European Court of Human Rights rules that collateral website blocking violates freedom of expression

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 15, iss. : 10, pp: 774–775, 2020

Freedom of expression, Human rights

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {European Court of Human Rights rules that collateral website blocking violates freedom of expression}, author = {Izyumenko, E.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpaa135}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-10-23}, journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice}, volume = {15}, issue = {10}, pages = {774–775}, keywords = {Freedom of expression, Human rights}, }

From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test external link

Abstract

In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.

access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement

Bibtex

Chapter{Senftleben2020b, title = {From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576019}, year = {0416}, date = {2020-04-16}, abstract = {In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.}, keywords = {access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement}, }

Prospective Policy Study on Artificial Intelligence and EU Trade Policy external link

Irion, K. & Williams, J.
2020

Abstract

Artificial intelligence is poised to be 21st century’s most transformative general purpose technology that mankind ever availed itself of. Artificial intelligence is a catch-all for technologies that can carry out complex processes fairly independently by learning from data. In the form of popular digital services and products, applied artificial intelligence is seeping into our daily lives, for example, as personal digital assistants or as autopiloting of self-driving cars. This is just the beginning of a development over the course of which artificial intelligence will generate transformative products and services that will alter world trade patterns. Artificial intelligence holds enormous promise for our information civilization if we get the governance of artificial intelligence right. What makes artificial intelligence even more fascinating is that the technology can be deployed fairly location-independent. Cross-border trade in digital services which incorporate applied artificial intelligence into their software architecture is ever increasing. That brings artificial intelligence within the purview of international trade law, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and ongoing negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trade related aspects of electronic commerce. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned this study to generate knowledge about the interface between international trade law and European norms and values in the use of artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence, EU law, Human rights, Transparency, WTO law

Bibtex

Report{Irion2020b, title = {Prospective Policy Study on Artificial Intelligence and EU Trade Policy}, author = {Irion, K. and Williams, J.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/ivir_policy-paper_ai-study_online/https://www.ivir.nl/ivir_artificial-intelligence-and-eu-trade-policy-2/}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-21}, abstract = {Artificial intelligence is poised to be 21st century’s most transformative general purpose technology that mankind ever availed itself of. Artificial intelligence is a catch-all for technologies that can carry out complex processes fairly independently by learning from data. In the form of popular digital services and products, applied artificial intelligence is seeping into our daily lives, for example, as personal digital assistants or as autopiloting of self-driving cars. This is just the beginning of a development over the course of which artificial intelligence will generate transformative products and services that will alter world trade patterns. Artificial intelligence holds enormous promise for our information civilization if we get the governance of artificial intelligence right. What makes artificial intelligence even more fascinating is that the technology can be deployed fairly location-independent. Cross-border trade in digital services which incorporate applied artificial intelligence into their software architecture is ever increasing. That brings artificial intelligence within the purview of international trade law, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and ongoing negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trade related aspects of electronic commerce. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned this study to generate knowledge about the interface between international trade law and European norms and values in the use of artificial intelligence.}, keywords = {Artificial intelligence, EU law, Human rights, Transparency, WTO law}, }

Discrimination, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic decision-making external link

vol. 2019, 2019

Abstract

This report, written for the Anti-discrimination department of the Council of Europe, concerns discrimination caused by algorithmic decision-making and other types of artificial intelligence (AI). AI advances important goals, such as efficiency, health and economic growth but it can also have discriminatory effects, for instance when AI systems learn from biased human decisions. In the public and the private sector, organisations can take AI-driven decisions with farreaching effects for people. Public sector bodies can use AI for predictive policing for example, or for making decisions on eligibility for pension payments, housing assistance or unemployment benefits. In the private sector, AI can be used to select job applicants, and banks can use AI to decide whether to grant individual consumers credit and set interest rates for them. Moreover, many small decisions, taken together, can have large effects. By way of illustration, AI-driven price discrimination could lead to certain groups in society consistently paying more. The most relevant legal tools to mitigate the risks of AI-driven discrimination are nondiscrimination law and data protection law. If effectively enforced, both these legal tools could help to fight illegal discrimination. Council of Europe member States, human rights monitoring bodies, such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and Equality Bodies should aim for better enforcement of current nondiscrimination norms. But AI also opens the way for new types of unfair differentiation (some might say discrimination) that escape current laws. Most non-discrimination statutes apply only to discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics, such as skin colour. Such statutes do not apply if an AI system invents new classes, which do not correlate with protected characteristics, to differentiate between people. Such differentiation could still be unfair, however, for instance when it reinforces social inequality. We probably need additional regulation to protect fairness and human rights in the area of AI. But regulating AI in general is not the right approach, as the use of AI systems is too varied for one set of rules. In different sectors, different values are at stake, and different problems arise. Therefore, sector-specific rules should be considered. More research and debate are needed.

ai, discriminatie, frontpage, kunstmatige intelligentie, Mensenrechten

Bibtex

Report{Borgesius2019, title = {Discrimination, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic decision-making}, author = {Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.}, url = {https://rm.coe.int/discrimination-artificial-intelligence-and-algorithmic-decision-making/1680925d73}, year = {0208}, date = {2019-02-08}, volume = {2019}, pages = {}, abstract = {This report, written for the Anti-discrimination department of the Council of Europe, concerns discrimination caused by algorithmic decision-making and other types of artificial intelligence (AI). AI advances important goals, such as efficiency, health and economic growth but it can also have discriminatory effects, for instance when AI systems learn from biased human decisions. In the public and the private sector, organisations can take AI-driven decisions with farreaching effects for people. Public sector bodies can use AI for predictive policing for example, or for making decisions on eligibility for pension payments, housing assistance or unemployment benefits. In the private sector, AI can be used to select job applicants, and banks can use AI to decide whether to grant individual consumers credit and set interest rates for them. Moreover, many small decisions, taken together, can have large effects. By way of illustration, AI-driven price discrimination could lead to certain groups in society consistently paying more. The most relevant legal tools to mitigate the risks of AI-driven discrimination are nondiscrimination law and data protection law. If effectively enforced, both these legal tools could help to fight illegal discrimination. Council of Europe member States, human rights monitoring bodies, such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and Equality Bodies should aim for better enforcement of current nondiscrimination norms. But AI also opens the way for new types of unfair differentiation (some might say discrimination) that escape current laws. Most non-discrimination statutes apply only to discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics, such as skin colour. Such statutes do not apply if an AI system invents new classes, which do not correlate with protected characteristics, to differentiate between people. Such differentiation could still be unfair, however, for instance when it reinforces social inequality. We probably need additional regulation to protect fairness and human rights in the area of AI. But regulating AI in general is not the right approach, as the use of AI systems is too varied for one set of rules. In different sectors, different values are at stake, and different problems arise. Therefore, sector-specific rules should be considered. More research and debate are needed.}, keywords = {ai, discriminatie, frontpage, kunstmatige intelligentie, Mensenrechten}, }

Expert Opinion: Legal basis for multilateral exchange of information external link

van Eijk, N. & Ryngaert, C.M.J.
2018

Abstract

Appendix IV to CTIVD report no. 56 to the review report on the multilateral exchange of data on (alleged) jihadists by the AIVD

gegevensbescherming, Mensenrechten, Privacy, veiligheidsdiensten

Bibtex

Report{vanEijk2018f, title = {Expert Opinion: Legal basis for multilateral exchange of information}, author = {van Eijk, N. and Ryngaert, C.M.J.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Expert_opinion_CTIVD.pdf}, year = {0503}, date = {2018-05-03}, abstract = {Appendix IV to CTIVD report no. 56 to the review report on the multilateral exchange of data on (alleged) jihadists by the AIVD}, keywords = {gegevensbescherming, Mensenrechten, Privacy, veiligheidsdiensten}, }

Deskundigenbericht: Juridische grondslag multilaterale informatie-uitwisseling external link

van Eijk, N. & Ryngaert, C.M.J.
vol. 2018, 2018

frontpage, gegevensuitwisseling, Mensenrechten, Privacy, toezicht, veiligheidsdiensten

Bibtex

Article{vanEijk2018e, title = {Deskundigenbericht: Juridische grondslag multilaterale informatie-uitwisseling}, author = {van Eijk, N. and Ryngaert, C.M.J.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Deskundigenbericht.pdf}, year = {0403}, date = {2018-04-03}, volume = {2018}, pages = {}, keywords = {frontpage, gegevensuitwisseling, Mensenrechten, Privacy, toezicht, veiligheidsdiensten}, }

Enkele kanttekeningen bij de Wiv 2017: De uitbreiding van bevoegdheden getoetst aan mensenrechten external link

van Eijk, N. & Eijkman, Q.
Justitiële Verkenningen, vol. 2018, num: 1, pp: 99-113, 2018

Abstract

Wij presenteren in dit artikel een aantal kanttekeningen bij de Wiv 2017. Dit doen wij door een aantal relevante in Nederland en in de Europese Unie verschenen overkoepelende studies over grondrechten te bespreken. Deze kanttekeningen zijn deels gebaseerd op normatieve uitgangspunten en aanbevelingen uit deze studies, deels ontleend aan nog lopend onderzoek. Gezien de aard en omvang van dit artikel is een selectie gemaakt en beperkt de analyse zich tot het schetsen van de belangrijkste dilemma’s.

bevoegdheden, frontpage, Mensenrechten, Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv), wiv

Bibtex

Article{vanEijk2018d, title = {Enkele kanttekeningen bij de Wiv 2017: De uitbreiding van bevoegdheden getoetst aan mensenrechten}, author = {van Eijk, N. and Eijkman, Q.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/JV_2018_1.pdf}, year = {0320}, date = {2018-03-20}, journal = {Justitiële Verkenningen}, volume = {2018}, number = {1}, pages = {99-113}, abstract = {Wij presenteren in dit artikel een aantal kanttekeningen bij de Wiv 2017. Dit doen wij door een aantal relevante in Nederland en in de Europese Unie verschenen overkoepelende studies over grondrechten te bespreken. Deze kanttekeningen zijn deels gebaseerd op normatieve uitgangspunten en aanbevelingen uit deze studies, deels ontleend aan nog lopend onderzoek. Gezien de aard en omvang van dit artikel is een selectie gemaakt en beperkt de analyse zich tot het schetsen van de belangrijkste dilemma’s.}, keywords = {bevoegdheden, frontpage, Mensenrechten, Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv), wiv}, }

“Fake news”: False fears or real concerns? external link

Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 35, num: 4, pp: 203-209, 2017

Abstract

‘‘Fake news’’ has become a much-used and much-hyped term in the so-called ‘‘post-truth’’ era that we now live in. It is also much-maligned: it is often blamed for having a disruptive impact on the outcomes of elections and referenda and for skewing democratic public debate, with the 2016 US Presidential elections and Brexit referendum often cited as examples. ‘‘Fake news’’ has also been flagged for fuelling propaganda and ‘‘hate speech’’ and even violence. ‘‘Pizzagate’’ is an infamous example of exceptional circumstances in which a false news story had a central role in a shooting incident. In December 2016, a man in Washington D.C. took it upon himself to ‘‘self-investigate’’ a story (a completely unfounded conspiracy theory) that the Hillary Clinton campaign team was running a paedophile ring from the premises of a pizzeria. Shots were fired and he was arrested and charged with assault and related offences. Given all this bad press, it is perhaps little wonder that ‘‘fake news’’ has become a major preoccupation for international organisations, national law- and policy-makers, the media and media actors, civil society and academia. But what exactly is ‘‘fake news’’ and what is all the fuss about? In addressing these questions, this column will also consider historical and contemporary perspectives on the term and its relationship with human rights.

Fake news, frontpage, Human rights, Journalistiek, Mediarecht, post-truth era

Bibtex

Article{McGonagle2017h, title = {“Fake news”: False fears or real concerns?}, author = {McGonagle, T.}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0924051917738685}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0924051917738685}, year = {1205}, date = {2017-12-05}, journal = {Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {203-209}, abstract = {‘‘Fake news’’ has become a much-used and much-hyped term in the so-called ‘‘post-truth’’ era that we now live in. It is also much-maligned: it is often blamed for having a disruptive impact on the outcomes of elections and referenda and for skewing democratic public debate, with the 2016 US Presidential elections and Brexit referendum often cited as examples. ‘‘Fake news’’ has also been flagged for fuelling propaganda and ‘‘hate speech’’ and even violence. ‘‘Pizzagate’’ is an infamous example of exceptional circumstances in which a false news story had a central role in a shooting incident. In December 2016, a man in Washington D.C. took it upon himself to ‘‘self-investigate’’ a story (a completely unfounded conspiracy theory) that the Hillary Clinton campaign team was running a paedophile ring from the premises of a pizzeria. Shots were fired and he was arrested and charged with assault and related offences. Given all this bad press, it is perhaps little wonder that ‘‘fake news’’ has become a major preoccupation for international organisations, national law- and policy-makers, the media and media actors, civil society and academia. But what exactly is ‘‘fake news’’ and what is all the fuss about? In addressing these questions, this column will also consider historical and contemporary perspectives on the term and its relationship with human rights.}, keywords = {Fake news, frontpage, Human rights, Journalistiek, Mediarecht, post-truth era}, }

The Chilling Effect of Liability for Online Reader Comments external link

European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 2017, num: 4, pp: 387-393, 2017

Abstract

This article assesses how the European Court of Human Rights has responded to the argument that holding online news media liable for reader comments has a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The article demonstrates how the Court first responded by dismissing the argument, and focused on the apparent lack of evidence for any such chilling effect. The article then argues that the Court has moved away from its initial rejection, and now accepts that a potential chilling effect, even without evidence, is integral to deciding whether online news media should be liable for reader comments. Finally, the article argues that this latter view is consistent with the Court’s precedent in other areas of freedom of expression law where a similar chilling effect may also arise.

chilling effect, defamation, electronic publishing, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Human rights, liability, online reader comments

Bibtex

Article{Fahy2017b, title = {The Chilling Effect of Liability for Online Reader Comments}, author = {Fahy, R.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/EHRLR_2017_4.pdf}, year = {0824}, date = {2017-08-24}, journal = {European Human Rights Law Review}, volume = {2017}, number = {4}, pages = {387-393}, abstract = {This article assesses how the European Court of Human Rights has responded to the argument that holding online news media liable for reader comments has a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The article demonstrates how the Court first responded by dismissing the argument, and focused on the apparent lack of evidence for any such chilling effect. The article then argues that the Court has moved away from its initial rejection, and now accepts that a potential chilling effect, even without evidence, is integral to deciding whether online news media should be liable for reader comments. Finally, the article argues that this latter view is consistent with the Court’s precedent in other areas of freedom of expression law where a similar chilling effect may also arise.}, keywords = {chilling effect, defamation, electronic publishing, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Human rights, liability, online reader comments}, }

Human rights and encryption external link

Schulz, W. & van Hoboken, J.
pp: 83 pp., 2016

Abstract

The study provides an overview of encryption technologies and their impact on human rights. It analyzes in-depth the role of encryption in the media and communications landscape, and the impact on different services, entities and end users. It highlights good practices and examines the legal environment surrounding encryption as well as various case studies of encryption policies. Built on this exploration and analysis, the research provides recommendations on encryption policy that are useful for various stakeholders. These include signaling the need to counter the lack of gender sensitivity in the current debate, and also highlighting ideas for enhancing “encryption literacy”.

encryption, frontpage, Human rights, unesco

Bibtex

Report{Schulz2016, title = {Human rights and encryption}, author = {Schulz, W. and van Hoboken, J.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/human_rights_and_encryption.pdf}, year = {1201}, date = {2016-12-01}, abstract = {The study provides an overview of encryption technologies and their impact on human rights. It analyzes in-depth the role of encryption in the media and communications landscape, and the impact on different services, entities and end users. It highlights good practices and examines the legal environment surrounding encryption as well as various case studies of encryption policies. Built on this exploration and analysis, the research provides recommendations on encryption policy that are useful for various stakeholders. These include signaling the need to counter the lack of gender sensitivity in the current debate, and also highlighting ideas for enhancing “encryption literacy”.}, keywords = {encryption, frontpage, Human rights, unesco}, }