The Truth dominates many public discussions today. Conventional truths from established epistemic authorities about all sorts of issues, from climate change to terrorist attacks, are increasingly challenged by ordinary citizens and presidents alike. Many have therefore proclaimed that we have entered a post-truth era: a world in which objective facts are no longer relevant. Media and politics speak in alarmist discourse about how fake news, conspiracy theories and alternative facts threaten democratic societies by destabilizing the Truth ‐ a clear sign of a moral panic. In this essay, I firstly explore what sociological changes have led to (so much commotion about) the alleged demise of the Truth. In contrast to the idea that we have moved beyond it, I argue that we are amidst public battles about the Truth: at stake is who gets to decide over that and why. I then discuss and criticize the dominant counter reaction (re-establishing the idea of one objective and irrefutable truth), which I see as an unsuccessful de-politisation strategy. Basing myself on research and experiments with epistemic democracy in the field of science studies, I end with a more effective and democratic alternative of how to deal with knowledge in the complex information landscape of today.

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New technologies, purposes and applications to process individuals’ personal data are being developed on a massive scale. But we have not only entered the ‘golden age of personal data’ in terms of its exploitation: ours is also the ‘golden age of personal data’ in terms of regulation of its use. Understood as an enabling right, the architecture of EU data protection law is capable of protecting against many of the negative short- and long-term effects of contemporary data processing. Against the backdrop of big data applications, we evaluate how the implementation of privacy and data protection rules protect against the short- and long-term effects of contemporary data processing. We conclude that from the perspective of protecting individual fundamental rights and freedoms, it would be worthwhile to explore alternative (legal) approaches instead of relying on EU data protection law alone to cope with contemporary data processing.

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the risks of privatised enforcement in the field of terrorism propaganda, stemming from the EU Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online. By shedding light on this Code, the author argues that implementation of it may undermine the rule of law and give rise to private censorship. In order to outweigh these risks, IT companies should improve their transparency, especially towards users whose content have been affected. Where automated means are used, the companies should always have in place some form of human intervention in order to contextualise posts. At the EU level, the Commission should provide IT companies with clearer guidelines regarding their liability exemption under the e-Commerce Directive. This would help prevent a race-to-the bottom where intermediaries choose to interpret and apply the most stringent national laws in order to secure at utmost their liability. The paper further articulates on the fine line that exists between ‘terrorist content’ and ‘illegal hate speech’ and the need for more detailed definitions.

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In this chapter we argue that the right to data protection is the posterchild of EU citizenship in the digital era. We start by providing a brief overview of the gradual construction of the right to personal data protection in the EU. We then identify a range of actors who have played a particular role in the building process, including EU citizens themselves. Next, we review the current legal ‘architecture’ of the right to the protection of personal data and discuss whether it could serve as a model for the future development of EU citizenship, notwithstanding remaining challenges at the level of national implementation and public and private compliance with EU rules. Finally, we reflect on the future of the right to data protection, and its contribution to the development of EU citizenship as a legal regime.

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De kinderen van Apple-baas Steve Jobs mochten geen iPad gebruiken. 1 Maar Jobs was niet de enige. Veel techies in Silicon Valley zijn zich bewust van de verslavende effecten van IT \textendash ze hebben de producten namelijk zelf ontwikkeld. En nu steeds meer spijtoptanten oproepen tot regulering van onlinediensten zoals Facebook, vraag ik me af: welke rol kan het privacyrecht daarbij spelen?

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This article introduces U.S. lawyers and academics to the normative foundations, attributes, and strategic approach to regulating personal data advanced by the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). We explain the genesis of the GDPR, which is best understood as an extension and refinement of existing requirements imposed by the 1995 Data Protection Directive; describe the GDPR’s approach and provisions; and make predictions about the GDPR’s short and medium-term implications. The GDPR is the most consequential regulatory development in information policy in a generation. The GDPR brings personal data into a detailed and protective regulatory regime, which will influence personal data usage worldwide. Understood properly, the GDPR encourages firms to develop information governance frameworks, to in-house data use, and to keep humans in the loop in decision making. Companies with direct relationships with consumers have strategic advantages under the GDPR, compared to third party advertising firms on the internet. To reach these objectives, the GDPR uses big sticks, structural elements that make proving violations easier, but only a few carrots. The GDPR will complicate and restrain some information-intensive business models. But the GDPR will also enable approaches previously impossible under less-protective approaches.

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Blogpost part of a series on data portability and interoperability.

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De vrijheid van meningsuiting heeft meer gewicht bij uitlatingen die deel uitmaken van het publiek debat. Dat is een bekend uitgangspunt dat ook door het EHRM gehanteerd wordt. Daarmee is de vraag hoe deze categorie met name beschermde uitlatingen wordt afgebakend nog niet beantwoord. Deze bijdrage tracht op grond van een analyse van de jurisprudentie van het EHRM antwoord op deze vraag te geven. Er wordt in het bijzonder ook onderzocht of de benadering van het Hof consistent is.<./p>},
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Alle opwinding over de nieuwe Europese privacyregels komt volgens Nico van Eijk neer op stemmingmakerij. Op 25 mei ziet hij bar weinig veranderen.

},
note = {<p>Opinie in Het Parool, 17 mei 2018.</p>},
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This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. With well over 30,000 downloads, the first three editions of the e-book (2013, 2015 and 2016) have proved hugely successful. The new fourth edition summarises over 270 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database). For an optimal navigational experience, one should download the e-book and read the technical tips on p. 3.

},
note = {<p>IRIS Themes, Vol. III, 4th edition, Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2017
ISBN: 9789287184351 (print version).</p>},
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Appendix IV to CTIVD report no. 56 to the review report on the multilateral exchange of data on (alleged) jihadists by the AIVD

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This article provides a more differentiated understanding of mobile health consumers, and considers whether health app use may contribute to new digital inequalities. It focuses on factors associated with mobile health app use, and identifies which factors explain the use of different types of health apps. Data from a large representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 1,079) show that mobile health app users were generally younger, higher educated, and had higher levels of e-health literacy skills than non-users. Interestingly, different usage patterns were found for specific types of health apps. Theory and policy implications are discussed.

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In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides comprehensive rules for the processing of personal data. In addition, the EU lawmaker intends to adopt specific rules to protect confidentiality of communications, in a separate ePrivacy Regulation. Some have argued that there is no need for such additional rules for communications confidentiality.
This paper discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality of communications in Europe. We look at the right’s origins as a fundamental right to assess the rationale for protecting the right. We also analyse how the right is currently protected under the European Convention on Human Rights and under EU law.
We show that the right to communications confidentiality protects three values: trust in communication services, privacy, and freedom of expression. The right aims to ensure that individuals and businesses can safely entrust communication to service providers. Initially, the right protected only postal letters, but it has gradually developed into a strong safeguard for the protection of confidentiality of communications, regardless of the technology used.
Hence, the right does not merely serve individual privacy interests, but also other interests that are crucial for the functioning of our information society. We conclude that separate EU rules to protect communications confidentiality, next to the GDPR, are justified and necessary to protect trust, privacy and freedom and expression.

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Het is drie jaar geleden dat Mediaforum een overzicht van tien privacytrends publiceerde. Toen was de Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming (AVG) nog niet aangenomen, lag Snowden nog fris in het geheugen en heette de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP) nog het College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens. Privacyrecht was ook toen al best belangrijk, maar de aandacht voor dit vakgebied is in de afgelopen jaren behoorlijk gegroeid. Dus laten we de vraag opnieuw stellen: wat is er de afgelopen tijd gebeurd op privacygebied, en vallen daarin grote lijnen te ontwaren?

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In Finland mogen openbare fiscale inkomensgegevens niet onbeperkt worden gepubliceerd: er moet een afweging plaatsvinden welk algemeen belang daarmee is gediend. Deze afweging is vergelijkbaar met die voor algemene privacy inbreuken door de pers geldt.

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Online political microtargeting involves monitoring people’s online behaviour, and using the collected data, sometimes enriched with other data, to show people-targeted political advertisements. Online political microtargeting is widely used in the US; Europe may not be far behind. This paper maps microtargeting’s promises and threats to democracy. For example, microtargeting promises to optimise the match between the electorate’s concerns and political campaigns, and to boost campaign engagement and political participation. But online microtargeting could also threaten democracy. For instance, a political party could, misleadingly, present itself as a different one-issue party to different individuals. And data collection for microtargeting raises privacy concerns. We sketch possibilities for policymakers if they seek to regulate online political microtargeting. We discuss which measures would be possible, while complying with the right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights.

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Uitlatingen van een Turkse politicus over de Armeense genocide (waarvan hij het bestaan ontkende) ten onrechte in Zwitserland veroordeeld.

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Het EHRM erkent onder voorwaarden dat er een recht op openbaarheid van bestuur uit artikel 10 is af te leiden.

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Is een 'dynamisch' IP adres een persoonsgegeven?
Verzoek om een prejudici\"{e}le beslissing ingediend door het Bundesgerichtshof (hoogste federale rechter in burgerlijke en strafzaken, Duitsland) bij beslissing van 28 oktober 2014.
Verwerking van persoonsgegevens. Begrip, persoonsgegevens’. Internetprotocoladressen. Bewaring door een aanbieder van onlinemediadiensten. Nationale regeling volgens welke geen rekening kan worden gehouden met het gerechtvaardigde belang van de voor de verwerking verantwoordelijke persoon.

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This article discusses ways in which the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and post-GATS free trade agreements may limit the EU's ability to regulate privacy and personal data protection as fundamental rights. After discussing this issue in two dimensions \textendash the vertical relationship between trade and national and European Union (EU) law, and the horizontal relationship between trade and human rights law \textendash the author concludes that these limits are real and pose serious risks.
Inspired by recent developments in safeguarding labour, and environmental standards and sustainable development, the article argues that privacy and personal data protection should be part of, and protected by, international trade deals made by the EU. The EU should negotiate future international trade agreements with the objective of allowing them to reflect the normative foundations of privacy and personal data protection. This article suggests a specific way to achieve this objective.

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Millions of European internet users access online platforms where their personal data is being collected, processed, analysed or sold. The existence of some of the largest online platforms is entirely based on data driven business models. In the European Union, the protection of personal data is considered a fundamental right. Under Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, compliance with data protection rules should be subject to control by an independent authority. In the EU, enforcement of privacy rules almost solely takes place by the national data protection authorities. They typically apply sector-specific rules, based on the EU Data Protection Directive. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission is the primary enforcer of consumers’ (online) privacy interests. The agency’s competence is not based on the protection of fundamental rights, but on the basis that maintenance of a competitive, fair marketplace will provide the right choices for consumers to take. In this Article the US legal framework will be discussed and compared to the EU legal framework, which forms our finding that in the EU rules on unfair commercial practices could be enforced in a similar manner to protect people’s privacy. In the EU, the many frictions concerning the market/consumer-oriented use of personal data form a good reason to actually deal with these frictions in a market/consumer legal framework.

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On the internet, we encounter take-it-or-leave-it choices regarding our privacy on a daily basis. In Europe, online tracking for targeted advertising generally requires the internet users’ consent to be lawful. Some websites use a tracking wall, a barrier that visitors can only pass if they consent to tracking by third parties. When confronted with such a tracking wall, many people click ‘I agree’ to tracking. A survey that we conducted shows that most people find tracking walls unfair and unacceptable. We analyse under which conditions the ePrivacy Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation allow tracking walls. We provide a list of circumstances to assess when a tracking wall makes consent invalid. We also explore how the EU lawmaker could regulate tracking walls, for instance in the ePrivacy Regulation. It should be seriously considered to ban tracking walls, at least in certain circumstances.

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In modern markets, many companies offer so-called “free” services and monetize consumer data they collect through those services. This paper argues that consumer law and data protection law can usefully complement each other. Data protection law can also inform the interpretation of consumer law. Using consumer rights, consumers should be able to challenge excessive collection of their personal data. Consumer organizations have used consumer law to tackle data protection infringements. The interplay of data protection law and consumer protection law provides exciting opportunities for a more integrated vision on “data consumer law”.

},
note = {<p>Draft version. Final version published in Common Market Law Review, 2017, nr. 5, p. 1427-1466.</p>},
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This report presents and draws on multidisciplinary insights into what characterises effective user control over the collection and use of personal data. User controls arise from the interplay of a number of conditions. These are partly technical but also connected to different aspects of user behaviour, the intricacies of design, as well as the internal and external incentives in privacy governance that exist today. Our review of the state of research underscores that devising effective user controls require close collaboration between different disciplines, clear regulatory guidance and scientifically-backed assessments.

},
note = {<p>Amsterdam / Hong Kong: IViR, 2017.</p>},
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Under European data protection law, consent of the data subject is one of the six grounds for lawful processing of personal data. It is such an important ground that lawmakers considered it necessary to provide a legal definition of consent. One of the conditions under this definition is that it needs to be “freely given.” The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 3 has further expanded on this concept in Article 7(4). It refers to a situation under which consent might not be considered “freely given.” If consent is invalid because it is not freely given, the processing is usually unlawful. Consequently, a legal basis for processing is missing. Therefore, this is an important provision. Yet the wording of this new provision is vague and its scope is unclear. Thus, the question arises as to how Article 7(4) should be applied. In this paper, the authors tease out the assessment criteria for the application of this provision on the basis of its text, structure and history. These criteria will then be applied to hypothetical cases in the final section.

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This article assesses how the European Court of Human Rights has responded to the argument that holding online news media liable for reader comments has a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The article demonstrates how the Court first responded by dismissing the argument, and focused on the apparent lack of evidence for any such chilling effect. The article then argues that the Court has moved away from its initial rejection, and now accepts that a potential chilling effect, even without evidence, is integral to deciding whether online news media should be liable for reader comments. Finally, the article argues that this latter view is consistent with the Court’s precedent in other areas of
freedom of expression law where a similar chilling effect may also arise.

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Verspreiding antiquarisch exemplaar Mein Kampf valt wel onder 137e 2e Sr, maar is niet strafbaar omdat de beperking in strijd komt met artikel 10 EVRM.

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Privacy werknemers bij een kritische publicatie over het bedrijf waar zij werkzaam zijn. Recht op anonimiteit?

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