. & Poort, J.

Cambridge University Press , 2026, ISBN: 9781009568159

Abstract

This Handbook analyses pressing legal and policy issues that have arisen in the rapidly changing media ecosystem: from threats to media freedom and pluralism and the safety of journalists to challenges arising from the shift to platform-based communication, the spread of disinformation and the impact of AI on media and news production. Seeking to pave the way for new, integrated regulatory responses, the individual chapters address legal and policy developments from an overarching perspective that includes insights from human rights law, media law and copyright law. Following this holistic approach, the Handbook identifies common principles for a coherent regulatory framework for news and media in Europe. It evaluates existing laws and media governance institutions in light of the economic, technological and political challenges posed to the media sector. The individual contributions present new directions for an integrated approach to European media law and policy.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009568159

Media law

RIS

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Senftleben, M.
AU  - Irion, K.
AU  - McGonagle, T.
AU  - Poort, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-30
T1  - The Cambridge Handbook of Media Law and Policy in Europe
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009568159
AB  - This Handbook analyses pressing legal and policy issues that have arisen in the rapidly changing media ecosystem: from threats to media freedom and pluralism and the safety of journalists to challenges arising from the shift to platform-based communication, the spread of disinformation and the impact of AI on media and news production. Seeking to pave the way for new, integrated regulatory responses, the individual chapters address legal and policy developments from an overarching perspective that includes insights from human rights law, media law and copyright law. Following this holistic approach, the Handbook identifies common principles for a coherent regulatory framework for news and media in Europe. It evaluates existing laws and media governance institutions in light of the economic, technological and political challenges posed to the media sector. The individual contributions present new directions for an integrated approach to European media law and policy.
K1  - Media law
ER  -

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Bibtex

Book{nokey,
	title = {The Cambridge Handbook of Media Law and Policy in Europe},
	author = {Senftleben, M. and Irion, K. and McGonagle, T. and Poort, J.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009568159},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-30},
	abstract = {This Handbook analyses pressing legal and policy issues that have arisen in the rapidly changing media ecosystem: from threats to media freedom and pluralism and the safety of journalists to challenges arising from the shift to platform-based communication, the spread of disinformation and the impact of AI on media and news production. Seeking to pave the way for new, integrated regulatory responses, the individual chapters address legal and policy developments from an overarching perspective that includes insights from human rights law, media law and copyright law. Following this holistic approach, the Handbook identifies common principles for a coherent regulatory framework for news and media in Europe. It evaluates existing laws and media governance institutions in light of the economic, technological and political challenges posed to the media sector. The individual contributions present new directions for an integrated approach to European media law and policy.},
	keywords = {Media law},
}

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Deepfakes: IP Is Not the Cure external link

Hugenholtz, P.B.

GRUR International, pp: 1-2, 2026

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Copyright, deepfakes, Intellectual property

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From AI Ethics to AI Regulation: Emerging Regulatory Frameworks for AI-Enhanced Justice

Helberger, N. & Banks, I.

In: The Cambridge Handbook of AI in Civil Dispute Resolution, Cambridge University Press , 2026, pp: 51-67, ISBN: 9781009589086

Abstract

In governing the development and deployment of AI across the European Member States, the EU AI Act tries to bring together two very different visions of AI. The first sees AI as a powerful tool that can be made less risky to the health, safety, and fundamental rights of European consumers if it adheres to a series of technical requirements. The second sees AI as a systems technology whose governance requires a nuanced understanding of its transformative effects on the values, fundamental rights, and power relations that characterise society. This chapter uses these two perspectives on AI as a lens through which to reflect on the implications of the EU AI Act for the justice sector. It analyses the extent to which the Act’s provisions and safeguards are aligned with emerging ethical guidelines for the use of AI in the administration of justice and discusses whether it can be expected to effectively address core ethical concerns about the use of AI in the justice sector. This analysis demonstrates the limitations of the ‘tool’ perspective that dominates the AI Act and reveals the considerable discretion it gives judicial authorities to guide the integration of AI as a societally transformative systems technology into the justice sector.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589086.009

RIS

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Helberger, N.
AU  - Banks, I.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-21
T1  - From AI Ethics to AI Regulation: Emerging Regulatory Frameworks for AI-Enhanced Justice
SP  - 51-67
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589086.009
AB  - In governing the development and deployment of AI across the European Member States, the EU AI Act tries to bring together two very different visions of AI. The first sees AI as a powerful tool that can be made less risky to the health, safety, and fundamental rights of European consumers if it adheres to a series of technical requirements. The second sees AI as a systems technology whose governance requires a nuanced understanding of its transformative effects on the values, fundamental rights, and power relations that characterise society. This chapter uses these two perspectives on AI as a lens through which to reflect on the implications of the EU AI Act for the justice sector. It analyses the extent to which the Act’s provisions and safeguards are aligned with emerging ethical guidelines for the use of AI in the administration of justice and discusses whether it can be expected to effectively address core ethical concerns about the use of AI in the justice sector. This analysis demonstrates the limitations of the ‘tool’ perspective that dominates the AI Act and reveals the considerable discretion it gives judicial authorities to guide the integration of AI as a societally transformative systems technology into the justice sector.
ER  -

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Bibtex

Chapter{nokey,
	title = {From AI Ethics to AI Regulation: Emerging Regulatory Frameworks for AI-Enhanced Justice},
	author = {Helberger, N. and Banks, I.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009589086.009},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-21},
	pages = {51-67},
	abstract = {In governing the development and deployment of AI across the European Member States, the EU AI Act tries to bring together two very different visions of AI. The first sees AI as a powerful tool that can be made less risky to the health, safety, and fundamental rights of European consumers if it adheres to a series of technical requirements. The second sees AI as a systems technology whose governance requires a nuanced understanding of its transformative effects on the values, fundamental rights, and power relations that characterise society. This chapter uses these two perspectives on AI as a lens through which to reflect on the implications of the EU AI Act for the justice sector. It analyses the extent to which the Act’s provisions and safeguards are aligned with emerging ethical guidelines for the use of AI in the administration of justice and discusses whether it can be expected to effectively address core ethical concerns about the use of AI in the justice sector. This analysis demonstrates the limitations of the ‘tool’ perspective that dominates the AI Act and reveals the considerable discretion it gives judicial authorities to guide the integration of AI as a societally transformative systems technology into the justice sector.},
}

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Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI external link

Metikoš, L.

2026

Abstract

Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.

Links

https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/321271751/Thesis.pdf

Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, right to an explanation

RIS

TY  - THES
AU  - Metikoš, L.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-06-03
T1  - Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI
AB  - Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - contestation
K1  - digital justice
K1  - right to an explanation
ER  -

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PhD Thesis{nokey,
	title = {Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI},
	author = {Metikoš, L.},
	url = {https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/321271751/Thesis.pdf},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-06-03},
	abstract = {Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, right to an explanation},
}

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Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China

Metikoš, L., Iglesias Keller, C., Qiao, C. & Helberger, N.

Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 61, 2026

Abstract

Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106302

Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, explainability, right to an explanation

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Metikoš, L.
AU  - Iglesias Keller, C.
AU  - Qiao, C.
AU  - Helberger, N.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-06-09
T1  - Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China
JO  - Computer Law & Security Review
VL  - 61
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106302
AB  - Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - contestation
K1  - digital justice
K1  - explainability
K1  - right to an explanation
ER  -

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Article{nokey,
	title = {Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China},
	author = {Metikoš, L. and Iglesias Keller, C. and Qiao, C. and Helberger, N.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106302},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-06-09},
	journal = {Computer Law & Security Review},
	volume = {61},
	abstract = {Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, explainability, right to an explanation},
}

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Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie 4 december 2025 (Mio / Galleri Mikael & Thomas Asplund Aktiebolag en USM U. Schärer Söhne / Konektra) download

Hugenholtz, P.B.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, iss. : 18, num: 155, pp: 3364-3367, 2026

Links

Annotatie_NJ_2026_155

Copyright, Neighbouring rights, reproductierecht

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New IViR Study: Towards a Digital Knowledge Act – Mapping Policy Options to Mitigate Legal Risks for Teaching, Learning and Research external link

Valk, E.G., Szkalej, K. & Senftleben, M.

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/new-ivir-study-towards-a-digital-knowledge-act-mapping-policy-options-to-mitigate-legal-risks-for-teaching-learning-and-research/

Copyright

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A Blind Spot at the Heart of EU Copyright and AI Policymaking? external link

Keller, P.

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/a-blind-spot-at-the-heart-of-eu-copyright-and-ai-policymaking/

Copyright

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