Business-to-government datadelen via een derde. Onderzoek naar een generiek juridisch-technisch data governance raamwerk

Business-to-government datadelen via een derde. Onderzoek naar een generiek juridisch-technisch data governance raamwerk download

working paper, 2025

Abstract

Bedrijven bezitten gegevens die een (lokale) overheid kunnen helpen een meer accuraat en evidence-based beleid te vormen en uit te voeren. Bestaat er een werkwijze waarop een gemeente toegang kan verkrijgen tot gegevens die bedrijven bezitten, en kunnen gemeenten die vervolgens op verantwoorde wijze verwerken zonder de rechten, belangen en het vertrouwen van de betrokken bedrijven, consumenten en burgers te beperken of te schaden? Op dit moment vindt business-to-government gegevensdeling (‘B2G’) op beperkte schaal plaats, en voor zover het al gebeurt, geschiedt het veelal op ad hoc basis. Een dergelijke onsystematische toegang tot gegevens is problematisch omdat deze een meer georganiseerde en voorspelbare ondersteuning van accuraat, evidence-based beleid kan belemmeren. De EU-wetgever heeft wetgeving aangenomen (Data Act) om B2G een kader te bieden, maar dat biedt nog niet de gewenste duidelijkheid – noch voor gemeenten, noch voor bedrijven. Bedrijven zijn terughoudend met het delen van gegevens, omdat met gegevens economische, technische, politieke en juridische risico’s gemoeid zijn. Deze en andere hindernissen zouden deels mogelijk kunnen worden overkomen door het delen van de gegevens te laten verlopen via een derde partij die erop gericht is de gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven en de gemeente op een juridisch correcte wijze en daarmee betrouwbare manier te (laten) delen. Deze derde, die we ‘data intermediary’ noemen mag, teneinde een dergelijke dienst aan bedrijven als de gemeente te kunnen bieden, deze gegevens alleen delen volgens een toegankelijk, transparant en handhaafbaar en specifiek op de situatie gericht juridisch data governance regime. De onlangs in werking getreden EU-Data Governanceverordening (‘DGA’) biedt data intermediaries enkele normen, maar nog geen sluitend data governance regime. Omdat er geen sluitende regelgeving is voor een dergelijk data govenance regime voor B2G via een data intermediary (B2G3P) dat de rechten en belangen van alle belanghebbenden, met name van hen die hun gegevens beschikbaar stellen, op juridische wijze reguleert, onderzoek ik in deze paper of een generiek data governance raamwerk ontwikkeld kan worden, dat juridische, organisatorische en technische voorwaarden die aan een dergelijk raamwerk moeten worden gesteld, op adequate wijze waar kan maken. We concluderen voorlopig het volgende: i. een geschikt generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk dient de juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aard van gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven, lokale overheden en de data intermediary op passende wijze te reguleren; ii. dat de EU-wetgeving enkele grondlijnen maar geen sluitend kader voor een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk biedt; iii. dat bestaande wetgeving op coherente en consistente wijze moet worden toegepast maar dat dit rechtsonzekerheid met zich meebrengt voor lokale overheden; en iv. dat bij het ontwikkelen van een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk een effectieve mix van juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aspecten moet worden geadresseerd en dat daarvoor passende socio-technische mechanismen moeten worden ontworpen.

Links

Working Paper Generiek juridisch kader voor B2G

RIS

TY  - UNPD
AU  - Janssen, H.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-12-16
T1  - Business-to-government datadelen via een derde. Onderzoek naar een generiek juridisch-technisch data governance raamwerk
JO  - working paper
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publications/business-to-government-datadelen-via-een-derde-onderzoek-naar-een-generiek-juridisch-technisch-data-governance-raamwerk/working-paper-generiek-juridisch-kader-voor-b2g/
AB  - Bedrijven bezitten gegevens die een (lokale) overheid kunnen helpen een meer accuraat en evidence-based beleid te vormen en uit te voeren. Bestaat er een werkwijze waarop een gemeente toegang kan verkrijgen tot gegevens die bedrijven bezitten, en kunnen gemeenten die vervolgens op verantwoorde wijze verwerken zonder de rechten, belangen en het vertrouwen van de betrokken bedrijven, consumenten en burgers te beperken of te schaden? Op dit moment vindt business-to-government gegevensdeling (‘B2G’) op beperkte schaal plaats, en voor zover het al gebeurt, geschiedt het veelal op ad hoc basis. Een dergelijke onsystematische toegang tot gegevens is problematisch omdat deze een meer georganiseerde en voorspelbare ondersteuning van accuraat, evidence-based beleid kan belemmeren. De EU-wetgever heeft wetgeving aangenomen (Data Act) om B2G een kader te bieden, maar dat biedt nog niet de gewenste duidelijkheid – noch voor gemeenten, noch voor bedrijven.
Bedrijven zijn terughoudend met het delen van gegevens, omdat met gegevens economische, technische, politieke en juridische risico’s gemoeid zijn. Deze en andere hindernissen zouden deels mogelijk kunnen worden overkomen door het delen van de gegevens te laten verlopen via een derde partij die erop gericht is de gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven en de gemeente op een juridisch correcte wijze en daarmee betrouwbare manier te (laten) delen. Deze derde, die we ‘data intermediary’ noemen mag, teneinde een dergelijke dienst aan bedrijven als de gemeente te kunnen bieden, deze gegevens alleen delen volgens een toegankelijk, transparant en handhaafbaar en specifiek op de situatie gericht juridisch data governance regime. De onlangs in werking getreden EU-Data Governanceverordening (‘DGA’) biedt data intermediaries enkele normen, maar nog geen sluitend data governance regime. 
Omdat er geen sluitende regelgeving is voor een dergelijk data govenance regime voor B2G via een data intermediary (B2G3P) dat de rechten en belangen van alle belanghebbenden, met name van hen die hun gegevens beschikbaar stellen, op juridische wijze reguleert, onderzoek ik in deze paper of een generiek data governance raamwerk ontwikkeld kan worden, dat juridische, organisatorische en technische voorwaarden die aan een dergelijk raamwerk moeten worden gesteld, op adequate wijze waar kan maken. We concluderen voorlopig het volgende:
i.	een geschikt generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk dient de juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aard van gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven, lokale overheden en de data intermediary op passende wijze te reguleren; 
ii.	dat de EU-wetgeving enkele grondlijnen maar geen sluitend kader voor een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk biedt; 
iii.	dat bestaande wetgeving op coherente en consistente wijze moet worden toegepast maar dat dit rechtsonzekerheid met zich meebrengt voor lokale overheden; en
iv.	dat bij het ontwikkelen van een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk een effectieve mix van juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aspecten moet worden geadresseerd en dat daarvoor passende socio-technische mechanismen moeten worden ontworpen.
ER  -

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Bibtex

Working paper{nokey,
	title = {Business-to-government datadelen via een derde. Onderzoek naar een generiek juridisch-technisch data governance raamwerk},
	author = {Janssen, H.},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-12-16},
	journal = {working paper},
	abstract = {Bedrijven bezitten gegevens die een (lokale) overheid kunnen helpen een meer accuraat en evidence-based beleid te vormen en uit te voeren. Bestaat er een werkwijze waarop een gemeente toegang kan verkrijgen tot gegevens die bedrijven bezitten, en kunnen gemeenten die vervolgens op verantwoorde wijze verwerken zonder de rechten, belangen en het vertrouwen van de betrokken bedrijven, consumenten en burgers te beperken of te schaden? Op dit moment vindt business-to-government gegevensdeling (‘B2G’) op beperkte schaal plaats, en voor zover het al gebeurt, geschiedt het veelal op ad hoc basis. Een dergelijke onsystematische toegang tot gegevens is problematisch omdat deze een meer georganiseerde en voorspelbare ondersteuning van accuraat, evidence-based beleid kan belemmeren. De EU-wetgever heeft wetgeving aangenomen (Data Act) om B2G een kader te bieden, maar dat biedt nog niet de gewenste duidelijkheid – noch voor gemeenten, noch voor bedrijven.
Bedrijven zijn terughoudend met het delen van gegevens, omdat met gegevens economische, technische, politieke en juridische risico’s gemoeid zijn. Deze en andere hindernissen zouden deels mogelijk kunnen worden overkomen door het delen van de gegevens te laten verlopen via een derde partij die erop gericht is de gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven en de gemeente op een juridisch correcte wijze en daarmee betrouwbare manier te (laten) delen. Deze derde, die we ‘data intermediary’ noemen mag, teneinde een dergelijke dienst aan bedrijven als de gemeente te kunnen bieden, deze gegevens alleen delen volgens een toegankelijk, transparant en handhaafbaar en specifiek op de situatie gericht juridisch data governance regime. De onlangs in werking getreden EU-Data Governanceverordening (‘DGA’) biedt data intermediaries enkele normen, maar nog geen sluitend data governance regime. 
Omdat er geen sluitende regelgeving is voor een dergelijk data govenance regime voor B2G via een data intermediary (B2G3P) dat de rechten en belangen van alle belanghebbenden, met name van hen die hun gegevens beschikbaar stellen, op juridische wijze reguleert, onderzoek ik in deze paper of een generiek data governance raamwerk ontwikkeld kan worden, dat juridische, organisatorische en technische voorwaarden die aan een dergelijk raamwerk moeten worden gesteld, op adequate wijze waar kan maken. We concluderen voorlopig het volgende:
i.	een geschikt generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk dient de juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aard van gegevensdeling tussen bedrijven, lokale overheden en de data intermediary op passende wijze te reguleren; 
ii.	dat de EU-wetgeving enkele grondlijnen maar geen sluitend kader voor een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk biedt; 
iii.	dat bestaande wetgeving op coherente en consistente wijze moet worden toegepast maar dat dit rechtsonzekerheid met zich meebrengt voor lokale overheden; en
iv.	dat bij het ontwikkelen van een generiek juridisch data governance raamwerk een effectieve mix van juridische, organisatorische en technische (‘socio-technische’) aspecten moet worden geadresseerd en dat daarvoor passende socio-technische mechanismen moeten worden ontworpen.},
}

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‘Must-carry’, special treatment and freedom of expression on online platforms: a European story external link

Kuczerawy, A. & Quintais, J.

European Law Open, pp: 1-34, 2025

Abstract

This paper examines the evolution and implications of ‘must-carry’ obligations in the regulation of online platforms, with a focus on Europe. These obligations, which restrict platforms’ discretion to remove or deprioritise certain content, represent a novel regulatory response to the growing power of platforms in shaping public discourse. The analysis traces developments at EU and national levels. At the EU level, it considers rejected must-carry proposals during the drafting of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the adoption of Article 18 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which grants privileges to recognised media service providers. At the national level, it examines Germany’s prohibition on content discrimination, the UK’s Online Safety Act, and Poland’s abandoned legislative proposal on freedom of expression online. Case law from courts in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Poland further illustrates the emergence of judicially crafted duties resembling must-carry obligations. The paper argues that these measures are best understood as special treatment rules that privilege particular speakers, notably media organisations and politicians, by limiting platform autonomy in content moderation. While intended to safeguard pluralism and access to trustworthy information, such rules risk creating a two-tier system of expression in which established voices receive disproportionate protection while ordinary users remain vulnerable. Protections for politicians raise concerns about shielding powerful actors from justified moderation, whereas media privileges, though more defensible, remain limited in scope and potentially counterproductive, especially when exploited by outlets disseminating disinformation. The conclusion is that compelled inclusion and preferential treatment are unlikely to offer sustainable solutions to the structural imbalances between platforms, media providers, and politicians. More durable approaches should focus on strengthening journalism through financial and structural support, fostering innovation and local media, and prioritising user empowerment measures. Only systemic safeguards of this kind can effectively promote pluralism, accountability, and resilience in the digital public sphere.

Links

Digital Services Act (DSA), European Media Freedom Act, Freedom of expression, must carry, platform regulation

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kuczerawy, A.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-12-15
T1  - ‘Must-carry’, special treatment and freedom of expression on online platforms: a European story
JO  - European Law Open
SP  - 1-34
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2025.10046
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2025.10046
AB  - This paper examines the evolution and implications of ‘must-carry’ obligations in the regulation of online platforms, with a focus on Europe. These obligations, which restrict platforms’ discretion to remove or deprioritise certain content, represent a novel regulatory response to the growing power of platforms in shaping public discourse. The analysis traces developments at EU and national levels. At the EU level, it considers rejected must-carry proposals during the drafting of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the adoption of Article 18 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which grants privileges to recognised media service providers. At the national level, it examines Germany’s prohibition on content discrimination, the UK’s Online Safety Act, and Poland’s abandoned legislative proposal on freedom of expression online. Case law from courts in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Poland further illustrates the emergence of judicially crafted duties resembling must-carry obligations. The paper argues that these measures are best understood as special treatment rules that privilege particular speakers, notably media organisations and politicians, by limiting platform autonomy in content moderation. While intended to safeguard pluralism and access to trustworthy information, such rules risk creating a two-tier system of expression in which established voices receive disproportionate protection while ordinary users remain vulnerable. Protections for politicians raise concerns about shielding powerful actors from justified moderation, whereas media privileges, though more defensible, remain limited in scope and potentially counterproductive, especially when exploited by outlets disseminating disinformation. The conclusion is that compelled inclusion and preferential treatment are unlikely to offer sustainable solutions to the structural imbalances between platforms, media providers, and politicians. More durable approaches should focus on strengthening journalism through financial and structural support, fostering innovation and local media, and prioritising user empowerment measures. Only systemic safeguards of this kind can effectively promote pluralism, accountability, and resilience in the digital public sphere.
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - European Media Freedom Act
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - must carry
K1  - platform regulation
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {‘Must-carry’, special treatment and freedom of expression on online platforms: a European story},
	author = {Kuczerawy, A. and Quintais, J.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2025.10046},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-12-15},
	journal = {European Law Open},
	pages = {1-34},
	abstract = {This paper examines the evolution and implications of ‘must-carry’ obligations in the regulation of online platforms, with a focus on Europe. These obligations, which restrict platforms’ discretion to remove or deprioritise certain content, represent a novel regulatory response to the growing power of platforms in shaping public discourse. The analysis traces developments at EU and national levels. At the EU level, it considers rejected must-carry proposals during the drafting of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the adoption of Article 18 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which grants privileges to recognised media service providers. At the national level, it examines Germany’s prohibition on content discrimination, the UK’s Online Safety Act, and Poland’s abandoned legislative proposal on freedom of expression online. Case law from courts in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Poland further illustrates the emergence of judicially crafted duties resembling must-carry obligations. The paper argues that these measures are best understood as special treatment rules that privilege particular speakers, notably media organisations and politicians, by limiting platform autonomy in content moderation. While intended to safeguard pluralism and access to trustworthy information, such rules risk creating a two-tier system of expression in which established voices receive disproportionate protection while ordinary users remain vulnerable. Protections for politicians raise concerns about shielding powerful actors from justified moderation, whereas media privileges, though more defensible, remain limited in scope and potentially counterproductive, especially when exploited by outlets disseminating disinformation. The conclusion is that compelled inclusion and preferential treatment are unlikely to offer sustainable solutions to the structural imbalances between platforms, media providers, and politicians. More durable approaches should focus on strengthening journalism through financial and structural support, fostering innovation and local media, and prioritising user empowerment measures. Only systemic safeguards of this kind can effectively promote pluralism, accountability, and resilience in the digital public sphere.},
	keywords = {Digital Services Act (DSA), European Media Freedom Act, Freedom of expression, must carry, platform regulation},
}

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Author remuneration in the streaming age – exploitation rights and fair remuneration rules in the EU external link

Senftleben, M. & Izyumenko, E.

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 20, iss. : 12, pp: 807–824, 2025

Abstract

The shift from linear to on-demand consumption of copyright content on platforms like Spotify, Netflix and YouTube raises the question of whether authors and performers receive a fair share of streaming revenues. While industry rights holders have the opportunity to control access to protected content, it is often not the creators themselves who benefit from growing streaming revenue. The issue is global. In the EU, debates over the 2019 Copyright Directive led to harmonized rules on fair author remuneration. In 2023, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries urged the World Intellectual Property Organization to analyse creators’ earnings from digital content. South Africa followed suit with its Copyright Amendment Bill in 2024. Together, these regional, international and national initiatives underscore the central role of remuneration in today’s copyright and streaming debates. This analysis focuses on the EU legal framework, which provides mechanisms to secure fair remuneration for authors and performers. These include rules for licensing agreements – such as contract adjustments, transparency obligations, revocation rights and jurisdiction norms – as well as a liability regime for user-generated content encouraging rights clearance. Mandatory collective licensing and remunerated copyright exceptions also help generate revenue for creators. Section I lays the groundwork for the discussion of these legal instruments. Section II reviews exclusive rights applicable to streaming. Section III describes the different legal mechanisms to ensure creators’ fair remuneration – from individual and mandatory collective licensing to remunerated copyright exceptions. Section IV explores producers’ bargaining power in streaming platform contexts, and Section V summarizes the results.

Links

Copyright, EU, exploitation, remuneration, streaming services

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Senftleben, M.
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-12-16
T1  - Author remuneration in the streaming age – exploitation rights and fair remuneration rules in the EU
JO  - Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice
VL  - 20
IS  - 12
SP  - 807–824
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpaf071
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpaf071
AB  - The shift from linear to on-demand consumption of copyright content on platforms like Spotify, Netflix and YouTube raises the question of whether authors and performers receive a fair share of streaming revenues. While industry rights holders have the opportunity to control access to protected content, it is often not the creators themselves who benefit from growing streaming revenue.

The issue is global. In the EU, debates over the 2019 Copyright Directive led to harmonized rules on fair author remuneration. In 2023, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries urged the World Intellectual Property Organization to analyse creators’ earnings from digital content. South Africa followed suit with its Copyright Amendment Bill in 2024. Together, these regional, international and national initiatives underscore the central role of remuneration in today’s copyright and streaming debates.

This analysis focuses on the EU legal framework, which provides mechanisms to secure fair remuneration for authors and performers. These include rules for licensing agreements – such as contract adjustments, transparency obligations, revocation rights and jurisdiction norms – as well as a liability regime for user-generated content encouraging rights clearance. Mandatory collective licensing and remunerated copyright exceptions also help generate revenue for creators. Section I lays the groundwork for the discussion of these legal instruments. Section II reviews exclusive rights applicable to streaming. Section III describes the different legal mechanisms to ensure creators’ fair remuneration – from individual and mandatory collective licensing to remunerated copyright exceptions. Section IV explores producers’ bargaining power in streaming platform contexts, and Section V summarizes the results.
K1  - Copyright
K1  - EU
K1  - exploitation
K1  - remuneration
K1  - streaming services
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Author remuneration in the streaming age – exploitation rights and fair remuneration rules in the EU},
	author = {Senftleben, M. and Izyumenko, E.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpaf071},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-12-16},
	journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice},
	volume = {20},
	issue = {12},
	pages = {807–824},
	abstract = {The shift from linear to on-demand consumption of copyright content on platforms like Spotify, Netflix and YouTube raises the question of whether authors and performers receive a fair share of streaming revenues. While industry rights holders have the opportunity to control access to protected content, it is often not the creators themselves who benefit from growing streaming revenue.

The issue is global. In the EU, debates over the 2019 Copyright Directive led to harmonized rules on fair author remuneration. In 2023, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries urged the World Intellectual Property Organization to analyse creators’ earnings from digital content. South Africa followed suit with its Copyright Amendment Bill in 2024. Together, these regional, international and national initiatives underscore the central role of remuneration in today’s copyright and streaming debates.

This analysis focuses on the EU legal framework, which provides mechanisms to secure fair remuneration for authors and performers. These include rules for licensing agreements – such as contract adjustments, transparency obligations, revocation rights and jurisdiction norms – as well as a liability regime for user-generated content encouraging rights clearance. Mandatory collective licensing and remunerated copyright exceptions also help generate revenue for creators. Section I lays the groundwork for the discussion of these legal instruments. Section II reviews exclusive rights applicable to streaming. Section III describes the different legal mechanisms to ensure creators’ fair remuneration – from individual and mandatory collective licensing to remunerated copyright exceptions. Section IV explores producers’ bargaining power in streaming platform contexts, and Section V summarizes the results.},
	keywords = {Copyright, EU, exploitation, remuneration, streaming services},
}

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Fundamental Rights in Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement under the Digital Services Act external link

Ruschemeier, H. & Quintais, J.

2025

Abstract

This paper argues that certified out-of-court dispute settlement (ODS) bodies under Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) should apply a structured fundamental rights review to platform content moderation, operationalised through the concept of case salience. Situating ODS within the DSA's broader regulatory architecture-particularly Articles 14(4), 17, and 20-the paper contends that Article 21 provides the procedural complement to Article 14(4)'s substantive duty to enforce terms of service "diligently, objectively and proportionately, with due regard to fundamental rights." Rather than extending the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) horizontally in a direct sense, ODS bodies give effect to Charter-conforming statutory obligations owed by platforms, interpreted in light of Article 52(1) CFR. Drawing on jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and national courts, the paper shows how freedom of expression and information interacts with countervailing rights-such as the freedom to conduct a business, privacy and data protection, and human dignity-in the context of online moderation. It proposes an intensity-of-review model: a deeper, meritsbased proportionality analysis for high-impact cases (e.g. political speech, account suspensions, issues of systemic relevance), and a lighter, procedural-sufficiency check for routine disputes. The paper emphasises that ODS remains non-judicial and operates without prejudice to Article 47 CFR and the availability of national court remedies. Over time, reasoned ODS decisions could evolve into a body of soft law, enhancing consistency and transparency in platform accountability. Ultimately, ODS bodies under the DSA represent a novel experiment in multi-actor rights protection. Their success will depend on whether they can reconcile accessibility, efficiency, and rights-based rigour, ensuring that content moderation in Europe evolves in line with the constitutional values of the Charter.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5900422

Content moderation, Digital Services Act (DSA), Fundamental rights

RIS

TY  - UNPD
AU  - Ruschemeier, H.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-12-10
T1  - Fundamental Rights in Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement under the Digital Services Act
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5900422
AB  - This paper argues that certified out-of-court dispute settlement (ODS) bodies under Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) should apply a structured fundamental rights review to platform content moderation, operationalised through the concept of case salience. Situating ODS within the DSA\'s broader regulatory architecture-particularly Articles 14(4), 17, and 20-the paper contends that Article 21 provides the procedural complement to Article 14(4)\'s substantive duty to enforce terms of service \"diligently, objectively and proportionately, with due regard to fundamental rights.\" Rather than extending the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) horizontally in a direct sense, ODS bodies give effect to Charter-conforming statutory obligations owed by platforms, interpreted in light of Article 52(1) CFR. Drawing on jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and national courts, the paper shows how freedom of expression and information interacts with countervailing rights-such as the freedom to conduct a business, privacy and data protection, and human dignity-in the context of online moderation. It proposes an intensity-of-review model: a deeper, meritsbased proportionality analysis for high-impact cases (e.g. political speech, account suspensions, issues of systemic relevance), and a lighter, procedural-sufficiency check for routine disputes. The paper emphasises that ODS remains non-judicial and operates without prejudice to Article 47 CFR and the availability of national court remedies. Over time, reasoned ODS decisions could evolve into a body of soft law, enhancing consistency and transparency in platform accountability. Ultimately, ODS bodies under the DSA represent a novel experiment in multi-actor rights protection. Their success will depend on whether they can reconcile accessibility, efficiency, and rights-based rigour, ensuring that content moderation in Europe evolves in line with the constitutional values of the Charter.
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - Fundamental rights
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Working paper{nokey,
	title = {Fundamental Rights in Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement under the Digital Services Act},
	author = {Ruschemeier, H. and Quintais, J.},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-12-10},
	abstract = {This paper argues that certified out-of-court dispute settlement (ODS) bodies under Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) should apply a structured fundamental rights review to platform content moderation, operationalised through the concept of case salience. Situating ODS within the DSA\'s broader regulatory architecture-particularly Articles 14(4), 17, and 20-the paper contends that Article 21 provides the procedural complement to Article 14(4)\'s substantive duty to enforce terms of service \"diligently, objectively and proportionately, with due regard to fundamental rights.\" Rather than extending the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) horizontally in a direct sense, ODS bodies give effect to Charter-conforming statutory obligations owed by platforms, interpreted in light of Article 52(1) CFR. Drawing on jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and national courts, the paper shows how freedom of expression and information interacts with countervailing rights-such as the freedom to conduct a business, privacy and data protection, and human dignity-in the context of online moderation. It proposes an intensity-of-review model: a deeper, meritsbased proportionality analysis for high-impact cases (e.g. political speech, account suspensions, issues of systemic relevance), and a lighter, procedural-sufficiency check for routine disputes. The paper emphasises that ODS remains non-judicial and operates without prejudice to Article 47 CFR and the availability of national court remedies. Over time, reasoned ODS decisions could evolve into a body of soft law, enhancing consistency and transparency in platform accountability. Ultimately, ODS bodies under the DSA represent a novel experiment in multi-actor rights protection. Their success will depend on whether they can reconcile accessibility, efficiency, and rights-based rigour, ensuring that content moderation in Europe evolves in line with the constitutional values of the Charter.},
	keywords = {Content moderation, Digital Services Act (DSA), Fundamental rights},
}

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Music streaming debates 2025 roundup: wrap-up for the streaming services as we know them? – Part 1 external link

Valk, E.G.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2025

Links

https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/copyright-blog/music-streaming-debates-2025-roundup-wrap-up-for-the-streaming-services-as-we-know-them-part-1/

Copyright, music, streaming services

RIS

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Bibtex

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Reconciling EU Copyright Protection With the Right to Research: Why We Need a General Research Exemption (Now!) external link

Senftleben, M.

Verfassungsblog, 2025

Links

https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-copyright-protection-right-to-research/

Copyright, right to research

RIS

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Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond external link

Izyumenko, E.

2025

Abstract

This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5783265

Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-11-25
T1  - Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5783265
AB  - This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Political speech
K1  - Trademark law
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Trademark Law and Political Expression: The Case of IKEA v. Vlaams Belang and Beyond},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-11-25},
	abstract = {This article offers a comprehensive exploration of the evolving interface between trademark law and freedom of political expression in Europe, using the CJEU case IKEA v. Vlaams Belang as a focal but not exhaustive case study. It argues that the dispute exemplifies a much broader and increasingly urgent structural question: how EU trademark law – especially in its protection of reputed marks – can be reconciled with the constitutional commitments to political speech, artistic creativity, and democratic participation embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Against a backdrop of the expanding preliminary infringement criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”, as well as the uniquely far-reaching Benelux “super anti-dilution” regime, the article demonstrates that “due cause” has become the principal doctrinal locus for internalising freedom-of-expression concerns within trademark law. Drawing on Strasbourg jurisprudence, it develops a holistic framework for a free-speech-conforming interpretation of “due cause”, analysing both the criteria suggested by the Belgian referring court and additional factors central to the European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality review, including commerciality, the value of political speech and artistic expression, the reputation of the mark and the power of corporate symbols, availability of alternatives, tolerance for offensive expression, the limits imposed by hate speech, and the compelled speech doctrine. The article concludes that failing to interpret “due cause” in a speech-sensitive way would risk enabling trademark rights to override core democratic freedoms.},
	keywords = {Freedom of expression, Political speech, Trademark law},
}

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The Obligations of Providers of General-Purpose AI Models external link

Veale, M. & Quintais, J.

Fortcoming in: Zanfir Fortuna, Malgieri, González Fuster and Mantelero (eds.) The Artificial Intelligence Act — A Thematic Commentary, Hart Publishing, 2026. This version: November , 2025

Abstract

During the legislative process, the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act was amended to include provisions related to general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. These broadly relate to transparency towards downstream users and relevant regulators, in addition to obligations connected to intellectual property. In this paper, we provide detailed analysis of these new provisions in the context of current technological applications and emerging trajectories, connecting them to computing literature and practice, and the broader context of connected and adjacent legal regimes, in particular copyright and relevant emerging case law. We find that there are a significant number of inclarities, tensions and contradictions both within the text, between the text and other legal regimes, and between the text and guideline documents, such as the Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI and recent guidelines by the European Commission. We identify a range of issues with the scoping of the provisions which may undermine its policy goals and create loopholes for regulatory avoidance, such as those relating to non-commercial models, open-source models, and model finetuning along the value chain. We find that the Code of Practice contains significant omissions and misstatements, some of which may present a compliance risk for an entity choosing to rely on the Code. We do not consider the provisions on GPAI models which present a systemic risk, which are dealt with elsewhere in the volume which this work will form a part of.

Links

AI Act, code of practice, Copyright, Transparency

RIS

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Veale, M.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-11-17
T1  - The Obligations of Providers of General-Purpose AI Models
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5744602
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5744602
AB  - During the legislative process, the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act was amended to include provisions related to general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. These broadly relate to transparency towards downstream users and relevant regulators, in addition to obligations connected to intellectual property. In this paper, we provide detailed analysis of these new provisions in the context of current technological applications and emerging trajectories, connecting them to computing literature and practice, and the broader context of connected and adjacent legal regimes, in particular copyright and relevant emerging case law. We find that there are a significant number of inclarities, tensions and contradictions both within the text, between the text and other legal regimes, and between the text and guideline documents, such as the Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI and recent guidelines by the European Commission. We identify a range of issues with the scoping of the provisions which may undermine its policy goals and create loopholes for regulatory avoidance, such as those relating to non-commercial models, open-source models, and model finetuning along the value chain. We find that the Code of Practice contains significant omissions and misstatements, some of which may present a compliance risk for an entity choosing to rely on the Code. We do not consider the provisions on GPAI models which present a systemic risk, which are dealt with elsewhere in the volume which this work will form a part of.
K1  - AI Act
K1  - code of practice
K1  - Copyright
K1  - Transparency
ER  -

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Bibtex

Chapter{nokey,
	title = {The Obligations of Providers of General-Purpose AI Models},
	author = {Veale, M. and Quintais, J.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5744602},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-11-17},
	abstract = {During the legislative process, the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act was amended to include provisions related to general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. These broadly relate to transparency towards downstream users and relevant regulators, in addition to obligations connected to intellectual property. In this paper, we provide detailed analysis of these new provisions in the context of current technological applications and emerging trajectories, connecting them to computing literature and practice, and the broader context of connected and adjacent legal regimes, in particular copyright and relevant emerging case law. We find that there are a significant number of inclarities, tensions and contradictions both within the text, between the text and other legal regimes, and between the text and guideline documents, such as the Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI and recent guidelines by the European Commission. We identify a range of issues with the scoping of the provisions which may undermine its policy goals and create loopholes for regulatory avoidance, such as those relating to non-commercial models, open-source models, and model finetuning along the value chain. We find that the Code of Practice contains significant omissions and misstatements, some of which may present a compliance risk for an entity choosing to rely on the Code. We do not consider the provisions on GPAI models which present a systemic risk, which are dealt with elsewhere in the volume which this work will form a part of.},
	keywords = {AI Act, code of practice, Copyright, Transparency},
}

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Tokenistic Decentralisation or Non-Tokenistic Distributism: Capitalist Blockchain Narratives and Varoufakis’s Alternative external link

Smethurst, R., Barbereau, T. & Bodó, B.

Triple C: Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society, vol. 23, iss. : 2, pp: 320-337, 2025

Abstract

Yanis Varoufakis wrote a science fiction novel, Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present, to encourage post-capitalist political projects in our so-called real world. Costa, a protagonist from the novel, invents a portal that enables communication between his universe and a parallel universe. The two universes diverged after the global financial crisis in 2008. Private money networks like Bitcoin emerged in Costa’s capitalist universe, while in the alternative universe, a post-capitalist society uses blockchain technology for “a plain vanilla public payments system”. Our essay draws a sophistic comparison between liberal-cum-libertarian blockchain narratives from our universe and the science-fictional blockchain narrative from Another Now. We distinguish tokenistic decentralisation (a liberal-cum-libertarian notion) and non-tokenistic distributism (a post-capitalist concept). Liberal-cum-libertarian narratives treat blockchain as a cause of decentralisation and self-sovereignty (individual empowerment). Varoufakis’s science-fictional narrative, by contrast, describes the use of blockchain for a distributist political cause.

Links

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Smethurst, R.
AU  - Barbereau, T.
AU  - Bodó, B.
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025-11-10
T1  - Tokenistic Decentralisation or Non-Tokenistic Distributism: Capitalist Blockchain Narratives and Varoufakis’s Alternative
JO  - Triple C: Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society
VL  - 23
IS  - 2
SP  - 320-337
UR  - https://triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/1568
DO  - https://doi.org/10.31269/y8jpac38
AB  - Yanis Varoufakis wrote a science fiction novel, Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present, to encourage post-capitalist political projects in our so-called real world. Costa, a protagonist from the novel, invents a portal that enables communication between his universe and a parallel universe. The two universes diverged after the global financial crisis in 2008. Private money networks like Bitcoin emerged in Costa’s capitalist universe, while in the alternative universe, a post-capitalist society uses blockchain technology for “a plain vanilla public payments system”. Our essay draws a sophistic comparison between liberal-cum-libertarian blockchain narratives from our universe and the science-fictional blockchain narrative from Another Now. We distinguish tokenistic decentralisation (a liberal-cum-libertarian notion) and non-tokenistic distributism (a post-capitalist concept). Liberal-cum-libertarian narratives treat blockchain as a cause of decentralisation and self-sovereignty (individual empowerment). Varoufakis’s science-fictional narrative, by contrast, describes the use of blockchain for a distributist political cause.
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Tokenistic Decentralisation or Non-Tokenistic Distributism: Capitalist Blockchain Narratives and Varoufakis’s Alternative},
	author = {Smethurst, R. and Barbereau, T. and Bodó, B.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31269/y8jpac38},
	year = {2025},
	date = {2025-11-10},
	journal = {Triple C: Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society},
	volume = {23},
	issue = {2},
	pages = {320-337},
	abstract = {Yanis Varoufakis wrote a science fiction novel, Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present, to encourage post-capitalist political projects in our so-called real world. Costa, a protagonist from the novel, invents a portal that enables communication between his universe and a parallel universe. The two universes diverged after the global financial crisis in 2008. Private money networks like Bitcoin emerged in Costa’s capitalist universe, while in the alternative universe, a post-capitalist society uses blockchain technology for “a plain vanilla public payments system”. Our essay draws a sophistic comparison between liberal-cum-libertarian blockchain narratives from our universe and the science-fictional blockchain narrative from Another Now. We distinguish tokenistic decentralisation (a liberal-cum-libertarian notion) and non-tokenistic distributism (a post-capitalist concept). Liberal-cum-libertarian narratives treat blockchain as a cause of decentralisation and self-sovereignty (individual empowerment). Varoufakis’s science-fictional narrative, by contrast, describes the use of blockchain for a distributist political cause.},
}

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Postkantoor in Iceland: On a margin of appreciation for European IP Offices in assessing the descriptiveness of trademarks download

Westenbroek, T.F.

Berichten Industriële Eigendom, iss. : 5, pp: 194-201, 2025

Links

Westenbroek Postkantoor in Iceland BIE 2025_5

margin of appreciation, Trademark law

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