Keyword: Copyright

Alternative compensation models for large-scale non-commercial online use of works external link

Quintais, J.
pp: pp. 298-306, 2016

Abstract

This paper briefly discusses an alternative legal model to assure remuneration for non-commercial mass online uses by individuals, covered by the exclusive rights of reproduction and communication/making available to the public in Directive 2001/29/EC. Alternative compensation systems (ACS) are legal mechanisms that forsake the need for direct authorization of end-user acts under the aforementioned rights – downloading, uploading, sharing, modifying –, while simultaneously ensuring compensation to creators (i.e. authors and performers) or all rights holders of works included in the scheme. After providing some background, the paper explains the concept of ACS, outlines the legal models and challenges to its implementation and reports on the results of an ongoing interdisciplinary research project on the legal and socioeconomic feasibility of such systems carried out by the Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam. Chief among the findings are the willingness of users to pay for and participate in an ACS, its quantification and, using the case-study of recorded music, the realization that such a model holds the promise of being welfare increasing.

ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copydan, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, levies, private copy

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Alternative compensation models for large-scale non-commercial online use of works}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625492}, doi = {https://doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110478198}, year = {1201}, date = {2016-12-01}, abstract = {This paper briefly discusses an alternative legal model to assure remuneration for non-commercial mass online uses by individuals, covered by the exclusive rights of reproduction and communication/making available to the public in Directive 2001/29/EC. Alternative compensation systems (ACS) are legal mechanisms that forsake the need for direct authorization of end-user acts under the aforementioned rights – downloading, uploading, sharing, modifying –, while simultaneously ensuring compensation to creators (i.e. authors and performers) or all rights holders of works included in the scheme. After providing some background, the paper explains the concept of ACS, outlines the legal models and challenges to its implementation and reports on the results of an ongoing interdisciplinary research project on the legal and socioeconomic feasibility of such systems carried out by the Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam. Chief among the findings are the willingness of users to pay for and participate in an ACS, its quantification and, using the case-study of recorded music, the realization that such a model holds the promise of being welfare increasing.}, keywords = {ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copydan, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, levies, private copy}, }

Going means trouble and staying makes it double: the value of licensing recorded music online external link

Handke, C.W., Bodó, B. & Vallbé, J.
Journal of Cultural Economics, 2015

Abstract

This paper discusses whether a copyright compensation system (CCS) for recorded music—endowing private Internet subscribers with the right to download and use works in return for a fee—would be welfare increasing. It reports on the results of a discrete choice experiment conducted with a representative sample of the Dutch population consisting of 4986 participants. Under some conservative assumptions, we find that applied only to recorded music, a mandatory CCS could increase the welfare of rights holders and users in the Netherlands by over €600 million per year (over €35 per capita). This far exceeds current rights holder revenues from the market of recorded music of ca. €144 million per year. A monthly CCS fee of ca. €1.74 as a surcharge on Dutch Internet subscriptions would raise the same amount of revenues to rights holders as the current market for recorded music. With a voluntary CCS, the estimated welfare gains to users and rights holders are even greater for CCS fees below €20 on the user side. A voluntary CCS would also perform better in the long run, as it could retain a greater extent of market coordination. The results of our choice experiment indicate that a well-designed CCS for recorded music would simultaneously make users and rights holders better off. This result holds even if we correct for frequently observed rates of overestimation in contingent valuation studies.

Auteursrecht, collective rights management, compensation systems, Contingent valuation, Copyright, Intellectuele eigendom, Internet, Recorded music

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Going means trouble and staying makes it double: the value of licensing recorded music online}, author = {Handke, C.W. and Bodó, B. and Vallbé, J.}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10824-015-9251-8}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-06-11}, journal = {Journal of Cultural Economics}, abstract = {This paper discusses whether a copyright compensation system (CCS) for recorded music—endowing private Internet subscribers with the right to download and use works in return for a fee—would be welfare increasing. It reports on the results of a discrete choice experiment conducted with a representative sample of the Dutch population consisting of 4986 participants. Under some conservative assumptions, we find that applied only to recorded music, a mandatory CCS could increase the welfare of rights holders and users in the Netherlands by over €600 million per year (over €35 per capita). This far exceeds current rights holder revenues from the market of recorded music of ca. €144 million per year. A monthly CCS fee of ca. €1.74 as a surcharge on Dutch Internet subscriptions would raise the same amount of revenues to rights holders as the current market for recorded music. With a voluntary CCS, the estimated welfare gains to users and rights holders are even greater for CCS fees below €20 on the user side. A voluntary CCS would also perform better in the long run, as it could retain a greater extent of market coordination. The results of our choice experiment indicate that a well-designed CCS for recorded music would simultaneously make users and rights holders better off. This result holds even if we correct for frequently observed rates of overestimation in contingent valuation studies.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, collective rights management, compensation systems, Contingent valuation, Copyright, Intellectuele eigendom, Internet, Recorded music}, }

Joint Copyrights Management by Collecting Societies and Online Platforms: An Economic Analysis external link

Handke, C.W.
2015

Abstract

This paper discusses the effects of technological change on joint (copy)rights management (JRM). The economic literature discusses JRM as a response to relatively high transaction costs in complex markets for copyright works. Based on a formal analysis, we show that JRM reduces the average transaction costs per transaction and the total number of transactions under a broad range of conditions. Throughout the 20th Century, JRM was mostly conducted by copyrights holder collectives. Recently, private for-profit online platforms are taking on core functions of JRM. Our formal analysis yields two essential results: (1) the efficient scale and scope of JRM will increase as copyright works are increasingly traded via digital ICT networks; (2) a change from collective JRM on behalf of rights holders to commercial intermediation weakens the position of rights holders, and will aggravate problems with the private provision of copyright works with public good attributes.

Auteursrecht, collecting societies, Copyright, copyright collectives, digitization, Intellectuele eigendom, online intermediaries

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Joint Copyrights Management by Collecting Societies and Online Platforms: An Economic Analysis}, author = {Handke and C.W.}, url = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616442}, year = {0611}, date = {2015-06-11}, abstract = {This paper discusses the effects of technological change on joint (copy)rights management (JRM). The economic literature discusses JRM as a response to relatively high transaction costs in complex markets for copyright works. Based on a formal analysis, we show that JRM reduces the average transaction costs per transaction and the total number of transactions under a broad range of conditions. Throughout the 20th Century, JRM was mostly conducted by copyrights holder collectives. Recently, private for-profit online platforms are taking on core functions of JRM. Our formal analysis yields two essential results: (1) the efficient scale and scope of JRM will increase as copyright works are increasingly traded via digital ICT networks; (2) a change from collective JRM on behalf of rights holders to commercial intermediation weakens the position of rights holders, and will aggravate problems with the private provision of copyright works with public good attributes.}, keywords = {Auteursrecht, collecting societies, Copyright, copyright collectives, digitization, Intellectuele eigendom, online intermediaries}, }

Deep Pockets, Packets, and Harbours: Never the Three Shall Meet external link

Margoni, T. & Perry, M.
Ohio State Law Journal, num: 6, pp: 1196-1216., 2013

Abstract

Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a set of methodologies used for the analysis of data flow over the Internet. It is the intention of this paper to describe technical details of this issue and to show that by using DPI technologies it is possible to understand the content of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol communications. This communications can carry public available content, private users information, legitimate copyrighted works, as well as infringing copyrighted works.<br /> Legislation in many jurisdictions regarding Internet service providers’ liability, or more generally the liability of communication intermediaries, usually contains “safe harbour” provisions. The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty of 1996 has a short but significant provision excluding liability for suppliers of physical facilities. The provision is aimed at communication to the public and the facilitation of physical means. Its extensive interpretation to cases of contributory or vicarious liability, in absence of specific national implementation, can prove problematic. Two of the most relevant legislative interventions in the field, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, regulate extensively the field of intermediary liability. This paper looks at the relationship between existing packet inspection technologies, especially the ‘deep version,’ and the international and national legal and regulatory interventions connected with intellectual property protection and with the correlated liabilities ‘exemptions. In analyzing the referred two main statutes, we will take a comparative look at similar interventions in Australia and Canada that can offer some interesting elements of reflection.

Copyright, Deep Packet Inspection, Intellectual property, Intellectuele eigendom, ISPs, Online liability, Privacy, safe harbours

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Deep Pockets, Packets, and Harbours: Never the Three Shall Meet}, author = {Margoni, T. and Perry, M.}, url = {http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2296216}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-04-12}, journal = {Ohio State Law Journal}, number = {6}, abstract = {Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a set of methodologies used for the analysis of data flow over the Internet. It is the intention of this paper to describe technical details of this issue and to show that by using DPI technologies it is possible to understand the content of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol communications. This communications can carry public available content, private users information, legitimate copyrighted works, as well as infringing copyrighted works.<br /> Legislation in many jurisdictions regarding Internet service providers’ liability, or more generally the liability of communication intermediaries, usually contains “safe harbour” provisions. The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty of 1996 has a short but significant provision excluding liability for suppliers of physical facilities. The provision is aimed at communication to the public and the facilitation of physical means. Its extensive interpretation to cases of contributory or vicarious liability, in absence of specific national implementation, can prove problematic. Two of the most relevant legislative interventions in the field, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, regulate extensively the field of intermediary liability. This paper looks at the relationship between existing packet inspection technologies, especially the ‘deep version,’ and the international and national legal and regulatory interventions connected with intellectual property protection and with the correlated liabilities ‘exemptions. In analyzing the referred two main statutes, we will take a comparative look at similar interventions in Australia and Canada that can offer some interesting elements of reflection.}, keywords = {Copyright, Deep Packet Inspection, Intellectual property, Intellectuele eigendom, ISPs, Online liability, Privacy, safe harbours}, }

Private Copying and Downloading from Unlawful Sources external link

Quintais, J.
IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 46, num: 1, pp: 66-92, 2014

Abstract

Private copying is one of the most contested areas of EU copyright law. This paper surveys that nebulous area and examines the issue of copies made from unlawful sources in light of the ECJ’s ACI Adam decision. After describing the legal background of copyright levies and the facts of the litigation, the paper scrutinizes the Advocate General’s Opinion and the Court’s decision. The latter is analyzed against the history of copyright levies, the ECJ’s extensive case-law on the private copying limitation and Member States’ regulation of unlawful sources. This paper further reflects on the decision’s implications for end-users, rights holders, collective management organizations and manufacturers/importers of levied goods. It concludes that, from a legal and economic standpoint, the decision not only fails to be properly justified, but its consequences will likely diverge from those anticipated by the Court. Most worrisome is the Court’s stance on the three-step test, which it views as a restrictive, rather than enabling, clause. In its interpretation of the test, the decision fails to strike the necessary balance between competing rights and interests. This is due to multiple factors: overreliance on the principle of strict interpretation; failure to consider the fundamental right of privacy; lack of justification of the normative and empirical elements of the test’s second condition; and a disregard for the remuneration element in connection with the test’s third condition. To the contrary, it is argued that a flexible construction of the three-step test is more suited to the Infosoc Directive’s balancing aims.

ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Information Influx Conference, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, IViR, levies, private copy

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Private Copying and Downloading from Unlawful Sources}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-014-0295-7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-014-0295-7}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-10-29}, journal = {IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {66-92}, abstract = {Private copying is one of the most contested areas of EU copyright law. This paper surveys that nebulous area and examines the issue of copies made from unlawful sources in light of the ECJ’s ACI Adam decision. After describing the legal background of copyright levies and the facts of the litigation, the paper scrutinizes the Advocate General’s Opinion and the Court’s decision. The latter is analyzed against the history of copyright levies, the ECJ’s extensive case-law on the private copying limitation and Member States’ regulation of unlawful sources. This paper further reflects on the decision’s implications for end-users, rights holders, collective management organizations and manufacturers/importers of levied goods. It concludes that, from a legal and economic standpoint, the decision not only fails to be properly justified, but its consequences will likely diverge from those anticipated by the Court. Most worrisome is the Court’s stance on the three-step test, which it views as a restrictive, rather than enabling, clause. In its interpretation of the test, the decision fails to strike the necessary balance between competing rights and interests. This is due to multiple factors: overreliance on the principle of strict interpretation; failure to consider the fundamental right of privacy; lack of justification of the normative and empirical elements of the test’s second condition; and a disregard for the remuneration element in connection with the test’s third condition. To the contrary, it is argued that a flexible construction of the three-step test is more suited to the Infosoc Directive’s balancing aims.}, keywords = {ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Information Influx Conference, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, IViR, levies, private copy}, }

Legalizing File-Sharing: An Idea Whose Time Has Come – Or Gone? Report from the Information Influx Conference 2014 external link

Quintais, J.
2014

Abstract

On 2-4 July 2014 Information Influx, the 25th anniversary conference of the Institute for Information Law (IViR) was held in Amsterdam. Integrated in the conference, on Friday, 4 July a panel entitled “Legalizing file-sharing: an idea whose time has come – or gone?” met.<br /> The panel’s moderator was Professor Bernt Hugenholtz (University of Amsterdam, IViR) and the panelists were scholars with groundbreaking research on the topic for the past decade: Professor Neil Netanel (University of California, Los Angeles), Professor Alexander Peukert (University of Frankfurt), Dr. Philippe Aigrain (La Quadrature du Net), Professor Séverine Dusollier (SciencesPo./École de droit).<br /> The panel was divided into four parts, which this report reflects. First, the moderator introduced the topic and the panelists. Second, IViR member Mr. Balázs Bodó offered a short presentation of an ongoing research project on the topic of debate. Third, each panelist commented on the topic from different perspectives. The panel discussion was then opened for comments from the audience and responses from the panel.

ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Information Influx Conference, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, IViR, levies, private copy

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Legalizing File-Sharing: An Idea Whose Time Has Come – Or Gone? Report from the Information Influx Conference 2014}, author = {Quintais, J.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510545}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-10-24}, abstract = {On 2-4 July 2014 Information Influx, the 25th anniversary conference of the Institute for Information Law (IViR) was held in Amsterdam. Integrated in the conference, on Friday, 4 July a panel entitled “Legalizing file-sharing: an idea whose time has come – or gone?” met.<br /> The panel’s moderator was Professor Bernt Hugenholtz (University of Amsterdam, IViR) and the panelists were scholars with groundbreaking research on the topic for the past decade: Professor Neil Netanel (University of California, Los Angeles), Professor Alexander Peukert (University of Frankfurt), Dr. Philippe Aigrain (La Quadrature du Net), Professor Séverine Dusollier (SciencesPo./École de droit).<br /> The panel was divided into four parts, which this report reflects. First, the moderator introduced the topic and the panelists. Second, IViR member Mr. Balázs Bodó offered a short presentation of an ongoing research project on the topic of debate. Third, each panelist commented on the topic from different perspectives. The panel discussion was then opened for comments from the audience and responses from the panel.}, keywords = {ACI ADAM, alternative compensation systems, Auteursrecht, collective rights management, content flat-rate, Copyright, exceptions and limitations, Information Influx Conference, Infosoc Directive, Intellectuele eigendom, IViR, levies, private copy}, }

Safe to be open: Study on the protection of research data and recommendations for access and usage external link

Guibault, L. & Margoni, T.
pp: 168, 2013

access, Auteursrecht, Copyright, Intellectuele eigendom, protection of research data, usage

Bibtex

Report{nokey, title = {Safe to be open: Study on the protection of research data and recommendations for access and usage}, author = {Guibault, L. and Margoni, T.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/safe_to_be_open.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-12-19}, keywords = {access, Auteursrecht, Copyright, Intellectuele eigendom, protection of research data, usage}, }