Keyword: Copyright
The AI Act/Copyright Interface – A Success Formula for Reconciling the Societal Interest in Culturally Diverse AI With Copyright Values? download
Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link
Text and Data Mining, Generative AI, and the Copyright Three-Step Test external link
Abstract
In the debate on copyright exceptions permitting text and data mining (“TDM”) for the development of generative AI systems, the so-called “three-step test” has become a centre of gravity. The test serves as a universal yardstick for assessing the compatibility of domestic copyright exceptions with international copyright law. However, it is doubtful whether the international three-step test is applicable at all. Arguably, TDM copies fall outside the scope of the international right of reproduction and go beyond the ambit of the test’s operation. Only if national or regional copyright legislation declares the test applicable, the question arises whether copyright exceptions supporting TDM for AI training constitute certain special cases that do not conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and do not unreasonably prejudice legitimate author or rightsholder interests. As the following analysis will show, rules permitting TDM for AI training can satisfy all test criteria. An opt-out opportunity for copyright owners bans the risk of a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation and an unreasonable prejudice from the outset. A clear focus on specific policy goals, such as the objective to support scientific research, adds conceptual contours that dispel concerns about incompliance. In the case of TDM provisions covering commercial AI development, equitable remuneration regimes can be introduced as a counterbalance to avoid an unreasonable prejudice.
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Copyright, Generative AI, Text and Data Mining (TDM), three-step test
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Comment of the European Copyright Society on the request for preliminary ruling in Case C-250/25 (Like Company) external link
Abstract
The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution.
While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching.
(1) The reference is factually murky with respect to the technology and services at stake, conflating concepts of ‘chatbot’, ‘large language model’, and ‘search engine’.
(2) The reference fails to identify consistently the subject matter at stake, which is the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (2019/790/EU, hereinafter CDSMD), not authorial works.
Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter InfoSoc Directive).
If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as ‘online use’, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Article 15 of the CDSMD.
In the Opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.
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Copyright
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De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht download
Abstract
De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.
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AI Act, Artificial intelligence, code of practice, Copyright
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Music streaming debates series part 2: streaming and GenAI discussions in canon external link
Abstract
Part 1 of this series gave a general overview of the copyright-related discussions regarding streaming services from the last year. In Part 2, we will gain a clearer picture of the expected challenges for fair remuneration and control over one’s artistry created by new GenAI music services. Also, the implications for “good old” streaming services will be examined. Some concrete legal solutions will be proposed, while also highlighting uncertainties that remain.
Artificial intelligence, Copyright, music, remuneration, streaming services
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Is Upcycling Always Green – and Should It Be? Reconsidering the Rationale for Accommodating Upcycling within IP Law and Leveraging the Potential of Quotation and ‘Due Cause’ external link
Abstract
Climate change has forced legal systems to question many of their long-standing assumptions, including the largely linear logic that continues to underpin intellectual property (IP) law. Existing scholarship has convincingly shown that copyright and trade mark laws often hinder circular practices such as repair and upcycling, prompting calls for greater flexibility or the ‘greenification’ of IP law. This article challenges a key premise of those proposals: that upcycling is inherently environmentally beneficial. The environmental value of upcycling is neither uniform nor self-evident, and in some contexts may be marginal or even adverse.
This uncertainty raises a normative question: should accommodation of upcycling under IP law depend on demonstrated environmental benefit, or does upcycling embody a wider social value warranting protection irrespective of ecological impact? The article argues for the latter, developing a justificatory framework grounded not primarily in environmental sustainability, but in artistic freedom and cultural diversity. On this account, environmental benefits – where present – serve as reinforcing considerations rather than the foundation for legal reform.
Building on this reframing, the article reassesses concerns about free-riding on IP holders’ rights and argues for a more calibrated balance between upcycling practices and the protection of legitimate IP interests. It then examines how this balance might be realised within existing EU IP law, focusing on the underexplored potential of the quotation exception in copyright law and the ‘due cause’ defence in trade mark law. By repositioning these defences within the sustainability discourse, the article seeks to broaden the tools available to courts and policymakers for aligning IP law with the social value of upcycling.
Copyright, Freedom of expression, Trademark law, upcycling