Keyword: Artificial intelligence
De AI-Verordening, de Code of Practice en het auteursrecht download
Abstract
De AI-Verordening, ook wel AI Act geheten, heeft op het eerste gezicht weinig met het auteursrecht van doen. Van de talloze regels van de Verordening heeft er precies één direct betrekking op het auteursrecht. Art. 53 lid 1 (c) AI-Vo verplicht aanbieders van algemene AI-modellen een beleid op te stellen “ter naleving van het Unierecht inzake auteursrechten en naburige rechten”. Dit artikel bespreekt de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze verplichting en onderzoekt de mogelijke extraterritoriale werking ervan. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de GPAI Code of Practice, waarin het auteursrechtelijke voorschrift van de AI-Verordening geconcretiseerd wordt.
Links
AI Act, Artificial intelligence, code of practice, Copyright
RIS
Bibtex
Music streaming debates series part 2: streaming and GenAI discussions in canon external link
Abstract
Part 1 of this series gave a general overview of the copyright-related discussions regarding streaming services from the last year. In Part 2, we will gain a clearer picture of the expected challenges for fair remuneration and control over one’s artistry created by new GenAI music services. Also, the implications for “good old” streaming services will be examined. Some concrete legal solutions will be proposed, while also highlighting uncertainties that remain.
Artificial intelligence, Copyright, music, remuneration, streaming services
RIS
Bibtex
LAION Round 2: Machine-Readable but Still Not Actionable — The Lack of Progress on TDM Opt-Outs – Part 2 external link
LAION Round 2: Machine-Readable but Still Not Actionable — The Lack of Progress on TDM Opt-Outs – Part 1 external link
Comparing the Right to an Explanation of Judicial AI by Function: Studies on the EU, Brazil, and China external link
Abstract
Courts across the world are increasingly adopting AI to automate various tasks. But, the opacity of judicial AI systems can hinder the ability of litigants to contest vital pieces of evidence and legal observations. One proposed remedy for the inscrutability of judicial AI has been the right to an explanation. This paper provides an analysis of the scope and contents of a right to an explanation of judicial AI in the EU, Brazil, and China. We argue that such a right needs to take into account that judicial AI can perform widely different functions. We provide a classification of these functions, ranging from ancillary to impactful tasks. We subsequently compare, by function, how judicial AI would need to be explained under due process standards, Data Protection Law, and AI regulation in the EU, Brazil, and China. We find that due process standards provide a broad normative basis for a derived right to an explanation. But, these standards do not sufficiently clarify the scope and content of such a right. Data Protection Law and AI regulations contain more explicitly formulated rights to an explanation that also apply to certain judicial AI systems. Nevertheless, they often exclude impactful functions of judicial AI from their scope. Within these laws there is also a lack of guidance as to what explainability substantively entails. Ultimately, this patchwork of legal frameworks suggests that the protection of litigant contestation is still incomplete.
Links
Artificial intelligence, digital justice, right to an explanation
RIS
Bibtex
Article 3: The Untapped Legal Basis for Europe’s Public AI Ambitions external link
A Procedural Sedative: The GDPR’s Right to an Explanation download
Abstract
What remedies do you have when AI errs, when it discriminates, or harms you in some other way? How can we hold organizations accountable when they cause people harm during the development, distribution, or use of AI? Arguably, the first step is understanding how the system in question works. To this end, the right to an explanation, provided in EU
law under the GDPR and the AI Act, is one of the most important remedies individuals have to contest AI.
Links
AI Act, Artificial intelligence, GDPR
RIS
Bibtex
Win-Win: How to Remove Copyright Obstacles to AI Training While Ensuring Author Remuneration (and Why the AI Act Fails to do the Magic) external link
Abstract
In the debate on AI training and copyright, the focus is often on the use of protected works during the AI training phase (input perspective). To reconcile training objectives with authors' fair remuneration interest, however, it is advisable to adopt an output perspective and focus on literary and artistic productions generated by fully-trained AI systems that are offered in the marketplace. Implementing output-based remuneration systems, lawmakers can establish a legal framework that supports the development of unbiased, high quality AI models while, at the same time, ensuring that authors receive a fair remuneration for the use of literary and artistic works for AI training purposes – a fair remuneration that softens displacement effects in the market for literary and artistic creations where human authors face shrinking market share and loss of income. Instead of imposing payment obligations and administrative burdens on AI developers during the AI training phase, output-based remuneration systems offer the chance of giving AI trainers far-reaching freedom. Without exposing AI developers to heavy administrative and financial burdens, lawmakers can permit the use of the full spectrum of human literary and artistic resources. Once fully developed AI systems are brought to the market, however, providers of these systems are obliged to compensate authors for the unbridled freedom to use human creations during the AI training phase and displacement effects caused by AI systems that are capable of mimicking human literary and artistic works.
As the analysis shows, the input-based remuneration approach in the EU – with rights reservations and complex transparency rules blocking access to AI training resources – is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the EU as a region for AI development. Moreover, the regulatory barriers posed by EU copyright law and the AI Act may marginalize the messages and values conveyed by European cultural expressions in AI training datasets and AI output. Considering the legal and practical difficulties resulting from the EU approach, lawmakers in other regions should refrain from following the EU model. As an alternative, they should explore output-based remuneration mechanisms. In contrast to the burdensome EU system that requires the payment of remuneration for access to human AI training resources, an output-based approach does not weaken the position of the domestic high-tech sector: AI developers are free to use human creations as training material. Once fully developed AI systems are offered in the marketplace, all providers of AI systems capable of producing literary and artistic output are subject to the same payment obligation and remuneration scheme – regardless of whether they are local or foreign companies. The advantages of this alternative approach are evident. Offering broad freedom to use human creations for AI training, an output-based approach is conducive to AI development. It also bans the risk of marginalizing the messages and values conveyed by a country’s literary and artistic expressions.
Links
Artificial intelligence, Copyright, remuneration
RIS
Bibtex
Copyright and the Expression Engine: Idea and Expression in AI-Assisted Creations external link
Links
Artificial intelligence, Copyright