Crosshatching Privacy: Financial Intermediaries’ Data Practices Between Law Enforcement and Data Economy

Crosshatching Privacy: Financial Intermediaries’ Data Practices Between Law Enforcement and Data Economy external link

Ferrari, V.

European Data Protection Law Review, vol. 6, num: 4, pp: 522-535, 2020

Abstract

Financial data are key to various law enforcement processes, including criminal investigations, anti-money laundering strategies and the implementation of national fiscal policies. However, financial data also qualify as personal data. While law enforcement objectives can derogate certain privacy-related legal safeguards, private financial firms should, in principle, comply with the privacy standards upheld by GDPR. Highlighting the most critical trends of the current financial industry (i.e. commercial exploitation of data; international dimension of financial informational networks; use of automated processing and decision-making tools), the present paper analyses how privacy and law enforcement priorities interplay in determining the governance of financial data. We conclude by recognizing that privacy loopholes exist in the current financial industry’s data practices, and that - as payments tend to be increasingly performed in digital manners, exponentially increasing the availability of financial data - privacy-enhancing payment methods should be encouraged and legitimised.

Links

financiele dienstverlening, handhaving, Privacy

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ferrari, V.
PY  - 1222
DA  - 2020-12-22
T1  - Crosshatching Privacy: Financial Intermediaries’ Data Practices Between Law Enforcement and Data Economy
JO  - European Data Protection Law Review
VL  - 6
NV  - 4
SP  - 522-535
UR  - https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/EDPL/2020/4/8
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/edpl_2020_04.pdf
DO  - https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2020/4/8
AB  - Financial data are key to various law enforcement processes, including criminal investigations, anti-money laundering strategies and the implementation of national fiscal policies. However, financial data also qualify as personal data. While law enforcement objectives can derogate certain privacy-related legal safeguards, private financial firms should, in principle, comply with the privacy standards upheld by GDPR. Highlighting the most critical trends of the current financial industry (i.e. commercial exploitation of data; international dimension of financial informational networks; use of automated processing and decision-making tools), the present paper analyses how privacy and law enforcement priorities interplay in determining the governance of financial data. We conclude by recognizing that privacy loopholes exist in the current financial industry’s data practices, and that - as payments tend to be increasingly performed in digital manners, exponentially increasing the availability of financial data - privacy-enhancing payment methods should be encouraged and legitimised.
K1  - financiele dienstverlening
K1  - handhaving
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Ferrari2020b,
	title = {Crosshatching Privacy: Financial Intermediaries’ Data Practices Between Law Enforcement and Data Economy},
	author = {Ferrari, V.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2020/4/8},
	year = {1222},
	date = {2020-12-22},
	journal = {European Data Protection Law Review},
	volume = {6},
	number = {4},
	pages = {522-535},
	abstract = {Financial data are key to various law enforcement processes, including criminal investigations, anti-money laundering strategies and the implementation of national fiscal policies. However, financial data also qualify as personal data. While law enforcement objectives can derogate certain privacy-related legal safeguards, private financial firms should, in principle, comply with the privacy standards upheld by GDPR. Highlighting the most critical trends of the current financial industry (i.e. commercial exploitation of data; international dimension of financial informational networks; use of automated processing and decision-making tools), the present paper analyses how privacy and law enforcement priorities interplay in determining the governance of financial data. We conclude by recognizing that privacy loopholes exist in the current financial industry’s data practices, and that - as payments tend to be increasingly performed in digital manners, exponentially increasing the availability of financial data - privacy-enhancing payment methods should be encouraged and legitimised.},
	keywords = {financiele dienstverlening, handhaving, Privacy},
}

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Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy external link

van Hoboken, J. & Fahy, R.

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, vol. 6, num: 1, pp: 9-36, 2021

Abstract

This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Regulating-Disinformation-in-Europe.pdf

disinformatie, frontpage, Privacy, Regulering, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - van Hoboken, J.
AU  - Fahy, R.
PY  - 0601
DA  - 2021-06-01
T1  - Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy
JO  - UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law
VL  - 6
NV  - 1
SP  - 9-36
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Regulating-Disinformation-in-Europe.pdf
AB  - This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.
K1  - disinformatie
K1  - frontpage
K1  - Privacy
K1  - Regulering
K1  - Vrijheid van meningsuiting
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{vanHoboken2021,
	title = {Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy},
	author = {van Hoboken, J. and Fahy, R.},
	year = {0601},
	date = {2021-06-01},
	journal = {UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law},
	volume = {6},
	number = {1},
	pages = {9-36},
	abstract = {This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.},
	keywords = {disinformatie, frontpage, Privacy, Regulering, Vrijheid van meningsuiting},
}

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Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie EU 16 juli 2020 (Data Protection Commissioner / Facebook Ireland & Schrems)(Schrems II) external link

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, vol. 2021, num: 5/6, pp: 455-458, 2021

Abstract

Uitlevering persoonsgegevens Ierland/VS in strijd met de AVG omdat veiligheidsdiensten in VS ongecontroleerd toegang hebben tot serviceproviders die deze persoonsgegevens ontvangen.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2021_24.pdf

Annotaties, AVG, frontpage, gegevensbescherming, Personal data, Privacy, Schrems II, serviceproviders, veiligheidsdiensten

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Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Digital trade and data external link

Irion, K.

2021

Abstract

Oral testimony on the UK House of Commons International Trade Committee. The Committee has launched an inquiry into digital trade and data. Digital trade refers to digitally enabled, or digitally delivered, trade in goods and services. Such trade involves the movement of data. The Committee’s inquiry will explore a range of issues, including: • Digital trade and data provisions in Free Trade Agreements • Concerns around the security and privacy of data • The environmental impact of digital trade • Relevant legal frameworks

Links

https://committees.parliament.uk/event/3859/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/

frontpage, gegevensbescherming, handel, Privacy

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Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price? download

Poort, J. & Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.

pp: 174-189, 2021

Abstract

An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.

Links

algorithms, frontpage, GDPR, gegevensbescherming, Personalisation, Price discrimination, Privacy

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Poort, J.
AU  - Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021-03-04
T1  - Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price?
SP  - 174-189
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publications/personalised-pricing-the-demise-of-the-fixed-price/personalised-pricing-the-demise-of-the-fixed-price/
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108891325.014
AB  - An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.
K1  - algorithms
K1  - frontpage
K1  - GDPR
K1  - gegevensbescherming
K1  - Personalisation
K1  - Price discrimination
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Poort2021,
	title = {Personalised pricing: The demise of the fixed price?},
	author = {Poort, J. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108891325.014},
	year = {2021},
	date = {2021-03-04},
	pages = {174-189},
	abstract = {An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness and morality of price discrimination, and the possible need for regulation. In this chapter, we discuss the underlying basis of price discrimination in economic theory, and its popular perception. Our surveys show that consumers are critical and suspicious of online price discrimination. A majority consider it unacceptable and unfair, and are in favour of a ban. When stores apply online price discrimination, most consumers think they should be informed about it. We argue that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the most controversial forms of online price discrimination, and not only requires companies to disclose their use of price discrimination, but also requires companies to ask customers for their prior consent. Industry practice, however, does not show any adoption of these two principles.},
	keywords = {algorithms, frontpage, GDPR, gegevensbescherming, Personalisation, Price discrimination, Privacy},
}

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Personal Data Stores: a user-centric privacy utopia? external link

Janssen, H., Cobbe, J. & Singh, J.

Internet Policy Review, 2021

Links

Privacy

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Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR external link

Janssen, H., Cobbe, J., Norval, C. & Singh, J.

International Data Privacy Law, vol. 10, num: 4, pp: 356-384, 2021

Abstract

When it comes to online services, users have limited control over how their personal data is processed. This is partly due to the nature of the business models of those services, where data is typically stored and aggregated in data centres. This has recently led to the development of technologies aiming at leveraging user control over the processing of their personal data. Personal Data Stores (“PDSs”) represent a class of these technologies; PDSs provide users with a device, enabling them to capture, aggregate and manage their personal data. The device provides tools for users to control and monitor access, sharing and computation over data on their device. The motivation for PDSs are described as (i) to assist users with their confidentiality and privacy concerns, and/or (ii) to provide opportunities for users to transact with or otherwise monetise their data. While PDSs potentially might enable some degree of user empowerment, they raise interesting considerations and uncertainties in relation to the responsibilities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). More specifically, the designations of responsibilities among key parties involved in PDS ecosystems are unclear. Further, the technical architecture of PDSs appears to restrict certain lawful grounds for processing, while technical means to identify certain category data, as proposed by some, may remain theoretical. We explore the considerations, uncertainties, and limitations of PDSs with respect to some key obligations under the GDPR. As PDS technologies continue to develop and proliferate, potentially providing an alternative to centralised approaches to data processing, we identify issues which require consideration by regulators, PDS platform providers and technologists.

Links

GDPR, Privacy

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Janssen, H.
AU  - Cobbe, J.
AU  - Norval, C.
AU  - Singh, J.
PY  - 0104
DA  - 2021-01-04
T1  - Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR
JO  - International Data Privacy Law
VL  - 10
NV  - 4
SP  - 356-384
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570895
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/IDPL-2021-4.pdf
DO  - https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipaa016
AB  - When it comes to online services, users have limited control over how their personal data is processed. This is partly due to the nature of the business models of those services, where data is typically stored and aggregated in data centres. This has recently led to the development of technologies aiming at leveraging user control over the processing of their personal data.
Personal Data Stores (“PDSs”) represent a class of these technologies; PDSs provide users with a device, enabling them to capture, aggregate and manage their personal data. The device provides tools for users to control and monitor access, sharing and computation over data on their device. The motivation for PDSs are described as (i) to assist users with their confidentiality and privacy concerns, and/or (ii) to provide opportunities for users to transact with or otherwise monetise their data.
While PDSs potentially might enable some degree of user empowerment, they raise interesting considerations and uncertainties in relation to the responsibilities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). More specifically, the designations of responsibilities among key parties involved in PDS ecosystems are unclear. Further, the technical architecture of PDSs appears to restrict certain lawful grounds for processing, while technical means to identify certain category data, as proposed by some, may remain theoretical.
We explore the considerations, uncertainties, and limitations of PDSs with respect to some key obligations under the GDPR. As PDS technologies continue to develop and proliferate, potentially providing an alternative to centralised approaches to data processing, we identify issues which require consideration by regulators, PDS platform providers and technologists.
K1  - GDPR
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

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Bibtex

Article{Janssen2021,
	title = {Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR},
	author = {Janssen, H. and Cobbe, J. and Norval, C. and Singh, J.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipaa016},
	year = {0104},
	date = {2021-01-04},
	journal = {International Data Privacy Law},
	volume = {10},
	number = {4},
	pages = {356-384},
	abstract = {When it comes to online services, users have limited control over how their personal data is processed. This is partly due to the nature of the business models of those services, where data is typically stored and aggregated in data centres. This has recently led to the development of technologies aiming at leveraging user control over the processing of their personal data.
Personal Data Stores (“PDSs”) represent a class of these technologies; PDSs provide users with a device, enabling them to capture, aggregate and manage their personal data. The device provides tools for users to control and monitor access, sharing and computation over data on their device. The motivation for PDSs are described as (i) to assist users with their confidentiality and privacy concerns, and/or (ii) to provide opportunities for users to transact with or otherwise monetise their data.
While PDSs potentially might enable some degree of user empowerment, they raise interesting considerations and uncertainties in relation to the responsibilities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). More specifically, the designations of responsibilities among key parties involved in PDS ecosystems are unclear. Further, the technical architecture of PDSs appears to restrict certain lawful grounds for processing, while technical means to identify certain category data, as proposed by some, may remain theoretical.
We explore the considerations, uncertainties, and limitations of PDSs with respect to some key obligations under the GDPR. As PDS technologies continue to develop and proliferate, potentially providing an alternative to centralised approaches to data processing, we identify issues which require consideration by regulators, PDS platform providers and technologists.},
	keywords = {GDPR, Privacy},
}

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Constitutionele Interpretatie. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar de vaststelling van de reikwijdte van het recht op persoonlijkheid external link

Janssen, H.

pp: 495, 2003

Links

https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/38414297/1637229.pdf

Persoonlijkheidsrechten, Privacy, rechtsvergelijking

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WODC-onderzoek: Voorziening voor verzoeken tot snelle verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content external link

van Hoboken, J., Appelman, N., van Duin, A., Blom, T., Zarouali, B., Fahy, R., Steel, M., Stringhi, E. & Helberger, N.

2020

Abstract

Dit onderzoek is uitgegeven als onderdeel van het speerpunt van de Minister voor Rechtsbescherming om de positie van slachtoffers van onrechtmatige uitingen op het internet te verbeteren. Aanleiding is dat het voor mensen als te moeilijk ervaren wordt om onrechtmatige online content snel verwijderd te krijgen. Dit rapport biedt inzicht in de juridische en praktische haalbaarheid van een voorziening voor de verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content die mensen persoonlijk raakt. Onrechtmatige content is informatie, door mensen op het internet geplaatst, die in strijd is met het recht, vanwege de schadelijke gevolgen ervan en/of omdat de belangen van anderen daardoor op ernstige wijze worden aangetast. Hierbij moet, bijvoorbeeld, gedacht worden aan bedreigingen, privacy-inbreuken of wraakporno. Het doel van de onderzochte voorziening is om mensen in staat te stellen deze onrechtmatige online content zo snel mogelijk te verwijderen. Het onderzoek focust op onrechtmatige online content die mensen in hun persoon raakt en daarmee onder het recht op privéleven uit artikel 8 Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (“EVRM”) valt.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/WODC_voorziening_onrechtmatige_content.pdf

Art. 8 EVRM, frontpage, Informatierecht, onrechtmatige online content, Privacy

RIS

TY  - RPRT
AU  - van Hoboken, J.
AU  - Appelman, N.
AU  - van Duin, A.
AU  - Blom, T.
AU  - Zarouali, B.
AU  - Fahy, R.
AU  - Steel, M.
AU  - Stringhi, E.
AU  - Helberger, N.
PY  - 1112
DA  - 2020-11-12
T1  - WODC-onderzoek: Voorziening voor verzoeken tot snelle verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/WODC_voorziening_onrechtmatige_content.pdf
AB  - Dit onderzoek is uitgegeven als onderdeel van het speerpunt van de Minister voor Rechtsbescherming om de positie van slachtoffers van onrechtmatige uitingen op het internet te verbeteren. Aanleiding is dat het voor mensen als te moeilijk ervaren wordt om onrechtmatige online content snel verwijderd te krijgen. Dit rapport biedt inzicht in de juridische en praktische haalbaarheid van een voorziening voor de verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content die mensen persoonlijk raakt. Onrechtmatige content is informatie, door mensen op het internet geplaatst, die in strijd is met het recht, vanwege de schadelijke gevolgen ervan en/of omdat de belangen van anderen daardoor op ernstige wijze worden aangetast. Hierbij moet, bijvoorbeeld, gedacht worden aan bedreigingen, privacy-inbreuken of wraakporno. Het doel van de onderzochte voorziening is om mensen in staat te stellen deze onrechtmatige online content zo snel mogelijk te verwijderen. Het onderzoek focust op onrechtmatige online content die mensen in hun persoon raakt en daarmee onder het recht op privéleven uit artikel 8 Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (“EVRM”) valt.
K1  - Art. 8 EVRM
K1  - frontpage
K1  - Informatierecht
K1  - onrechtmatige online content
K1  - Privacy
ER  -

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Bibtex

Report{vanHoboken2020d,
	title = {WODC-onderzoek: Voorziening voor verzoeken tot snelle verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content},
	author = {van Hoboken, J. and Appelman, N. and van Duin, A. and Blom, T. and Zarouali, B. and Fahy, R. and Steel, M. and Stringhi, E. and Helberger, N.},
	year = {1112},
	date = {2020-11-12},
	abstract = {Dit onderzoek is uitgegeven als onderdeel van het speerpunt van de Minister voor Rechtsbescherming om de positie van slachtoffers van onrechtmatige uitingen op het internet te verbeteren. Aanleiding is dat het voor mensen als te moeilijk ervaren wordt om onrechtmatige online content snel verwijderd te krijgen. Dit rapport biedt inzicht in de juridische en praktische haalbaarheid van een voorziening voor de verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content die mensen persoonlijk raakt. Onrechtmatige content is informatie, door mensen op het internet geplaatst, die in strijd is met het recht, vanwege de schadelijke gevolgen ervan en/of omdat de belangen van anderen daardoor op ernstige wijze worden aangetast. Hierbij moet, bijvoorbeeld, gedacht worden aan bedreigingen, privacy-inbreuken of wraakporno. Het doel van de onderzochte voorziening is om mensen in staat te stellen deze onrechtmatige online content zo snel mogelijk te verwijderen. Het onderzoek focust op onrechtmatige online content die mensen in hun persoon raakt en daarmee onder het recht op privéleven uit artikel 8 Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (“EVRM”) valt.},
	keywords = {Art. 8 EVRM, frontpage, Informatierecht, onrechtmatige online content, Privacy},
}

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Annotatie bij Rb. Den Haag 5 februari 2020 (NJCM c.s. / Staat der Nederlanden – SyRI-wetgeving) external link

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, num: 45, pp: 6792-6795, 2020

Abstract

De SyRI-wetgeving voldoet niet aan de in art. 8 lid 2 EVRM gestelde eis dat de inmenging in de uitoefening van het recht op respect voor het privéleven noodzakelijk is in een democratische samenleving, dat wil zeggen noodzakelijk, evenredig (proportioneel) en subsidiair in relatie tot het beoogde doel.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2020_386.pdf

Annotaties, frontpage, Privacy, SyRI-wetgeving

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