The rise of NFTs: These aren’t the droids you’re looking for

The rise of NFTs: These aren’t the droids you’re looking for external link

Bodó, B., Giannopoulou, A., Quintais, J. & Mezei, P.

European Intellectual Property Review, 2022

Abstract

Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are hailed as revolutionary tools that will empower artists and revolutionize copyright management and remuneration. This article explores their copyright relevance, and it describes how copyright might apply in relation to NFT creation and trading. In doing so, it provides an overview of the ecosystem of actors built around NFTs, and it analyzes the role of these actors according to the European copyright normative framework.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000423

blockchain, Copyright, digital art, frontpage, non-fungible tokens

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A Proposal to leverage Article 17 to build a public repository of Public Domain and openly licensed works external link

Reda, J. & Keller, P.

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2021

Links

http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/09/23/a-proposal-to-leverage-article-17-to-build-a-public-repository-of-public-domain-and-openly-licensed-works/

Art. 17, Auteursrecht, Copyright, frontpage, public domain

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Public Sector Information Reuse and Copyright download

van Eechoud, M.

2021

Links

VanEechoud ALAI 2021 PSI and copyright

Copyright, public sector information

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EU copyright law round up – second trimester of 2021 external link

Trapova, A. & Quintais, J.

2021

Links

http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/08/16/eu-copyright-law-round-up-second-trimester-of-2021/

Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Article 17, Copyright, frontpage

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Commission’s Guidance on Art. 17 CDSM Directive: the authorisation dimension external link

Quintais, J.

2021

Links

http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/06/10/commissions-guidance-on-art-17-cdsm-directive-the-authorisation-dimension/

Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Article 17, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Copyright, frontpage

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Ensuring the Visibility and Accessibility of European Creative Content on the World Market: The Need for Copyright Data Improvement in the Light of New Technologies external link

Senftleben, M., Margoni, T., Antal, D., Bodó, B., van Gompel, S., Handke, C.W., Kretschmer, M., Poort, J., Quintais, J. & Schwemer, S.

JIPITEC, vol. 13, iss. : 1, pp: 67-86, 2022

Abstract

In the European Strategy for Data, the European Commission highlighted the EU’s ambition to acquire a leading role in the data economy. At the same time, the Commission conceded that the EU would have to increase its pools of quality data available for use and re-use. In the creative industries, this need for enhanced data quality and interoperability is particularly strong. Without data improvement, unprecedented opportunities for monetising the wide variety of EU creative and making this content available for new technologies, such as artificial intelligence training systems, will most probably be lost. The problem has a worldwide dimension. While the US have already taken steps to provide an integrated data space for music as of 1 January 2021, the EU is facing major obstacles not only in the field of music but also in other creative industry sectors. Weighing costs and benefits, there can be little doubt that new data improvement initiatives and sufficient investment in a better copyright data infrastructure should play a central role in EU copyright policy. A trade-off between data harmonisation and interoperability on the one hand, and transparency and accountability of content recommender systems on the other, could pave the way for successful new initiatives.

Links

https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-13-1-2022/5515 https://www.ivir.nl/jipitec_2022/

Artificial intelligence, Collective licensing, Content moderation, Copyright, creative industry, cultural diversity, Digital Services Act (DSA), interoperability, market concentration, market failure, metadata, Music Modernization Act, recommender systems, SME, Transparency, trustworthy AI

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Senftleben, M.
AU  - Margoni, T.
AU  - Antal, D.
AU  - Bodó, B.
AU  - van Gompel, S.
AU  - Handke, C.W.
AU  - Kretschmer, M.
AU  - Poort, J.
AU  - Quintais, J.
AU  - Schwemer, S.
PY  - 0412
DA  - 2022-04-12
T1  - Ensuring the Visibility and Accessibility of European Creative Content on the World Market: The Need for Copyright Data Improvement in the Light of New Technologies
JO  - JIPITEC
VL  - 13
IS  - 1
SP  - 67-86
UR  - https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-13-1-2022/5515
https://www.ivir.nl/jipitec_2022/
AB  - In the European Strategy for Data, the European Commission highlighted the EU’s ambition to acquire a leading role in the data economy. At the same time, the Commission conceded that the EU would have to increase its pools of quality data available for use and re-use. In the creative industries, this need for enhanced data quality and interoperability is particularly strong. Without data improvement, unprecedented opportunities for monetising the wide variety of EU creative and making this content available for new technologies, such as artificial intelligence training systems, will most probably be lost. The problem has a worldwide dimension. While the US have already taken steps to provide an integrated data space for music as of 1 January 2021, the EU is facing major obstacles not only in the field of music but also in other creative industry sectors. Weighing costs and benefits, there can be little doubt that new data improvement initiatives and sufficient investment in a better copyright data infrastructure should play a central role in EU copyright policy. A trade-off between data harmonisation and interoperability on the one hand, and transparency and accountability of content recommender systems on the other, could pave the way for successful new initiatives.
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - Collective licensing
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - Copyright
K1  - creative industry
K1  - cultural diversity
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - interoperability
K1  - market concentration
K1  - market failure
K1  - metadata
K1  - Music Modernization Act
K1  - recommender systems
K1  - SME
K1  - Transparency
K1  - trustworthy AI
ER  -

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Article{Senftleben2021,
	title = {Ensuring the Visibility and Accessibility of European Creative Content on the World Market: The Need for Copyright Data Improvement in the Light of New Technologies},
	author = {Senftleben, M. and Margoni, T. and Antal, D. and Bodó, B. and van Gompel, S. and Handke, C.W. and Kretschmer, M. and Poort, J. and Quintais, J. and Schwemer, S.},
	year = {0412},
	date = {2022-04-12},
	journal = {JIPITEC},
	volume = {13},
	issue = {1},
	pages = {67-86},
	abstract = {In the European Strategy for Data, the European Commission highlighted the EU’s ambition to acquire a leading role in the data economy. At the same time, the Commission conceded that the EU would have to increase its pools of quality data available for use and re-use. In the creative industries, this need for enhanced data quality and interoperability is particularly strong. Without data improvement, unprecedented opportunities for monetising the wide variety of EU creative and making this content available for new technologies, such as artificial intelligence training systems, will most probably be lost. The problem has a worldwide dimension. While the US have already taken steps to provide an integrated data space for music as of 1 January 2021, the EU is facing major obstacles not only in the field of music but also in other creative industry sectors. Weighing costs and benefits, there can be little doubt that new data improvement initiatives and sufficient investment in a better copyright data infrastructure should play a central role in EU copyright policy. A trade-off between data harmonisation and interoperability on the one hand, and transparency and accountability of content recommender systems on the other, could pave the way for successful new initiatives.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Collective licensing, Content moderation, Copyright, creative industry, cultural diversity, Digital Services Act (DSA), interoperability, market concentration, market failure, metadata, Music Modernization Act, recommender systems, SME, Transparency, trustworthy AI},
}

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The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright? external link

Quintais, J. & Schwemer, S.

European Journal of Risk Regulation, vol. 13, iss. : 2, pp: 191-217, 2022

Abstract

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services. Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter. From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.

Links

Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Content moderation, Copyright, Digital Services Act (DSA), frontpage, Online platforms

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Quintais, J.
AU  - Schwemer, S.
PY  - 0314
DA  - 2022-03-14
T1  - The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright?
JO  - European Journal of Risk Regulation
VL  - 13
IS  - 2
SP  - 191-217
UR  - https://www.ivir.nl/ejrr_2022/
DO  - https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2022.1
AB  - On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services.

Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter.

From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.
K1  - Art. 17 CDSM Directive
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - Copyright
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - frontpage
K1  - Online platforms
ER  -

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Article{Quintais2021e,
	title = {The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright?},
	author = {Quintais, J. and Schwemer, S.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2022.1},
	year = {0314},
	date = {2022-03-14},
	journal = {European Journal of Risk Regulation},
	volume = {13},
	issue = {2},
	pages = {191-217},
	abstract = {On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services.

Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter.

From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.},
	keywords = {Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Content moderation, Copyright, Digital Services Act (DSA), frontpage, Online platforms},
}

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Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders external link

Husovec, M. & Quintais, J.

Oxford University Press, 0429

Abstract

Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators. EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835930

Article 17, Copyright, equal treatment, frontpage, online platform

RIS

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Husovec, M.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 0429
DA  - 2021-04-29
T1  - Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835930
AB  - Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators.

EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.
K1  - Article 17
K1  - Copyright
K1  - equal treatment
K1  - frontpage
K1  - online platform
ER  -

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Bibtex

Chapter{HusovecQuintais2021-2,
	title = {Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders},
	author = {Husovec, M. and Quintais, J.},
	year = {0429},
	date = {2021-04-29},
	abstract = {Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators.

EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.},
	keywords = {Article 17, Copyright, equal treatment, frontpage, online platform},
}

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