competition

Laying Competition to Waste: The Economics of Resale, Recycling, and Upcycling download

In: The Cambridge Handbook of Intellectual Property and Upcycling, P. Mezei & H. Härkönen (ed.), Cambridge University Press , 2026, pp: 339-347, ISBN: 9781009685108

Abstract

This chapter analyzes upcycling through an economic lens. First, it discusses the similarities and differences between resale, recycling, and upcycling from an economic perspective. Next, it analyzes the incentives for producers in the primary market to engage with these markets further down the lifecycle of a product. The author argues that companies with sufficient market power in their primary market often have an incentive to try to control such aftermarkets, particularly in the case of resale or upcycling, in order to price discriminate in the primary market or to reduce competition in their primary market. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the role of IPRs in this and analyzes from a normative economic perspective (incentive rationale for IPRs), whether IPRs should grant producers control over resale and upcycling.

Links

competition, economical aspects, upcycling

RIS

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Poort, J.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-05-15
T1  - Laying Competition to Waste: The Economics of Resale, Recycling, and Upcycling
SP  - 339-347
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009685078.025
AB  - This chapter analyzes upcycling through an economic lens. First, it discusses the similarities and differences between resale, recycling, and upcycling from an economic perspective. Next, it analyzes the incentives for producers in the primary market to engage with these markets further down the lifecycle of a product. The author argues that companies with sufficient market power in their primary market often have an incentive to try to control such aftermarkets, particularly in the case of resale or upcycling, in order to price discriminate in the primary market or to reduce competition in their primary market. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the role of IPRs in this and analyzes from a normative economic perspective (incentive rationale for IPRs), whether IPRs should grant producers control over resale and upcycling.
K1  - competition
K1  - economical aspects
K1  - upcycling
ER  -

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Bibtex

Chapter{nokey,
	title = {Laying Competition to Waste: The Economics of Resale, Recycling, and Upcycling},
	author = {Poort, J.},
	url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/publications/laying-competition-to-waste-the-economics-of-resale-recycling-and-upcycling/laying-competition-to-waste/},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009685078.025},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-05-15},
	pages = {339-347},
	abstract = {This chapter analyzes upcycling through an economic lens. First, it discusses the similarities and differences between resale, recycling, and upcycling from an economic perspective. Next, it analyzes the incentives for producers in the primary market to engage with these markets further down the lifecycle of a product. The author argues that companies with sufficient market power in their primary market often have an incentive to try to control such aftermarkets, particularly in the case of resale or upcycling, in order to price discriminate in the primary market or to reduce competition in their primary market. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the role of IPRs in this and analyzes from a normative economic perspective (incentive rationale for IPRs), whether IPRs should grant producers control over resale and upcycling.},
	keywords = {competition, economical aspects, upcycling},
}

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Regulating Collective Management by Competition: an Incomplete Answer to the Licensing Problem external link

Hviid, M., Schroff, S. & Street, J.

JIPITEC, vol. 7, num: 3, pp: 256- 270, 2017

Abstract

While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations - to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue - have traditionally been accepted as a progression towards a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer lead to such a fate. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least regarding the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hviid, M.
AU  - Schroff, S.
AU  - Street, J.
PY  - 0131
DA  - 2017-01-31
T1  - Regulating Collective Management by Competition: an Incomplete Answer to the Licensing Problem
JO  - JIPITEC
VL  - 7
NV  - 3
SP  - 256- 270
AB  - While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations - to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue - have traditionally been accepted as a progression towards a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer lead to such a fate. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least regarding the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.
K1  - collective management organisations
K1  - competition
K1  - frontpage
K1  - licensing reforms EC
K1  - qualitative research
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{Hviid2017,
	title = {Regulating Collective Management by Competition: an Incomplete Answer to the Licensing Problem},
	author = {Hviid, M. and Schroff, S. and Street, J.},
	url = {https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-7-3-2016/4507},
	year = {0131},
	date = {2017-01-31},
	journal = {JIPITEC},
	volume = {7},
	number = {3},
	pages = {256- 270},
	abstract = {While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations - to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue - have traditionally been accepted as a progression towards a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer lead to such a fate. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least regarding the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.},
	keywords = {collective management organisations, competition, frontpage, licensing reforms EC, qualitative research},
}

Save .bib

Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing problem? external link

Hviid, M., Schroff, S. & Street, J.

CREATe Working Paper Series, vol. 2016/03, pp: 1- 31, 2016

Abstract

While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations – to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue – have traditionally been accepted as leading to a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer support such a conclusion. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least as regards the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hviid, M.
AU  - Schroff, S.
AU  - Street, J.
PY  - 0301
DA  - 2016-03-01
T1  - Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing problem?
JO  - CREATe Working Paper Series
VL  - 2016/03
SP  - 1- 31
AB  - While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations – to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue – have traditionally been accepted as leading to a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer support such a conclusion. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least as regards the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.
K1  - collective management
K1  - competition
K1  - Licensing
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{Hviid2016,
	title = {Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing problem?},
	author = {Hviid, M. and Schroff, S. and Street, J.},
	url = {http://www.create.ac.uk/publications/regulating-cmos-by-competition-an-incomplete-answer-to-the-licensing-problem/},
	year = {0301},
	date = {2016-03-01},
	journal = {CREATe Working Paper Series},
	volume = {2016/03},
	pages = {1- 31},
	abstract = {While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations – to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue – have traditionally been accepted as leading to a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer support such a conclusion. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least as regards the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.},
	keywords = {collective management, competition, Licensing},
}

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