contestation

Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI external link

2026

Abstract

Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.

RIS

TY  - THES
AU  - Metikoš, L.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-06-03
T1  - Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI
AB  - Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - contestation
K1  - digital justice
K1  - right to an explanation
ER  -

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Bibtex

PhD Thesis{nokey,
	title = {Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI},
	author = {Metikoš, L.},
	url = {https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/321271751/Thesis.pdf},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-06-03},
	abstract = {Judges across the world increasingly use various AI-tools in the administration of justice. However, litigants may be unable to contest important pieces of evidence or legal arguments when the functioning and usage of these systems remains unexplained. This dissertation discusses how a right to an explanation could enable litigant contestation of judicial AI. To that end, a comparative overview is provided of the scope, content, and restrictions of this right under due process safeguards, Data Protection Law, and AI Law in the EU, Brazil, and China. Moreover, based on four different theories of procedural justice, the normative reasons why litigant contestation of judicial AI should be enabled are also discussed. This includes analyses of utilitarian, rights-based (including a dignitarian and a Dworkinian approach), and relational approaches to procedural justice. These highlight different values of litigant contestation; it has instrumental value in error correction, and intrinsic value in respecting the dignity of litigants, either as rational autonomous agents or as socio-relational beings. However, it is technically difficult to faithfully explain the internal workings of certain opaque AI-models. Moreover, integrity and safety concerns and the potential violation of trade secrets and business interests of external developers could block the disclosure of explanations. To address these issues, this dissertation argues that judiciaries should adopt certain technical and organizational measures already during the development of judicial AI. This shows that the right to an explanation should not be conceptualized as a mere procedural right, but also as a substantive requirement that safeguards contestation by design.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, right to an explanation},
}

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Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China

Metikoš, L., Iglesias Keller, C., Qiao, C. & Helberger, N.

Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 61, 2026

Abstract

Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Metikoš, L.
AU  - Iglesias Keller, C.
AU  - Qiao, C.
AU  - Helberger, N.
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026-06-09
T1  - Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China
JO  - Computer Law & Security Review
VL  - 61
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106302
AB  - Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.
K1  - Artificial intelligence
K1  - contestation
K1  - digital justice
K1  - explainability
K1  - right to an explanation
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China},
	author = {Metikoš, L. and Iglesias Keller, C. and Qiao, C. and Helberger, N.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106302},
	year = {2026},
	date = {2026-06-09},
	journal = {Computer Law & Security Review},
	volume = {61},
	abstract = {Courts across the world are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) to automate various tasks. But the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the European Union (EU), Brazil, and China; three jurisdictions with distinct legal traditions and institutional architectures. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. However, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete, requiring further legislative and scholarly efforts to substantiate the right to an explanation in the administration of justice.},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, contestation, digital justice, explainability, right to an explanation},
}

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Keyword: contestation

Enabling contestation: The right to an explanation of judicial AI external link

Abstract

Links

RIS

Bibtex

Comparing the right to an explanation of judicial AI by function; studies on the EU, Brazil, and China

Abstract

Links

RIS

Bibtex