Keyword: Freedom of expression
Public Knowledge and Expertise Under Authoritarian Siege: A Defense of Academic Freedom from Digital Journalism Studies external link
Abstract
This article addresses the growing global assault on academic free-dom—a cornerstone of democratic societies now under increasingthreat from authoritarian regimes. It highlights a global decline inthat freedom since its peak 20 years ago, focusing on the UnitedStates in 2025 to illustrate rapidly escalating academic silencing, evenin a country with well-established democratic freedoms and institu-tions. Drawing on the collective expertise of international scholars indigital journalism studies (DJS)—a field situated at the crossroads ofvulnerable institutions—and informed by anonymous reports fromU.S.-based academics as well as the wider academic literature, thiscommentary examines the impact of political interference, censorship,and self-censorship in academia. It argues that DJS as a field mustdevelop approaches that actively resist authoritarianism and upholdfreedom of expression and inquiry. The commentary concludes witha normative framework for doing this, proposing a three-prongedapproach to defending the larger field, the scholarship within it, andthe wellbeing of individual scholars of digital journalism studies.
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academic freedom, academic research, censorship, Freedom of expression
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Fashion Waste, Trade Mark Protection, and the Circular Economy: Towards a New Public Domain for Sustainable Reuse download
Abstract
Traditionally, the debate on trade mark law and the public domain has focused on the strategic use of trade mark law to artificially prolong exclusive rights after the expiry of protection in intellectual property systems with a limited term, and the grant of trade mark rights covering public domain material, such as cultural signs and traditional cultural expressions. While the glamorous world of fashion offers examples of protection term extension and public domain re-appropriation cases, the following analysis focuses on fashion reuse in the circular economy as a phenomenon that can be placed in a public domain context. Considering the urgent need for measures to enhance legal certainty for sustainable fashion reuse in the circular economy, the question arises whether the time has come to discuss a limitation of trade mark rights and a corresponding broadening of the public domain. More concretely, it seems tempting to establish a new public domain by giving second-hand and unsold fashion items the status of freely available resources for sustainable upcycling and reuse in the circular economy—even if these fashion items bear protected third-party brand insignia. Exploring options for the practical implementation of this new public domain space, the analysis will yield the insight that the termination of trade mark rights is beyond reach. Alternatively, however, lawmakers and judges could consider introducing a robust principle of free reuse that shields initiatives leading to the sustainable reuse of trade-marked fashion items effectively against allegations of trade mark infringement.
Fashion, Freedom of expression, Intellectual property, public domain, trade mark
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The Regulation of Disinformation Under the Digital Services Act external link
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This article critically examines the regulation of disinformation under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA). It begins by analysing how the DSA applies to disinformation, discussing how the DSA facilitates the removal of illegal disinformation, and on the other hand, how it can protect users’ freedom of expression against the removal of certain content classified as disinformation. The article then moves to the DSA’s special risk‐based rules, which apply to Very Large Online Platforms in relation to mitigation of systemic risks relating to disinformation, and are to be enforced by the European Commission. We analyse recent regulatory action by the Commission in tackling disinformation within its DSA competencies, and assess these actions from a fundamental rights perspective, focusing on freedom of expression guaranteed under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Digital Services Act (DSA), disinformation, Freedom of expression, Online platforms
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How the EU Outsources the Task of Human Rights Protection to Platforms and Users: The Case of UGC Monetization external link
Abstract
With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach.
Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.
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Artificial intelligence, Content moderation, Copyright, derivative works, discrimination, Freedom of expression, Human rights, liability, proportionality, user-generated content
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Generative AI and Author Remuneration
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With the evolution of generative AI systems, machine-made productions in the literary and artistic field have reached a level of refinement that allows them to replace human creations. The increasing sophistication of AI systems will inevitably disrupt the market for human literary and artistic works. Generative AI systems provide literary and artistic output much faster and cheaper. It is therefore foreseeable that human authors will be exposed to substitution effects. They may lose income as they are replaced by machines in sectors ranging from journalism and writing to music and visual arts. Considering this trend, the question arises whether it is advisable to take measures to compensate human authors for the reduction in their market share and income. Copyright law could serve as a tool to introduce an AI levy system and ensure the payment of equitable remuneration. In combination with mandatory collective rights management, the new revenue stream could be used to finance social and cultural funds that improve the working and living conditions of flesh-and-blood authors.
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collective rights management, Copyright, Freedom of expression, Text and Data Mining (TDM), three-step test
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Designing a freedom of expression-compliant framework for moral rights in the EU: challenges and proposals
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In the discussions on copyright and freedom of expression, it is common to focus on copy-right’s economic rights and their potential to restrict the users’ freedom of artistic creativity, freedom to express criticism or freedom to receive and impart information. By contrast, moral rights of the authors (such as the right of divulgation, the right of attribution and the right of integrity) have been much less explored with regard to their potential conflict with creators’ and users’ freedom of expression. Without doubt, moral rights are at the core of copyright protection, in particular in systems following the so-called “civil law” tradition. Their protection represents an important interest that can claim fundamental rights foundations. On a more general level, moral rights can emanate from the need to protect the authors’ dignity and personality - the values underlying a number of fundamental rights in the human rights treaties. More specifically, certain scholars allocate the interest in the protection of the authors’ moral rights in the right to privacy and personal integrity, others - in the so-called “negative” aspect of the right to freedom of expression - the right not to speak and to be free from unwanted associations. Either one way or another, however, the interest of the author in the protection of her personality via moral rights should not be accorded absolute and hence unqualified protection. In particular, competing freedom of expression interests of users (including derivative creators) must not be neglected as a result of such protection. The argument of this chapter is that, despite a relative lack of attention towards the effects of moral rights on the freedom of expression of others, moral rights, if applied in an unlimited way, might impede users’ freedoms even to a greater extent than economic rights of copyright holders. The problem thus deserves further scrutiny and solutions need to be advanced to guarantee that uses of copyright-protected works that are essential for a democratic society are not unduly hindered by moral rights.
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Freedom of expression, moral rights
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Freedom of Expression as a Rationale for IP Protection
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This article revisits the discussion on the rationales for intellectual property (IP) protection by addressing a particular justificatory theory for IP that had come to the forefront of legal discussions in recent years – the theory based on freedom of expression and information. This modern vision of IP focuses on the communicative nature of IP subject-matter and of IP as a legal regime. Firstly, this article reviews the Kantian theory of copyright that lies at the origins of any modern discussions on the communicative nature of IP regulation with the aim of answering whether IP should be more properly conceived as the system for regulating communication. It then looks at the readings of this theory by contemporary copyright scholars and considers applicability of the communicative theory to other areas of IP such as trademarks and patents. The analysis then proceeds towards looking at the freedom of expression dimension of the ‘classic’ IP theories. Reflecting on this matter is important as the rationales for IP protection influence virtually all spheres of IP’s legal regulation, including – first and foremost – the reach of IP holders’ entitlements.
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Freedom of expression, Intellectual property
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Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation
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Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.
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Content moderation, Digital Services Act (DSA), Freedom of expression, Online platforms, platform regulation, terms and conditions
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Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights external link
Abstract
This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first seven editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2022) have proved hugely successful. The new seventh edition summarises over 378 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database).
Freedom of expression, Journalism, Media law