Publications - Page 2 of 266

Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link

Mezei, P., Kretschmer, M., Margoni, T., Peukert, A. & Quintais, J.

2026

Abstract

The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching. (1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’. (2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works. Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD. In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.

Links

https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ecs-comment-on-the-like-company-reference.pdf

Copyright

RIS

TY  - BLOG
AU  - Mezei, P.
AU  - Kretschmer, M.
AU  - Margoni, T.
AU  - Peukert, A.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-03-03
T1  - Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6333539
AB  - The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution.
While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.
(1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’.
(2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive).
If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD.
In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

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Bibtex

Online publication{nokey,
	title = {Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company)},
	author = {Mezei, P. and Kretschmer, M. and Margoni, T. and Peukert, A. and Quintais, J.},
	url = {https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ecs-comment-on-the-like-company-reference.pdf},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-03-03},
	abstract = {The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution.
While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.
(1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’.
(2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.

Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive).
If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD.
In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.},
	keywords = {Copyright},
}

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De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht download

Hugenholtz, P.B.

Auteursrecht, iss. : 1, pp: 5-10, 2026

Abstract

De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.

AI Act, Artificial intelligence, code of practice, Copyright

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-26
T1  - De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht
JO  - Auteursrecht
IS  - 1
SP  - 5-10
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publications/de-ai-verordening-de-code-of-practice-en-het-auteursrecht/auteursrecht_2026_1/
AB  - De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.
K1  - AI Act
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - code of practice
K1  - Copyright
ER  -

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Annotatie bij Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 8 juli 2025 (Google / Rusland) download

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, iss. : 6, num: 52, pp: 1192-1194, 2026

Abstract

Google weigert bepaalde YouTube-video’s te verwijderen en een geblokkeerd YouTube-kanaal te herstellen. De Russische autoriteiten leggen daarop een zeer hoge boete op, alsmede een last onder dwangsom. De rechterlijke beslissingen in de daarop volgende procedure zijn onvoldoende gemotiveerd. Schending vrijheid van meningsuiting (art. 10 EVRM) en eerlijk proces (art. 6 EVRM).

Case notes, Freedom of expression

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Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt? download

Hugenholtz, P.B.

Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), iss. : 6, num: 299, pp: 442-450, 2026

Abstract

Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?

Auteursrecht, deepfake, wet op de naburige rechten

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-13
T1  - Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt?
JO  - Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)
IS  - 6
NV  - 299
SP  - 442-450
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publications/een-naburig-deepfake-recht-echt/njb06_een-naburig-deepfake-recht/
AB  - Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?
K1  - Auteursrecht
K1  - deepfake
K1  - wet op de naburige rechten
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Een naburig deepfake-recht. Echt?},
	author = {Hugenholtz, P.B.},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-13},
	journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
	issue = {6},
	number = {299},
	pages = {442-450},
	abstract = {Deepfake porno, politieke manipulatie en misinformatie reclame hebben verstrekkende gevolgen voor privacy, democratie en vertrouwen in media en wetenschap. Najaar 2025 is een initiatiefwetsvoorstel gepresenteerd dat voorziet in de invoering van een naburig recht op deepfakes van personen. Het voorstel kent aan iedere natuurlijke persoon een exclusief en licentieerbaar recht toe op ‘zijn’ of ‘haar’ deepfakes. Daarmee wordt een in wezen privacyrechtelijke aanspraak gegoten in het jasje van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht. Deze benadering roept vragen op. Is aanvullende bescherming tegen deepfakes echt nodig, nu het bestaande recht reeds een uitgebreid arsenaal aan bescherming biedt? Past een dergelijk verhandelbaar recht binnen de systematiek van het Nederlandse en Europese recht? En draagt zo’n nieuw naburig recht bij aan de beteugeling van deepfakes of normaliseert en commercialiseert het juist het fenomeen dat het zegt te willen reguleren?},
	keywords = {Auteursrecht, deepfake, wet op de naburige rechten},
}

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Judges-in-the-loop? Judicial involvement in human oversight of high-risk decision support systems under the EU AI Act

Banks, I.

International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 34, 2026

Abstract

The European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) requires institutions that deploy high-risk AI systems to ensure that they are overseen by individuals with the necessary competence, training, authority, and support. Judicial institutions may look to judges who use the high-risk decision support systems they deploy to perform this oversight role. These judges are ‘in-the-loop’ in the sense that they review each output the system generates and decide whether to override, disregard, or defer to it. This article explores the implications of making judges-in-the-loop responsible for human oversight under the AI Act by assessing the unique professional responsibilities, skills, motivations, and biases they bring to the AI-supported decision-making process. It finds that the task of overseeing high-risk decision support systems is too big for judges-in-the-loop alone and proposes an alternative way of involving judges in human oversight that not only meets the AI Act’s requirements, but more reliably safeguards judicial values and fundamental rights.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaag001

AI Act

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Banks, I.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-12
T1  - Judges-in-the-loop? Judicial involvement in human oversight of high-risk decision support systems under the EU AI Act
JO  - International Journal of Law and Information Technology
VL  - 34
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaag001
AB  - The European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) requires institutions that deploy high-risk AI systems to ensure that they are overseen by individuals with the necessary competence, training, authority, and support. Judicial institutions may look to judges who use the high-risk decision support systems they deploy to perform this oversight role. These judges are ‘in-the-loop’ in the sense that they review each output the system generates and decide whether to override, disregard, or defer to it. This article explores the implications of making judges-in-the-loop responsible for human oversight under the AI Act by assessing the unique professional responsibilities, skills, motivations, and biases they bring to the AI-supported decision-making process. It finds that the task of overseeing high-risk decision support systems is too big for judges-in-the-loop alone and proposes an alternative way of involving judges in human oversight that not only meets the AI Act’s requirements, but more reliably safeguards judicial values and fundamental rights.
K1  - AI Act
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Judges-in-the-loop? Judicial involvement in human oversight of high-risk decision support systems under the EU AI Act},
	author = {Banks, I.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaag001},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-12},
	journal = {International Journal of Law and Information Technology},
	volume = {34},
	abstract = {The European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) requires institutions that deploy high-risk AI systems to ensure that they are overseen by individuals with the necessary competence, training, authority, and support. Judicial institutions may look to judges who use the high-risk decision support systems they deploy to perform this oversight role. These judges are ‘in-the-loop’ in the sense that they review each output the system generates and decide whether to override, disregard, or defer to it. This article explores the implications of making judges-in-the-loop responsible for human oversight under the AI Act by assessing the unique professional responsibilities, skills, motivations, and biases they bring to the AI-supported decision-making process. It finds that the task of overseeing high-risk decision support systems is too big for judges-in-the-loop alone and proposes an alternative way of involving judges in human oversight that not only meets the AI Act’s requirements, but more reliably safeguards judicial values and fundamental rights.},
	keywords = {AI Act},
}

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Music streaming debates series part 2: streaming and GenAI discussions in canon external link

Valk, E.G.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2026

Abstract

Part 1 of this series gave a general overview of the copyright-related discussions regarding streaming services from the last year. In Part 2, we will gain a clearer picture of the expected challenges for fair remuneration and control over one’s artistry created by new GenAI music services. Also, the implications for “good old” streaming services will be examined. Some concrete legal solutions will be proposed, while also highlighting uncertainties that remain.

Artificial intelligence, Copyright, music, remuneration, streaming services

RIS

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Is Upcycling Always Green – and Should It Be? Reconsidering the Rationale for Accommodating Upcycling within IP Law and Leveraging the Potential of Quotation and ‘Due Cause’ external link

Izyumenko, E.

2026

Abstract

Climate change has forced legal systems to question many of their long-standing assumptions, including the largely linear logic that continues to underpin intellectual property (IP) law. Existing scholarship has convincingly shown that copyright and trade mark laws often hinder circular practices such as repair and upcycling, prompting calls for greater flexibility or the ‘greenification’ of IP law. This article challenges a key premise of those proposals: that upcycling is inherently environmentally beneficial. The environmental value of upcycling is neither uniform nor self-evident, and in some contexts may be marginal or even adverse. This uncertainty raises a normative question: should accommodation of upcycling under IP law depend on demonstrated environmental benefit, or does upcycling embody a wider social value warranting protection irrespective of ecological impact? The article argues for the latter, developing a justificatory framework grounded not primarily in environmental sustainability, but in artistic freedom and cultural diversity. On this account, environmental benefits – where present – serve as reinforcing considerations rather than the foundation for legal reform. Building on this reframing, the article reassesses concerns about free-riding on IP holders’ rights and argues for a more calibrated balance between upcycling practices and the protection of legitimate IP interests. It then examines how this balance might be realised within existing EU IP law, focusing on the underexplored potential of the quotation exception in copyright law and the ‘due cause’ defence in trade mark law. By repositioning these defences within the sustainability discourse, the article seeks to broaden the tools available to courts and policymakers for aligning IP law with the social value of upcycling.

Copyright, Freedom of expression, Trademark law, upcycling

RIS

TY  - UNPD
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-02-04
T1  - Is Upcycling Always Green – and Should It Be? Reconsidering the Rationale for Accommodating Upcycling within IP Law and Leveraging the Potential of Quotation and ‘Due Cause’
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6176840
AB  - Climate change has forced legal systems to question many of their long-standing assumptions, including the largely linear logic that continues to underpin intellectual property (IP) law. Existing scholarship has convincingly shown that copyright and trade mark laws often hinder circular practices such as repair and upcycling, prompting calls for greater flexibility or the ‘greenification’ of IP law. This article challenges a key premise of those proposals: that upcycling is inherently environmentally beneficial. The environmental value of upcycling is neither uniform nor self-evident, and in some contexts may be marginal or even adverse.

This uncertainty raises a normative question: should accommodation of upcycling under IP law depend on demonstrated environmental benefit, or does upcycling embody a wider social value warranting protection irrespective of ecological impact? The article argues for the latter, developing a justificatory framework grounded not primarily in environmental sustainability, but in artistic freedom and cultural diversity. On this account, environmental benefits – where present – serve as reinforcing considerations rather than the foundation for legal reform.

Building on this reframing, the article reassesses concerns about free-riding on IP holders’ rights and argues for a more calibrated balance between upcycling practices and the protection of legitimate IP interests. It then examines how this balance might be realised within existing EU IP law, focusing on the underexplored potential of the quotation exception in copyright law and the ‘due cause’ defence in trade mark law. By repositioning these defences within the sustainability discourse, the article seeks to broaden the tools available to courts and policymakers for aligning IP law with the social value of upcycling.
K1  - Copyright
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Trademark law
K1  - upcycling
ER  -

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Bibtex

Working paper{nokey,
	title = {Is Upcycling Always Green – and Should It Be? Reconsidering the Rationale for Accommodating Upcycling within IP Law and Leveraging the Potential of Quotation and ‘Due Cause’},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-02-04},
	abstract = {Climate change has forced legal systems to question many of their long-standing assumptions, including the largely linear logic that continues to underpin intellectual property (IP) law. Existing scholarship has convincingly shown that copyright and trade mark laws often hinder circular practices such as repair and upcycling, prompting calls for greater flexibility or the ‘greenification’ of IP law. This article challenges a key premise of those proposals: that upcycling is inherently environmentally beneficial. The environmental value of upcycling is neither uniform nor self-evident, and in some contexts may be marginal or even adverse.

This uncertainty raises a normative question: should accommodation of upcycling under IP law depend on demonstrated environmental benefit, or does upcycling embody a wider social value warranting protection irrespective of ecological impact? The article argues for the latter, developing a justificatory framework grounded not primarily in environmental sustainability, but in artistic freedom and cultural diversity. On this account, environmental benefits – where present – serve as reinforcing considerations rather than the foundation for legal reform.

Building on this reframing, the article reassesses concerns about free-riding on IP holders’ rights and argues for a more calibrated balance between upcycling practices and the protection of legitimate IP interests. It then examines how this balance might be realised within existing EU IP law, focusing on the underexplored potential of the quotation exception in copyright law and the ‘due cause’ defence in trade mark law. By repositioning these defences within the sustainability discourse, the article seeks to broaden the tools available to courts and policymakers for aligning IP law with the social value of upcycling.},
	keywords = {Copyright, Freedom of expression, Trademark law, upcycling},
}

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The European Court of Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Still Waiting for the New Innovation Frontier? external link

Izyumenko, E.

GRUR International, 2026

Abstract

This article explores the influence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on intellectual property (IP) law through human rights methodologies. While Professor Laurence Helfer, in his seminal article published in 2008, identified the ECtHR as an emerging innovation frontier in Europe, the extent to which this prediction has come to fruition might seem debatable. Notably, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), rather than that of the ECtHR, has largely dominated discussions on the intersection of IP and human rights in Europe. As such, this article seeks to analyse the ECtHR’s contribution to – and its actual impact on – the human rights-based adjudication of IP issues. After a short introduction (I), it begins by examining the possible reasons behind the relative obscurity of ECtHR decisions in the European IP law discourse (II). It then focuses on the Strasbourg Court’s contribution to the development of human rights-based IP adjudication, demonstrating that, despite the limited engagement of IP community with the ECtHR, its jurisprudence has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in shaping European IP law norms (III). This influence is assessed by first exploring the ECtHR-developed approaches to resolving conflicts between IP protection and freedom of expression (III.1), followed by an examination of the Court’s recognition of IP rights as an integral part of the broader human right to property – an area that has seen considerable expansion, particularly in recent years (III.2). Based on this analysis, the article concludes that we are certainly not waiting anymore for the ECtHR to become a new innovation frontier – it has already become one, having formed itself as a significant, albeit often underappreciated, force in the European IP legal landscape, operating quietly but far more meaningfully than is commonly recognised (IV).

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikag004

Freedom of expression, Human rights, Intellectual property

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-01-22
T1  - The European Court of Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Still Waiting for the New Innovation Frontier?
JO  - GRUR International
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5375309
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikag004
AB  - This article explores the influence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on intellectual property (IP) law through human rights methodologies. While Professor Laurence Helfer, in his seminal article published in 2008, identified the ECtHR as an emerging innovation frontier in Europe, the extent to which this prediction has come to fruition might seem debatable. Notably, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), rather than that of the ECtHR, has largely dominated discussions on the intersection of IP and human rights in Europe. As such, this article seeks to analyse the ECtHR’s contribution to – and its actual impact on – the human rights-based adjudication of IP issues. After a short introduction (I), it begins by examining the possible reasons behind the relative obscurity of ECtHR decisions in the European IP law discourse (II). It then focuses on the Strasbourg Court’s contribution to the development of human rights-based IP adjudication, demonstrating that, despite the limited engagement of IP community with the ECtHR, its jurisprudence has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in shaping European IP law norms (III). This influence is assessed by first exploring the ECtHR-developed approaches to resolving conflicts between IP protection and freedom of expression (III.1), followed by an examination of the Court’s recognition of IP rights as an integral part of the broader human right to property – an area that has seen considerable expansion, particularly in recent years (III.2). Based on this analysis, the article concludes that we are certainly not waiting anymore for the ECtHR to become a new innovation frontier – it has already become one, having formed itself as a significant, albeit often underappreciated, force in the European IP legal landscape, operating quietly but far more meaningfully than is commonly recognised (IV).
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Human rights
K1  - Intellectual property
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {The European Court of Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Still Waiting for the New Innovation Frontier?},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikag004},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-01-22},
	journal = {GRUR International},
	abstract = {This article explores the influence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on intellectual property (IP) law through human rights methodologies. While Professor Laurence Helfer, in his seminal article published in 2008, identified the ECtHR as an emerging innovation frontier in Europe, the extent to which this prediction has come to fruition might seem debatable. Notably, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), rather than that of the ECtHR, has largely dominated discussions on the intersection of IP and human rights in Europe. As such, this article seeks to analyse the ECtHR’s contribution to – and its actual impact on – the human rights-based adjudication of IP issues. After a short introduction (I), it begins by examining the possible reasons behind the relative obscurity of ECtHR decisions in the European IP law discourse (II). It then focuses on the Strasbourg Court’s contribution to the development of human rights-based IP adjudication, demonstrating that, despite the limited engagement of IP community with the ECtHR, its jurisprudence has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in shaping European IP law norms (III). This influence is assessed by first exploring the ECtHR-developed approaches to resolving conflicts between IP protection and freedom of expression (III.1), followed by an examination of the Court’s recognition of IP rights as an integral part of the broader human right to property – an area that has seen considerable expansion, particularly in recent years (III.2). Based on this analysis, the article concludes that we are certainly not waiting anymore for the ECtHR to become a new innovation frontier – it has already become one, having formed itself as a significant, albeit often underappreciated, force in the European IP legal landscape, operating quietly but far more meaningfully than is commonly recognised (IV).},
	keywords = {Freedom of expression, Human rights, Intellectual property},
}

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Procedural Justice and Judicial AI: Substantiating Explainability Rights with the Values of Contestation external link

Metikoš, L. & Domselaar, I. van

Journal of Human-Technology Relations, vol. 3, iss. : 1, pp: 1-34, 2025

Abstract

The advent of opaque assistive AI in courtrooms has raised concerns about the contestability of these systems, and their impact on procedural justice. The right to an explanation under the GDPR and the AI Act could address the inscrutability of judicial AIfor litigants. To substantiate this right in the domain of justice, we examine utilitarian, rights-based (including dignitarian and Dworkinian approaches), and relational theories of procedural justice. These theories reveal diverse perspectives on contestation, which can help shape explainability rights in the context of judicial AI. These theories respectively highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting litigants’ dignity, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. These insights help us answer three central and practical questions on how the right to an explanation should be operationalized to enable litigant contestation: should explanations be general or specific, to what extent do explanations need to be faithful to the system’s internal behavior or merely provide a plausible approximation, and should more interpretable systems be used, even at the cost of accuracy? These questions are notstrictly legal or technical in nature, but also rely on normative considerations. Finally, this paper also evaluateswhat theory of procedural justice could best safeguard contestation effectively in the age of judicial AI.Thereto, itprovides the first building blocks of an AI-responsive theory of procedural justice.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.59490/jhtr.2025.3.8163

RIS

TY  - GEN
AU  - Metikoš, L.
AU  - Domselaar, I. van
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-12-30
T1  - Procedural Justice and Judicial AI: Substantiating Explainability Rights with the Values of Contestation
JO  - Journal of Human-Technology Relations
VL  - 3
IS  - 1
SP  - 1-34
UR  - https://journals.open.tudelft.nl/jhtr/article/view/8163/6486
DO  - https://doi.org/10.59490/jhtr.2025.3.8163
AB  - The advent of opaque assistive AI in courtrooms has raised concerns about the contestability of these systems, and their impact on procedural justice. The right to an explanation under the GDPR and the AI Act could address the inscrutability of judicial AIfor litigants. To substantiate this right in the domain of justice, we examine utilitarian, rights-based (including dignitarian and Dworkinian approaches), and relational theories of procedural justice. These theories reveal diverse perspectives on contestation, which can help shape explainability rights in the context of judicial AI. These theories respectively highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting litigants’ dignity, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. These insights help us answer three central and practical questions on how the right to an explanation should be operationalized to enable litigant contestation: should explanations be general or specific, to what extent do explanations need to be faithful to the system’s internal behavior or merely provide a plausible approximation, and should more interpretable systems be used, even at the cost of accuracy? These questions are notstrictly legal or technical in nature, but also rely on normative considerations. Finally, this paper also evaluateswhat theory of procedural justice could best safeguard contestation effectively in the age of judicial AI.Thereto, itprovides the first building blocks of an AI-responsive theory of procedural justice.
ER  -

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Bibtex

article{nokey,
	title = {Procedural Justice and Judicial AI: Substantiating Explainability Rights with the Values of Contestation},
	author = {Metikoš, L. and Domselaar, I. van},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.59490/jhtr.2025.3.8163},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-12-30},
	journal = {Journal of Human-Technology Relations},
	volume = {3},
	issue = {1},
	pages = {1-34},
	abstract = {The advent of opaque assistive AI in courtrooms has raised concerns about the contestability of these systems, and their impact on procedural justice. The right to an explanation under the GDPR and the AI Act could address the inscrutability of judicial AIfor litigants. To substantiate this right in the domain of justice, we examine utilitarian, rights-based (including dignitarian and Dworkinian approaches), and relational theories of procedural justice. These theories reveal diverse perspectives on contestation, which can help shape explainability rights in the context of judicial AI. These theories respectively highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting litigants’ dignity, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. These insights help us answer three central and practical questions on how the right to an explanation should be operationalized to enable litigant contestation: should explanations be general or specific, to what extent do explanations need to be faithful to the system’s internal behavior or merely provide a plausible approximation, and should more interpretable systems be used, even at the cost of accuracy? These questions are notstrictly legal or technical in nature, but also rely on normative considerations. Finally, this paper also evaluateswhat theory of procedural justice could best safeguard contestation effectively in the age of judicial AI.Thereto, itprovides the first building blocks of an AI-responsive theory of procedural justice.},
}

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VPNs, Copyright Territoriality, and Why Borders Still Matter Online: AG Rantos’ Opinion in Anne Frank Fonds (C-788/24) external link

Izyumenko, E.

Copyright, territoriality

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