Keyword: Human rights

From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test external link

Senftleben, M.
0416

Abstract

In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.

access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement

Bibtex

Chapter{Senftleben2020b, title = {From Flexible Balancing Tool to Quasi-Constitutional Straitjacket – How the EU Cultivates the Constraining Function of the Three-Step Test}, author = {Senftleben, M.}, url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576019}, year = {0416}, date = {2020-04-16}, abstract = {In the international intellectual property (IP) arena, the so-called “three-step test” regulates the room for the adoption of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to exclusive rights across different fields of IP. Given the openness of the individual test criteria, it is tempting for proponents of strong IP protection to strive for the fixation of the meaning of the three-step test at the constraining end of the spectrum of possible interpretations. As the three-step test lies at the core of legislative initiatives to balance exclusive rights and user freedoms, the cultivation of the test’s constraining function and the suppression of the test’s enabling function has the potential to transform the three-step test into a bulwark against limitations of IP protection. The EU is at the forefront of a constraining use and interpretation of the three-step test in the field of copyright law. The configuration of the legal framework in the EU is worrisome because it obliges judges to apply the three-step test as an additional control instrument. It is not sufficient that an individual use falls within the scope of a statutory copyright limitation that explicitly permits this type of use without prior authorization. In addition, judges applying the three-step test also examine whether the specific form of use at issue complies with each individual criterion of the three-step test. Hence, the test serves as an instrument to further restrict L&Es that have already been defined precisely in statutory law. Not surprisingly, decisions from courts in the EU have a tendency of shedding light on the constraining aspect of the three-step test and, therefore, reinforcing the hegemony of copyright holders in the IP arena. The hypothesis underlying the following examination, therefore, is that the EU approach to the three-step test is one-sided in the sense that it only demonstrates the potential of the test to set additional limits to L&Es. The analysis focuses on this transformation of a flexible international balancing tool into a powerful confirmation and fortification of IP protection. For this purpose, the two facets of the international three-step test – its enabling and constraining function – are explored before embarking on a discussion of case law that evolved under the one-sided EU approach. Analyzing repercussions on international lawmaking, it will become apparent that the EU approach already impacted the further development of international L&Es. Certain features of the Marrakesh Treaty clearly reflect the restrictive EU approach.}, keywords = {access to knowledge, Berne Convention, Copyright, EU law, frontpage, Human rights, limitations and exceptions, Marrakesh Treaty, rights of disabled persons, transformative use, TRIPS Agreement}, }

Prospective Policy Study on Artificial Intelligence and EU Trade Policy external link

Irion, K. & Williams, J.
2020

Abstract

Artificial intelligence is poised to be 21st century’s most transformative general purpose technology that mankind ever availed itself of. Artificial intelligence is a catch-all for technologies that can carry out complex processes fairly independently by learning from data. In the form of popular digital services and products, applied artificial intelligence is seeping into our daily lives, for example, as personal digital assistants or as autopiloting of self-driving cars. This is just the beginning of a development over the course of which artificial intelligence will generate transformative products and services that will alter world trade patterns. Artificial intelligence holds enormous promise for our information civilization if we get the governance of artificial intelligence right. What makes artificial intelligence even more fascinating is that the technology can be deployed fairly location-independent. Cross-border trade in digital services which incorporate applied artificial intelligence into their software architecture is ever increasing. That brings artificial intelligence within the purview of international trade law, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and ongoing negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trade related aspects of electronic commerce. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned this study to generate knowledge about the interface between international trade law and European norms and values in the use of artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence, EU law, Human rights, Transparency, WTO law

Bibtex

Report{Irion2020b, title = {Prospective Policy Study on Artificial Intelligence and EU Trade Policy}, author = {Irion, K. and Williams, J.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/ivir_policy-paper_ai-study_online/https://www.ivir.nl/ivir_artificial-intelligence-and-eu-trade-policy-2/}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-21}, abstract = {Artificial intelligence is poised to be 21st century’s most transformative general purpose technology that mankind ever availed itself of. Artificial intelligence is a catch-all for technologies that can carry out complex processes fairly independently by learning from data. In the form of popular digital services and products, applied artificial intelligence is seeping into our daily lives, for example, as personal digital assistants or as autopiloting of self-driving cars. This is just the beginning of a development over the course of which artificial intelligence will generate transformative products and services that will alter world trade patterns. Artificial intelligence holds enormous promise for our information civilization if we get the governance of artificial intelligence right. What makes artificial intelligence even more fascinating is that the technology can be deployed fairly location-independent. Cross-border trade in digital services which incorporate applied artificial intelligence into their software architecture is ever increasing. That brings artificial intelligence within the purview of international trade law, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and ongoing negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trade related aspects of electronic commerce. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned this study to generate knowledge about the interface between international trade law and European norms and values in the use of artificial intelligence.}, keywords = {Artificial intelligence, EU law, Human rights, Transparency, WTO law}, }

“Fake news”: False fears or real concerns? external link

McGonagle, T.
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 35, num: 4, pp: 203-209, 2017

Abstract

‘‘Fake news’’ has become a much-used and much-hyped term in the so-called ‘‘post-truth’’ era that we now live in. It is also much-maligned: it is often blamed for having a disruptive impact on the outcomes of elections and referenda and for skewing democratic public debate, with the 2016 US Presidential elections and Brexit referendum often cited as examples. ‘‘Fake news’’ has also been flagged for fuelling propaganda and ‘‘hate speech’’ and even violence. ‘‘Pizzagate’’ is an infamous example of exceptional circumstances in which a false news story had a central role in a shooting incident. In December 2016, a man in Washington D.C. took it upon himself to ‘‘self-investigate’’ a story (a completely unfounded conspiracy theory) that the Hillary Clinton campaign team was running a paedophile ring from the premises of a pizzeria. Shots were fired and he was arrested and charged with assault and related offences. Given all this bad press, it is perhaps little wonder that ‘‘fake news’’ has become a major preoccupation for international organisations, national law- and policy-makers, the media and media actors, civil society and academia. But what exactly is ‘‘fake news’’ and what is all the fuss about? In addressing these questions, this column will also consider historical and contemporary perspectives on the term and its relationship with human rights.

Fake news, frontpage, Human rights, Journalistiek, Mediarecht, post-truth era

Bibtex

Article{McGonagle2017h, title = {“Fake news”: False fears or real concerns?}, author = {McGonagle, T.}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0924051917738685}, doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0924051917738685}, year = {1205}, date = {2017-12-05}, journal = {Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {203-209}, abstract = {‘‘Fake news’’ has become a much-used and much-hyped term in the so-called ‘‘post-truth’’ era that we now live in. It is also much-maligned: it is often blamed for having a disruptive impact on the outcomes of elections and referenda and for skewing democratic public debate, with the 2016 US Presidential elections and Brexit referendum often cited as examples. ‘‘Fake news’’ has also been flagged for fuelling propaganda and ‘‘hate speech’’ and even violence. ‘‘Pizzagate’’ is an infamous example of exceptional circumstances in which a false news story had a central role in a shooting incident. In December 2016, a man in Washington D.C. took it upon himself to ‘‘self-investigate’’ a story (a completely unfounded conspiracy theory) that the Hillary Clinton campaign team was running a paedophile ring from the premises of a pizzeria. Shots were fired and he was arrested and charged with assault and related offences. Given all this bad press, it is perhaps little wonder that ‘‘fake news’’ has become a major preoccupation for international organisations, national law- and policy-makers, the media and media actors, civil society and academia. But what exactly is ‘‘fake news’’ and what is all the fuss about? In addressing these questions, this column will also consider historical and contemporary perspectives on the term and its relationship with human rights.}, keywords = {Fake news, frontpage, Human rights, Journalistiek, Mediarecht, post-truth era}, }

The Chilling Effect of Liability for Online Reader Comments external link

Fahy, R.
European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 2017, num: 4, pp: 387-393, 2017

Abstract

This article assesses how the European Court of Human Rights has responded to the argument that holding online news media liable for reader comments has a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The article demonstrates how the Court first responded by dismissing the argument, and focused on the apparent lack of evidence for any such chilling effect. The article then argues that the Court has moved away from its initial rejection, and now accepts that a potential chilling effect, even without evidence, is integral to deciding whether online news media should be liable for reader comments. Finally, the article argues that this latter view is consistent with the Court’s precedent in other areas of freedom of expression law where a similar chilling effect may also arise.

chilling effect, defamation, electronic publishing, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Human rights, liability, online reader comments

Bibtex

Article{Fahy2017b, title = {The Chilling Effect of Liability for Online Reader Comments}, author = {Fahy, R.}, url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/EHRLR_2017_4.pdf}, year = {0824}, date = {2017-08-24}, journal = {European Human Rights Law Review}, volume = {2017}, number = {4}, pages = {387-393}, abstract = {This article assesses how the European Court of Human Rights has responded to the argument that holding online news media liable for reader comments has a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The article demonstrates how the Court first responded by dismissing the argument, and focused on the apparent lack of evidence for any such chilling effect. The article then argues that the Court has moved away from its initial rejection, and now accepts that a potential chilling effect, even without evidence, is integral to deciding whether online news media should be liable for reader comments. Finally, the article argues that this latter view is consistent with the Court’s precedent in other areas of freedom of expression law where a similar chilling effect may also arise.}, keywords = {chilling effect, defamation, electronic publishing, Freedom of expression, frontpage, Human rights, liability, online reader comments}, }

Human rights and encryption external link

Schulz, W. & van Hoboken, J.
pp: 83 pp., 2016

Abstract

The study provides an overview of encryption technologies and their impact on human rights. It analyzes in-depth the role of encryption in the media and communications landscape, and the impact on different services, entities and end users. It highlights good practices and examines the legal environment surrounding encryption as well as various case studies of encryption policies. Built on this exploration and analysis, the research provides recommendations on encryption policy that are useful for various stakeholders. These include signaling the need to counter the lack of gender sensitivity in the current debate, and also highlighting ideas for enhancing “encryption literacy”.

encryption, frontpage, Human rights, unesco

Bibtex

Report{Schulz2016, title = {Human rights and encryption}, author = {Schulz, W. and van Hoboken, J.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/human_rights_and_encryption.pdf}, year = {1201}, date = {2016-12-01}, abstract = {The study provides an overview of encryption technologies and their impact on human rights. It analyzes in-depth the role of encryption in the media and communications landscape, and the impact on different services, entities and end users. It highlights good practices and examines the legal environment surrounding encryption as well as various case studies of encryption policies. Built on this exploration and analysis, the research provides recommendations on encryption policy that are useful for various stakeholders. These include signaling the need to counter the lack of gender sensitivity in the current debate, and also highlighting ideas for enhancing “encryption literacy”.}, keywords = {encryption, frontpage, Human rights, unesco}, }

Is the Human Rights Framework Still Fit for the Big Data Era? A Discussion of the ECtHR’s Case Law on Privacy Violations Arising from Surveillance Activities external link

van der Sloot, B.
2015

Abstract

Human rights protect humans. This seemingly uncontroversial axiom might become quintessential over time, especially with regard to the right to privacy. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights grants natural persons> a right to complain, in order to protect their individual interests, such as those related to personal freedom, human dignity and individual autonomy. With Big Data processes, however, individuals are mostly unaware that their personal data are gathered and processed and even if they are, they are often unable to substantiate their specific individual interest in these large data gathering systems. When the European Court of Human Rights assesses these types of cases, mostly revolving around (mass) surveillance activities, it finds itself stuck between the human rights framework on the one hand and the desire to evaluate surveillance practices by states on the other. Interestingly, the Court chooses to deal with these cases under Article 8 ECHR, but in order to do so, it is forced to go beyond the fundamental pillars of the human rights framework.

Big data, conventionality, Grondrechten, Human rights, individual harm, mass surveillance, Privacy, societal interest

Bibtex

Other{nokey, title = {Is the Human Rights Framework Still Fit for the Big Data Era? A Discussion of the ECtHR’s Case Law on Privacy Violations Arising from Surveillance Activities}, author = {van der Sloot, B.}, url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1701.pdf}, year = {1215}, date = {2015-12-15}, abstract = {Human rights protect humans. This seemingly uncontroversial axiom might become quintessential over time, especially with regard to the right to privacy. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights grants natural persons> a right to complain, in order to protect their individual interests, such as those related to personal freedom, human dignity and individual autonomy. With Big Data processes, however, individuals are mostly unaware that their personal data are gathered and processed and even if they are, they are often unable to substantiate their specific individual interest in these large data gathering systems. When the European Court of Human Rights assesses these types of cases, mostly revolving around (mass) surveillance activities, it finds itself stuck between the human rights framework on the one hand and the desire to evaluate surveillance practices by states on the other. Interestingly, the Court chooses to deal with these cases under Article 8 ECHR, but in order to do so, it is forced to go beyond the fundamental pillars of the human rights framework.}, keywords = {Big data, conventionality, Grondrechten, Human rights, individual harm, mass surveillance, Privacy, societal interest}, }

Back to Black: justice.cn external link

Tsoutsanis, A.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, num: 10, pp: 725., 2015

Abstract

This short - peer reviewed - article touches on innovation in China in the field of smart phones, recent legislative reform in China for fostering intellectual property and combating counterfeit and trade mark grabbing. It also touches on human rights in China, the different approach in which the West advances its economic v human rights agenda and the selective way Silicon Valley industry participates in grass roots debate on civil liberties. The article also touches on the 'right to seek counsel' as one of the fundamental rights, which many arrested lawyers in China were deprived of during the July 2015 arrests.

bad faith, China, counterfeit, Fundamental rights, Human rights, innovation, Intellectual property, national security law, Patent law, Trademark law

Bibtex

Article{nokey, title = {Back to Black: justice.cn}, author = {Tsoutsanis, A.}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=2667516}, year = {1015}, date = {2015-10-15}, journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice}, number = {10}, abstract = {This short - peer reviewed - article touches on innovation in China in the field of smart phones, recent legislative reform in China for fostering intellectual property and combating counterfeit and trade mark grabbing. It also touches on human rights in China, the different approach in which the West advances its economic v human rights agenda and the selective way Silicon Valley industry participates in grass roots debate on civil liberties. The article also touches on the \'right to seek counsel\' as one of the fundamental rights, which many arrested lawyers in China were deprived of during the July 2015 arrests.}, keywords = {bad faith, China, counterfeit, Fundamental rights, Human rights, innovation, Intellectual property, national security law, Patent law, Trademark law}, }