Keyword: Platforms

Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential external link

Sax, M. & Ausloos, J.
Interactive Entertainment Law Review, vol. 4, num: 1, 2021

Abstract

This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices – which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future – we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.

Consumer law, Data protection law, Fortnite, manipulation, Platforms, video games

Bibtex

Article{SaxAusloos2021, title = {Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential}, author = {Sax, M. and Ausloos, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764489}, year = {0301}, date = {2021-03-01}, journal = {Interactive Entertainment Law Review}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {}, abstract = {This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices – which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future – we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.}, keywords = {Consumer law, Data protection law, Fortnite, manipulation, Platforms, video games}, }

CIPIL Evening Webinar: ‘Article 17 and the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms’ external link

Quintais, J.
2020

Abstract

This presentation addresses the hottest topic in EU copyright law and policy: Article 17 of the new Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM) Directive (2019/790). The CDSM Directive is the culmination of a controversial political and legislative process at EU level. None of its provisions has caused greater debate than Article 17, which introduces a new liability regime for "online content-sharing service providers". These include most user-generated content platforms hosting copyright-protected content accessed daily by millions of individuals in the EU and across the globe. Even before the CDSM Directive is implemented into national law, the issues surrounding Article 17 have already spilled out to the policy and judicial arenas. At the policy level, the debates taking place in a number of Commission-led Stakeholder Dialogues have laid bare many of the unresolved challenges ahead for national legislators and courts. At the judicial level, the Polish government has filed an action for annulment with the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU, focusing on the most problematic aspects of Article 17. This presentation will first place Article 17 into its broader EU policy context of the discussion on the responsibilities of online platforms – from the agenda on "Tackling Illegal Content Online" to the Digital Services Act – and the narrow copyright context regarding the liability of intermediary platforms for third-party content they host. This will be followed by an explanation of the complex mechanics of Article 17 and an identification of some of its fundamental problems. Finally, some tentative proposals will be advanced for how to begin to address such problems, focusing on the core issues of licensing mechanisms and fundamental rights safeguards.

Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Auteursrecht, eu-recht, frontpage, Platforms

Bibtex

Online publication{Quintais2020d, title = {CIPIL Evening Webinar: ‘Article 17 and the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms’}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {https://youtu.be/f1tGV_IdueQ }, year = {1117}, date = {2020-11-17}, abstract = {This presentation addresses the hottest topic in EU copyright law and policy: Article 17 of the new Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM) Directive (2019/790). The CDSM Directive is the culmination of a controversial political and legislative process at EU level. None of its provisions has caused greater debate than Article 17, which introduces a new liability regime for "online content-sharing service providers". These include most user-generated content platforms hosting copyright-protected content accessed daily by millions of individuals in the EU and across the globe. Even before the CDSM Directive is implemented into national law, the issues surrounding Article 17 have already spilled out to the policy and judicial arenas. At the policy level, the debates taking place in a number of Commission-led Stakeholder Dialogues have laid bare many of the unresolved challenges ahead for national legislators and courts. At the judicial level, the Polish government has filed an action for annulment with the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU, focusing on the most problematic aspects of Article 17. This presentation will first place Article 17 into its broader EU policy context of the discussion on the responsibilities of online platforms – from the agenda on "Tackling Illegal Content Online" to the Digital Services Act – and the narrow copyright context regarding the liability of intermediary platforms for third-party content they host. This will be followed by an explanation of the complex mechanics of Article 17 and an identification of some of its fundamental problems. Finally, some tentative proposals will be advanced for how to begin to address such problems, focusing on the core issues of licensing mechanisms and fundamental rights safeguards.}, keywords = {Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Auteursrecht, eu-recht, frontpage, Platforms}, }

Operationalizing Research Access in Platform Governance: What to learn from other industries? external link

Ausloos, J., Leerssen, P. & Thije, P. ten
2020

Abstract

A new study published by AlgorithmWatch, in cooperation with the European Policy Centre and the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Information Law, shows that the GDPR needn’t stand in the way of meaningful research access to platform data; looks to health and environmental sectors for best practices in privacy-respecting data sharing frameworks.

Facebook, frontpage, governance, Platforms, research access

Bibtex

Report{Ausloos2020b, title = {Operationalizing Research Access in Platform Governance: What to learn from other industries?}, author = {Ausloos, J. and Leerssen, P. and Thije, P. ten}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/GoverningPlatforms_IViR_study_June2020-AlgorithmWatch-2020-06-24.pdf}, year = {0625}, date = {2020-06-25}, abstract = {A new study published by AlgorithmWatch, in cooperation with the European Policy Centre and the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Information Law, shows that the GDPR needn’t stand in the way of meaningful research access to platform data; looks to health and environmental sectors for best practices in privacy-respecting data sharing frameworks.}, keywords = {Facebook, frontpage, governance, Platforms, research access}, }

Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement – The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability external link

Senftleben, M.
Florida International University Law Review, vol. 14, num: 2, pp: 299-328, 2020

Abstract

Algorithmic copyright enforcement – the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet – has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads. To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.

aansprakelijkheid, Auteursrecht, censuur, EU, frontpage, Platforms, user-generated content, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{Senftleben2020, title = {Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement – The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565175 https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/11/}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.14.2.11}, year = {1020}, date = {2020-10-20}, journal = {Florida International University Law Review}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {299-328}, abstract = {Algorithmic copyright enforcement – the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet – has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads. To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.}, keywords = {aansprakelijkheid, Auteursrecht, censuur, EU, frontpage, Platforms, user-generated content, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie van de EU 3 oktober 2019 (Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek) external link

McGonagle, T.
European Human Rights Cases Updates, 2020

Platforms, smaad, Vrijheid van meningsuiting

Bibtex

Article{McGonagle2020c, title = {Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie van de EU 3 oktober 2019 (Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek)}, author = {McGonagle, T.}, url = {https://www.ehrc-updates.nl/commentaar/209146}, year = {0204}, date = {2020-02-04}, journal = {European Human Rights Cases Updates}, keywords = {Platforms, smaad, Vrijheid van meningsuiting}, }

Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European Academics external link

Quintais, J., Frosio, G., van Gompel, S., Hugenholtz, P., Husovec, M., Jütte, B.J. & Senftleben, M.
JIPITEC, vol. vol. 10, num: nr. 3 - 2019, 2020

Article 17, Content-Sharing Service Providers, Copyright, digital content, Digital Single Market, DSM Directive, exceptions and limitations, Licensing, Online services, Platforms

Bibtex

Article{Quintais2020b, title = {Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European Academics}, author = {Quintais, J. and Frosio, G. and van Gompel, S. and Hugenholtz, P. and Husovec, M. and Jütte, B.J. and Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-3-2019/5042}, year = {0225}, date = {2020-02-25}, journal = {JIPITEC}, volume = {vol. 10}, number = {nr. 3 - 2019}, pages = {}, keywords = {Article 17, Content-Sharing Service Providers, Copyright, digital content, Digital Single Market, DSM Directive, exceptions and limitations, Licensing, Online services, Platforms}, }

European Regulation of Smartphone Ecosystems external link

Fahy, R. & van Hoboken, J.
European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), vol. 5, num: 4, pp: 476-491, 2019

Abstract

For the first time, two pieces of EU legislation will specifically target smartphone ecosystems in relation to smartphone and mobile software (eg, iOS and Android) privacy, and use and monetisation of data. And yet, both pieces of legislation approach data use and data monetisation from radically contrasting perspectives. The first is the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, which seeks to provide enhanced protection against user data monitoring and tracking in smartphones, and safeguard privacy in electronic communications. On the other hand, the recently enacted Platform-to-Business Regulation 2019, seeks to bring fairness to platform-business user relations (including app stores and app developers), and is crucially built upon the premise that the ability to access and use data, including personal data, can enable important value creation in the online platform economy. This article discusses how these two Regulations will apply to smartphone ecosystems, especially relating to user and device privacy. The article analyses the potential tension points between the two sets of rules, which result from the underlying policy objectives of safeguarding privacy in electronic communications and the functioning of the digital economy in the emerging era of platform governance. The article concludes with a discussion on how to address these issues, at the intersection of privacy and competition in the digital platform economy.

frontpage, governance, Platforms, Privacy, Regulering, smartphones

Bibtex

Article{Fahy2019eb, title = {European Regulation of Smartphone Ecosystems}, author = {Fahy, R. and van Hoboken, J.}, url = {https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/EDPL/2019/4/6}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2019/4/6}, year = {1213}, date = {2019-12-13}, journal = {European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL)}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {476-491}, abstract = {For the first time, two pieces of EU legislation will specifically target smartphone ecosystems in relation to smartphone and mobile software (eg, iOS and Android) privacy, and use and monetisation of data. And yet, both pieces of legislation approach data use and data monetisation from radically contrasting perspectives. The first is the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, which seeks to provide enhanced protection against user data monitoring and tracking in smartphones, and safeguard privacy in electronic communications. On the other hand, the recently enacted Platform-to-Business Regulation 2019, seeks to bring fairness to platform-business user relations (including app stores and app developers), and is crucially built upon the premise that the ability to access and use data, including personal data, can enable important value creation in the online platform economy. This article discusses how these two Regulations will apply to smartphone ecosystems, especially relating to user and device privacy. The article analyses the potential tension points between the two sets of rules, which result from the underlying policy objectives of safeguarding privacy in electronic communications and the functioning of the digital economy in the emerging era of platform governance. The article concludes with a discussion on how to address these issues, at the intersection of privacy and competition in the digital platform economy.}, keywords = {frontpage, governance, Platforms, Privacy, Regulering, smartphones}, }

Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie 3 oktober 2019 (Facebook / Glawischnig) external link

Dommering, E.
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, num: 48/49, pp: 7206-7208, 2019

Abstract

E-Commerce richtlijn verbiedt niet een wereldwijd verbod van informatie op een platform. Discretionaire bevoegdheid nationale rechter.

Annotaties, e-commerce, frontpage, Platforms

Bibtex

Article{Dommering2019j, title = {Annotatie bij Hof van Justitie 3 oktober 2019 (Facebook / Glawischnig)}, author = {Dommering, E.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2019_436.pdf}, year = {1210}, date = {2019-12-10}, journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie}, number = {48/49}, abstract = {E-Commerce richtlijn verbiedt niet een wereldwijd verbod van informatie op een platform. Discretionaire bevoegdheid nationale rechter.}, keywords = {Annotaties, e-commerce, frontpage, Platforms}, }

Platform ad archives: promises and pitfalls external link

Leerssen, P., Ausloos, J., Zarouali, B., Helberger, N. & Vreese, C.H. de
Internet Policy Review, vol. 8, num: 4, 2019

Abstract

This paper discusses the new phenomenon of platform ad archives. Over the past year, leading social media platforms have installed publicly accessible databases documenting their political advertisements, and several countries have moved to regulate them. If designed and implemented properly, ad archives can correct for structural informational asymmetries in the online advertising industry, and thereby improve accountability through litigation and through publicity. However, present implementations leave much to be desired. We discuss key criticisms, suggest several improvements and identify areas for future research and debate.

Advertising, frontpage, Micro-targeting, Platforms, Politics, Technologie en recht, Transparency

Bibtex

Article{Leerssen2019b, title = {Platform ad archives: promises and pitfalls}, author = {Leerssen, P. and Ausloos, J. and Zarouali, B. and Helberger, N. and Vreese, C.H. de}, url = {https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/platform-ad-archives-promises-and-pitfalls}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1421}, year = {1010}, date = {2019-10-10}, journal = {Internet Policy Review}, volume = {8}, number = {4}, pages = {}, abstract = {This paper discusses the new phenomenon of platform ad archives. Over the past year, leading social media platforms have installed publicly accessible databases documenting their political advertisements, and several countries have moved to regulate them. If designed and implemented properly, ad archives can correct for structural informational asymmetries in the online advertising industry, and thereby improve accountability through litigation and through publicity. However, present implementations leave much to be desired. We discuss key criticisms, suggest several improvements and identify areas for future research and debate.}, keywords = {Advertising, frontpage, Micro-targeting, Platforms, Politics, Technologie en recht, Transparency}, }

How to license Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms external link

Husovec, M. & Quintais, J.
2019

Abstract

How can the EU Member States license Article 17 of the new Directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market? This is the central question that this paper addresses. To answer it, we first analyse the nature of the right included in Article 17. We argue that the nature of the right has a number of serious consequences for its licensing. First, it determines whether the right is mandated by public international law, and hence what licensing modalities are allowed under the 1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement and 1996 WIPO treaties. Second, it clarifies what other conditions European Union law itself imposes on the newly established right and its implementation into national law. These restraints shape the margin of discretion of EU Member States. Third, it may imply changes to existing licensing practices, including the need for collective rights management organisations to obtain new mandates. Fourth, it influences how Member States can incorporate users’ rights into the legal framework. We argue that Article 17 is a special or sui generis right. We identify how this right fits the existing international and EU law, and explain why the Member States have a broad margin of discretion when implementing the corresponding licensing regimes. Perhaps most importantly, and counter-intuitively, we show that the legal arguments against Article 17 licensing via modalities of statutory licensing and mandatory collective management schemes are weaker than one might initially think.

Article 17, Copyright, DMS Directive, frontpage, Licensing, ontent sharing service providers, Platforms

Bibtex

Article{Husovec2019, title = {How to license Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms}, author = {Husovec, M. and Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463011}, year = {1003}, date = {2019-10-03}, abstract = {How can the EU Member States license Article 17 of the new Directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market? This is the central question that this paper addresses. To answer it, we first analyse the nature of the right included in Article 17. We argue that the nature of the right has a number of serious consequences for its licensing. First, it determines whether the right is mandated by public international law, and hence what licensing modalities are allowed under the 1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement and 1996 WIPO treaties. Second, it clarifies what other conditions European Union law itself imposes on the newly established right and its implementation into national law. These restraints shape the margin of discretion of EU Member States. Third, it may imply changes to existing licensing practices, including the need for collective rights management organisations to obtain new mandates. Fourth, it influences how Member States can incorporate users’ rights into the legal framework. We argue that Article 17 is a special or sui generis right. We identify how this right fits the existing international and EU law, and explain why the Member States have a broad margin of discretion when implementing the corresponding licensing regimes. Perhaps most importantly, and counter-intuitively, we show that the legal arguments against Article 17 licensing via modalities of statutory licensing and mandatory collective management schemes are weaker than one might initially think.}, keywords = {Article 17, Copyright, DMS Directive, frontpage, Licensing, ontent sharing service providers, Platforms}, }