Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation

Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation external link

German Law Journal (forthcoming), 2022

Abstract

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platform's terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards, and therefore allowing Article 14 to fulfil its revolutionary potential.

Links

Content moderation, Digital Services Act (DSA), Freedom of expression, Online platforms, platform regulation, terms and conditions

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Quintais, J.
AU  - Appelman, N.
AU  - Fahy, R.
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022-11-25
T1  - Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation
JO  - German Law Journal (forthcoming)
UR  - https://osf.io/f2n7m/
AB  - Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platform\'s terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards, and therefore allowing Article 14 to fulfil its revolutionary potential.
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Online platforms
K1  - platform regulation
K1  - terms and conditions
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation},
	author = {Quintais, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R.},
	url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4286147},
	year = {2022},
	date = {2022-11-25},
	journal = {German Law Journal (forthcoming)},
	abstract = {Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platform\'s terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards, and therefore allowing Article 14 to fulfil its revolutionary potential.},
	keywords = {Content moderation, Digital Services Act (DSA), Freedom of expression, Online platforms, platform regulation, terms and conditions},
}

Save .bib

A Freedom of Expression Right to Register “Immoral” Trademarks and Trademarks Contrary to Public Order

Izyumenko, E.

IIC, vol. 52, iss. : 7, pp: 893–914, 2021

Abstract

Recently, in a judgment on the “Fack Ju Göhte” case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acknowledged that freedom of expression must be taken into account when applying the absolute ground for refusal of trademark registration related to public policy or to accepted principles of morality. Even prior to this pronouncement by the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had already confirmed that the refusal of trademark registration, as such, implicates the speech rights of trademark applicants. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), likewise, had admitted on a number of occasions that the trademark applicant seeking registration of an “immoral” trademark or a trademark contrary to public order has a right “to freely employ words and images in the signs it wishes to register as trademarks”. This article explains what the freedom of expression grounding of the rights of trademark applicants to the so-called “immoral” trademarks and/or trademarks contrary to public order might mean for the future of these absolute grounds for refusal of trademark registration in Europe. It does so by reviewing, first, whether the wording and practical application of these grounds for refusal comply with the standards that can be derived from Art. 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It then examines particularities of the free speech analysis with regards to religious, sexually obscene or otherwise “immoral” signs, as well as with regards to the signs amounting to hate speech or other speech presumably dangerous to public order.

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-021-01085-3

Freedom of expression, Trademark law

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Izyumenko, E.
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021-06-30
T1  - A Freedom of Expression Right to Register “Immoral” Trademarks and Trademarks Contrary to Public Order
JO  - IIC
VL  - 52
IS  - 7
SP  - 893–914
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-021-01085-3
AB  - Recently, in a judgment on the “Fack Ju Göhte” case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acknowledged that freedom of expression must be taken into account when applying the absolute ground for refusal of trademark registration related to public policy or to accepted principles of morality. Even prior to this pronouncement by the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had already confirmed that the refusal of trademark registration, as such, implicates the speech rights of trademark applicants. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), likewise, had admitted on a number of occasions that the trademark applicant seeking registration of an “immoral” trademark or a trademark contrary to public order has a right “to freely employ words and images in the signs it wishes to register as trademarks”. This article explains what the freedom of expression grounding of the rights of trademark applicants to the so-called “immoral” trademarks and/or trademarks contrary to public order might mean for the future of these absolute grounds for refusal of trademark registration in Europe. It does so by reviewing, first, whether the wording and practical application of these grounds for refusal comply with the standards that can be derived from Art. 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It then examines particularities of the free speech analysis with regards to religious, sexually obscene or otherwise “immoral” signs, as well as with regards to the signs amounting to hate speech or other speech presumably dangerous to public order.
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Trademark law
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{nokey,
	title = {A Freedom of Expression Right to Register “Immoral” Trademarks and Trademarks Contrary to Public Order},
	author = {Izyumenko, E.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-021-01085-3},
	year = {2021},
	date = {2021-06-30},
	journal = {IIC},
	volume = {52},
	issue = {7},
	pages = {893–914},
	abstract = {Recently, in a judgment on the “Fack Ju Göhte” case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acknowledged that freedom of expression must be taken into account when applying the absolute ground for refusal of trademark registration related to public policy or to accepted principles of morality. Even prior to this pronouncement by the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had already confirmed that the refusal of trademark registration, as such, implicates the speech rights of trademark applicants. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), likewise, had admitted on a number of occasions that the trademark applicant seeking registration of an “immoral” trademark or a trademark contrary to public order has a right “to freely employ words and images in the signs it wishes to register as trademarks”. This article explains what the freedom of expression grounding of the rights of trademark applicants to the so-called “immoral” trademarks and/or trademarks contrary to public order might mean for the future of these absolute grounds for refusal of trademark registration in Europe. It does so by reviewing, first, whether the wording and practical application of these grounds for refusal comply with the standards that can be derived from Art. 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It then examines particularities of the free speech analysis with regards to religious, sexually obscene or otherwise “immoral” signs, as well as with regards to the signs amounting to hate speech or other speech presumably dangerous to public order.},
	keywords = {Freedom of expression, Trademark law},
}

Save .bib

The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights external link

Quintais, J. & Quintais, J.

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 16, num: 3, pp: 213-225, 2021

Abstract

On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated. This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling. This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).

Links

Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 0218
DA  - 2021-02-18
T1  - The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights
JO  - Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice
VL  - 16
NV  - 3
SP  - 213-225
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775599
DO  - https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040
AB  - On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).
K1  - Copyright
K1  - EU law
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - frontpage
K1  - Fundamental rights
K1  - Funke Medien
K1  - limitations and exceptions
K1  - music sampling
K1  - Pelham
K1  - Spiegel Online
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{QuintaisJutte2021,
	title = {The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights},
	author = {Quintais, J.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040},
	year = {0218},
	date = {2021-02-18},
	journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice},
	volume = {16},
	number = {3},
	pages = {213-225},
	abstract = {On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).},
	keywords = {Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online},
}

Save .bib

The freedom of expression perspectives on intellectual property in Europe

Izyumenko, E.

2020

Abstract

PhD thesis, CEIPI, Strasbourg.

Europe, Freedom of expression, Intellectual property

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market external link

Senftleben, M. & Angelopoulos, C.

2020

Abstract

EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers. This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD'). With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022

algorithmic enforcement, Auteursrecht, censorship, Content moderation, Copyright, defamation, Digital Services Act (DSA), filtering, Freedom of expression, frontpage, general monitoring, hosting service, injunctive relief, intermediary liability, notice and stay down, notice and take down, safe harbour, trade mark, user-generated content

RIS

TY  - RPRT
AU  - Senftleben, M.
AU  - Angelopoulos, C.
PY  - 1029
DA  - 2020-10-29
T1  - The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022
AB  - EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of \'double specificity\' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive (\'ECD\') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (\'CDSMD\').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.
K1  - algorithmic enforcement
K1  - Auteursrecht
K1  - censorship
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - Copyright
K1  - defamation
K1  - Digital Services Act (DSA)
K1  - filtering
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - frontpage
K1  - general monitoring
K1  - hosting service
K1  - injunctive relief
K1  - intermediary liability
K1  - notice and stay down
K1  - notice and take down
K1  - safe harbour
K1  - trade mark
K1  - user-generated content
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Report{Senftleben2020e,
	title = {The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market},
	author = {Senftleben, M. and Angelopoulos, C.},
	year = {1029},
	date = {2020-10-29},
	abstract = {EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of \'double specificity\' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive (\'ECD\') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (\'CDSMD\').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.},
	keywords = {algorithmic enforcement, Auteursrecht, censorship, Content moderation, Copyright, defamation, Digital Services Act (DSA), filtering, Freedom of expression, frontpage, general monitoring, hosting service, injunctive relief, intermediary liability, notice and stay down, notice and take down, safe harbour, trade mark, user-generated content},
}

Save .bib

European Court of Human Rights rules that collateral website blocking violates freedom of expression

Izyumenko, E.

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 15, iss. : 10, pp: 774–775, 2020

Links

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpaa135

Freedom of expression, Human rights

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law – Comment of the European Copyright Society external link

Metzger, A., Senftleben, M., Derclaye E., Dreier, T., Geiger, C., Griffiths, J., Hilty, R., Hugenholtz, P.B., Riis, T., Rognstad, O.A., Strowel, A.M., Synodinou, T. & Xalabarder, R.

2020

Abstract

The national implementation of Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) poses particular challenges. Article 17 is one of the most complex – and most controversial – provisions of the new legislative package which EU Member States must transpose into national law by 7 June 2021. Seeking to contribute to the debate on implementation options, the European Copyright Society addresses several core aspects of Article 17 that may play an important role in the national implementation process. It deals with the concept of online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) before embarking on a discussion of the licensing and content moderation duties which OCSSPs must fulfil in accordance with Article 17(1) and (4). The analysis also focuses on the copyright limitations mentioned in Article 17(7) that support the creation and dissemination of transformative user-generated content (UGC). It also discusses the appropriate configuration of complaint and redress mechanisms set forth in Article 17(9) that seek to reduce the risk of unjustified content removals. Finally, the European Copyright Society addresses the possibility of implementing direct remuneration claims for authors and performers, and explores the private international law aspect of applicable law – an impact factor that is often overlooked in the debate.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589323

algorithmic enforcement, applicable law, collective copyright management, content hosting, Content moderation, copyright contract law, EU copyright law, filtering mechanisms, Freedom of expression, Licensing, notice-and-takedown, private international law, transformative use, user-generated content

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Metzger, A.
AU  - Senftleben, M.
AU  - Derclaye E.
AU  - Dreier, T.
AU  - Geiger, C.
AU  - Griffiths, J.
AU  - Hilty, R.
AU  - Hugenholtz, P.B.
AU  - Riis, T.
AU  - Rognstad, O.A.
AU  - Strowel, A.M.
AU  - Synodinou, T.
AU  - Xalabarder, R.
PY  - 0507
DA  - 2020-05-07
T1  - Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law – Comment of the European Copyright Society
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589323
AB  - The national implementation of Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) poses particular challenges. Article 17 is one of the most complex – and most controversial – provisions of the new legislative package which EU Member States must transpose into national law by 7 June 2021. Seeking to contribute to the debate on implementation options, the European Copyright Society addresses several core aspects of Article 17 that may play an important role in the national implementation process. It deals with the concept of online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) before embarking on a discussion of the licensing and content moderation duties which OCSSPs must fulfil in accordance with Article 17(1) and (4). The analysis also focuses on the copyright limitations mentioned in Article 17(7) that support the creation and dissemination of transformative user-generated content (UGC). It also discusses the appropriate configuration of complaint and redress mechanisms set forth in Article 17(9) that seek to reduce the risk of unjustified content removals. Finally, the European Copyright Society addresses the possibility of implementing direct remuneration claims for authors and performers, and explores the private international law aspect of applicable law – an impact factor that is often overlooked in the debate.
K1  - algorithmic enforcement
K1  - applicable law
K1  - collective copyright management
K1  - content hosting
K1  - Content moderation
K1  - copyright contract law
K1  - EU copyright law
K1  - filtering mechanisms
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - Licensing
K1  - notice-and-takedown
K1  - private international law
K1  - transformative use
K1  - user-generated content
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{Metzger2020,
	title = {Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law – Comment of the European Copyright Society},
	author = {Metzger, A. and Senftleben, M. and Derclaye E. and Dreier, T. and Geiger, C. and Griffiths, J. and Hilty, R. and Hugenholtz, P.B. and Riis, T. and Rognstad, O.A. and Strowel, A.M. and Synodinou, T. and Xalabarder, R.},
	year = {0507},
	date = {2020-05-07},
	abstract = {The national implementation of Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) poses particular challenges. Article 17 is one of the most complex – and most controversial – provisions of the new legislative package which EU Member States must transpose into national law by 7 June 2021. Seeking to contribute to the debate on implementation options, the European Copyright Society addresses several core aspects of Article 17 that may play an important role in the national implementation process. It deals with the concept of online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) before embarking on a discussion of the licensing and content moderation duties which OCSSPs must fulfil in accordance with Article 17(1) and (4). The analysis also focuses on the copyright limitations mentioned in Article 17(7) that support the creation and dissemination of transformative user-generated content (UGC). It also discusses the appropriate configuration of complaint and redress mechanisms set forth in Article 17(9) that seek to reduce the risk of unjustified content removals. Finally, the European Copyright Society addresses the possibility of implementing direct remuneration claims for authors and performers, and explores the private international law aspect of applicable law – an impact factor that is often overlooked in the debate.},
	keywords = {algorithmic enforcement, applicable law, collective copyright management, content hosting, Content moderation, copyright contract law, EU copyright law, filtering mechanisms, Freedom of expression, Licensing, notice-and-takedown, private international law, transformative use, user-generated content},
}

Save .bib

Implications of AI-driven tools in the media for freedom of expression external link

Helberger, N., Eskens, S., Drunen, M. van, Bastian, M. & Möller, J.

2020

Abstract

Background Paper to the Ministerial Conference "Artificial Intelligence - Intelligent Politics: Challenges and opportunities for media and democracy, Cyprus, 28-29 May 2020."

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/AI-and-Freedom-of-Expression.pdf

Artificial intelligence, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Media law

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Article 10 ECHR and Expressive Conduct external link

Fahy, R. & Voorhoof, D.

Communications Law, vol. 24, num: 2, pp: 62-73, 2019

Abstract

The European Court of Human Rights has recently delivered a series of judgments finding violations of the right to freedom of expression over convictions for engaging in expressive conduct. The purpose of this article is to discuss the European Court's recent case law on expressive conduct under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and in particular to assess in what circumstances, if any, domestic courts may impose prison sentences, even if suspended, on individuals engaging in peaceful, but provocative and offensive expression.

Links

https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Communications_Law_2019.pdf

article 10, expressive conduct, Freedom of expression, frontpage

RIS

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Save .bib

Advocate General Turns down the Music – Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right under EU Copyright Law external link

Jütte, B. & Quintais, J.

European Intellectual Property Review , vol. 41, num: 10, pp: 654-657, 2019

Abstract

In his Opinion in Pelham (C-467/17) Advocate General Szpunar suggests that the use of samples from sound recordings is not permitted under the European copyright rules. While applying an extensive interpretation of the scope of the rights of phonogram producers, he rejects an extensive interpretation of the quotation exception and limits the role of fundamental rights as external checks to copyright law. Despite its merits, there are key aspects of the Opinion that raise concerns: a too broad interpretation of the reproduction right; and an unduly strict view of copyright exceptions – especially quotation – and the role of fundamental rights in shaping the scope of copyright protection. On those points, we suggest that the Court does not follow the Opinion.

Links

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3377205

Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, limitations and exceptions, music sampling

RIS

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jütte, B.
AU  - Quintais, J.
PY  - 2019
DA  - 2019-05-09
T1  - Advocate General Turns down the Music – Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right under EU Copyright Law
JO  - European Intellectual Property Review 
VL  - 41
NV  - 10
SP  - 654-657
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3377205
AB  - In his Opinion in Pelham (C-467/17) Advocate General Szpunar suggests that the use of samples from sound recordings is not permitted under the European copyright rules. While applying an extensive interpretation of the scope of the rights of phonogram producers, he rejects an extensive interpretation of the quotation exception and limits the role of fundamental rights as external checks to copyright law. Despite its merits, there are key aspects of the Opinion that raise concerns: a too broad interpretation of the reproduction right; and an unduly strict view of copyright exceptions – especially quotation – and the role of fundamental rights in shaping the scope of copyright protection. On those points, we suggest that the Court does not follow the Opinion.
K1  - Copyright
K1  - EU law
K1  - Freedom of expression
K1  - frontpage
K1  - Fundamental rights
K1  - limitations and exceptions
K1  - music sampling
ER  -

Save .RIS

Bibtex

Article{Jütte2019,
	title = {Advocate General Turns down the Music – Sampling Is Not a Fundamental Right under EU Copyright Law},
	author = {Jütte, B. and Quintais, J.},
	year = {2019},
	date = {2019-05-09},
	journal = {European Intellectual Property Review },
	volume = {41},
	number = {10},
	pages = {654-657},
	abstract = {In his Opinion in Pelham (C-467/17) Advocate General Szpunar suggests that the use of samples from sound recordings is not permitted under the European copyright rules. While applying an extensive interpretation of the scope of the rights of phonogram producers, he rejects an extensive interpretation of the quotation exception and limits the role of fundamental rights as external checks to copyright law. Despite its merits, there are key aspects of the Opinion that raise concerns: a too broad interpretation of the reproduction right; and an unduly strict view of copyright exceptions – especially quotation – and the role of fundamental rights in shaping the scope of copyright protection. On those points, we suggest that the Court does not follow the Opinion.},
	keywords = {Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, limitations and exceptions, music sampling},
}

Save .bib