Keyword: Copyright
EU copyright law round up – second trimester of 2021 external link
Commission’s Guidance on Art. 17 CDSM Directive: the authorisation dimension external link
Ensuring the Visibility and Accessibility of European Creative Content on the World Market: The Need for Copyright Data Improvement in the Light of New Technologies external link
Abstract
In the European Strategy for Data, the European Commission highlighted the EU’s ambition to acquire a leading role in the data economy. At the same time, the Commission conceded that the EU would have to increase its pools of quality data available for use and re-use. In the creative industries, this need for enhanced data quality and interoperability is particularly strong. Without data improvement, unprecedented opportunities for monetising the wide variety of EU creative and making this content available for new technologies, such as artificial intelligence training systems, will most probably be lost. The problem has a worldwide dimension. While the US have already taken steps to provide an integrated data space for music as of 1 January 2021, the EU is facing major obstacles not only in the field of music but also in other creative industry sectors. Weighing costs and benefits, there can be little doubt that new data improvement initiatives and sufficient investment in a better copyright data infrastructure should play a central role in EU copyright policy. A trade-off between data harmonisation and interoperability on the one hand, and transparency and accountability of content recommender systems on the other, could pave the way for successful new initiatives.
Artificial intelligence, Collective licensing, Content moderation, Copyright, creative industry, cultural diversity, Digital Services Act (DSA), interoperability, market concentration, market failure, metadata, Music Modernization Act, recommender systems, SME, Transparency, trustworthy AI
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The Interplay between the Digital Services Act and Sector Regulation: How Special is Copyright? external link
Abstract
On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the 21-year- old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services.
Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this paper, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in art. 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the DSA will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by art. 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where art. 17 leaves margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the DSA relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where art. 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter.
From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the DSA aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might be help achieve that goal.
Art. 17 CDSM Directive, Content moderation, Copyright, Digital Services Act (DSA), frontpage, Online platforms
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Too Small to Matter? On the Copyright Directive’s bias in favour of big right-holders external link
Abstract
Copyright law is about recognising the author’s material and non-material interests and setting the incentives for creativity right. The legislative changes in this area increasingly look as if simple linearity governs the world: what we take away from some, we automatically give away in equal part to others. The idea of redistribution is noticeable in recent legislative developments. Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive) is the latest policy intervention to prove this point. According to its logic, imposing stricter liability on some online gatekeepers will automatically improve the position and revenues for all right-holders. This chapter explores the flaws in such an approach by highlighting how the excessive focus of Art. 17 on big right-holders neglects and harms smaller creators.
EU copyright law often uses a technical term of ‘right-holders’ to refer to a wide range of players with legal entitlements in the copyright ecosystem: authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers, broadcasting organisations and (most recently) press publishers. Obviously, not all right-holders are created equal nor do their legal entitlements flow from identical normative justifications. We argue in this chapter that even the use of this seemingly neutral term can, due to the design of underlying legal solutions, lead to stark inequality between right-holders. Our broader goal is to demonstrate that maximising enforcement by means of Art. 17 of the DSM Directive does not simply maximise the position of every right-holder at the expense of platforms but does so disproportionality for big right-holders. Besides, we show that blind use of ‘right-holder’ and ‘user’ distinction harms the very creators that provision is supposed to protect.
Article 17, Copyright, equal treatment, frontpage, online platform
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The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part II external link
The Rise of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the Role of Copyright Law – Part I external link
The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights external link
Abstract
On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.
This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.
This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).
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Copyright, EU law, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Fundamental rights, Funke Medien, limitations and exceptions, music sampling, Pelham, Spiegel Online
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The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market external link
Abstract
EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.
This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD').
With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.
algorithmic enforcement, Auteursrecht, censorship, Content moderation, Copyright, defamation, Digital Services Act (DSA), filtering, Freedom of expression, frontpage, general monitoring, hosting service, injunctive relief, intermediary liability, notice and stay down, notice and take down, safe harbour, trade mark, user-generated content