Creativity, autonomy and personal touch: A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for copyright
Abstract
Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard. Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarified that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case, where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38). The meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality criterion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the first place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life. A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often naturally restricted.
Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom
Bibtex
Chapter{vanGompel2014,
title = {Creativity, autonomy and personal touch: A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for copyright},
author = {van Gompel, S.},
url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1468.pdf},
year = {1218},
date = {2014-12-18},
abstract = {Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard. Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarified that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case, where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38). The meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality criterion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the first place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life. A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often naturally restricted.},
keywords = {Auteursrecht, Intellectuele eigendom},
}