Grondrechten

Drie mogelijke boetes van mededingings-, consumenten- en persoonsgegevensautoriteiten voor hetzelfde datagebruik

Arnbak, A., Geursen, W,W,, Yakovleva, S.

Tijdschrift Mededingingsrecht in de Praktijk, (2), pp. 30-37, 2020.

Het juridisch kader voor de verspreiding van desinformatie via internetdiensten en de regulering van politieke advertenties

Appelman, N., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Leerssen, P., McGonagle, T., van Eijk, N., van Hoboken, J.

2020, (Rapport voor het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Amsterdam, december 2019).

@techreport{vanHoboken2020b,
title = {Het juridisch kader voor de verspreiding van desinformatie via internetdiensten en de regulering van politieke advertenties},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R. and Leerssen, P. and McGonagle, T. and van Eijk, N. and Helberger, N.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Rapport_desinformatie_december2019.pdf
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Kamerbrief_desinformatie.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-14},
abstract = {Het onderzoek, uitgevoerd in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, analyseert het juridisch kader van toepassing op de verspreiding van desinformatie via online diensten. Het rapport biedt een uitgebreid overzicht van de relevante Europese en Nederlandse normen en doet aanbevelingen voor de verbetering van dit juridisch kader. Het onderzoek bevat daarnaast ook een analyse van het relevant wettelijke kader in de V.S., het V.K, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Canada en Zweden.
Het rapport maakt duidelijk hoe de vrijheid van meningsuiting als rode draad door het wettelijke kader loopt. Dit fundamentele recht vormt zowel de buitenste grens voor regulering als een basis voor nieuwe maatregelen, bijvoorbeeld voor de bescherming van pluralisme. Het wettelijk kader van toepassing op desinformatie blijkt zeer breed, bevat verschillende reguleringsniveaus, verschuift afhankelijk van de specifieke context en omvat vele al bestaande normen voor de regulering van specifieke typen desinformatie. Verder blijkt het toezicht op dit wettelijk kader vrij gefragmenteerd te zijn. Op basis van deze analyse komt het rapport tot aan aantal aanbevelingen. De aanbevelingen hebben onder andere betrekking op het gebruik van de term desinformatie als beleidsterm, het omgaan met de spanningen op de verschillende beleidsniveaus, de regulering van internettussenpersonen door middel van transparantie verplichtingen en de samenwerking tussen de verschillende toezichthouders.
Voorafgaand aan deze eindrapportage is in eind 2019 het interim-rapport gepubliceerd. Dit rapport focuste op de relatie tussen desinformatie en online politieke advertenties. Beide studies zijn onderdeel van het onderzoeksproject ‘Digital Transition of Decision-Making at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam’ dat zich buigt over vraagstukken gerelateerd aan kunstmatige intelligentie en publieke waarden, data governance, en online platforms. },
note = {Rapport voor het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Amsterdam, december 2019},
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pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

The legal framework on the dissemination of disinformation through Internet services and the regulation of political advertising

Appelman, N., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Leerssen, P., McGonagle, T., van Eijk, N., van Hoboken, J.

2020, (A report for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Amsterdam, December 2019).

@techreport{vanHoboken2020c,
title = {The legal framework on the dissemination of disinformation through Internet services and the regulation of political advertising},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R. and Leerssen, P. and McGonagle, T. and van Eijk, N. and Helberger, N.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Report_Disinformation_Dec2019-1.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-14},
abstract = {The study, commissioned by the Dutch government, focusses on the legal framework governing the dissemination of disinformation, in particular through Internet services. The study provides an extensive overview of relevant European and Dutch legal norms relating to the spread of online disinformation, and recommendations are given on how to improve this framework. Additionally, the study includes an analysis of the relevant legal framework in 6 different countries (U.K., U.S., France, Germany, Sweden and Canada).
The report makes clear how the freedom of expression runs as a central theme through the legal framework, both forming the outer limit for possible regulation and a legal basis to create new regulation (e.g. protecting pluralism). The legal framework governing disinformation online is shown to be very broad, encompassing different levels of regulation, shifting depending on the context and already regulating many different types of disinformation. Further, oversight seems to be fragmented with many different supervisory authorities involved but limited cooperation. Based on this analysis, the report offers several recommendations, such as on the use of disinformation not as a legal term but a policy term, on negotiating the tensions on the different policy levels, on the regulation of internet intermediaries including transparency obligations and on increased cooperation between the relevant supervisory authorities.
Previously, the interim report focussing on political advertising was published in late 2019. Both these studies have been carried out in the context of the research initiative on the Digital Transition of Decision-Making at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam, focussing on questions related to AI and public values, data governance and online platforms.},
note = {A report for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Amsterdam, December 2019},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

McGonagle, T., Voorhoof, D.

2020, (IRIS Themes - Volume III (5th edition), European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg).

Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law – Comment of the European Copyright Society

Dreier, T., Derclaye E., Geiger, C., Griffiths, J., Hilty, R., Hugenholtz, P., Metzger, A., Riis, T., Rognstad, O.A., Senftleben, M., Strowel, A.M., Synodinou, T., Xalabarder, R.

2020.

@article{Metzger2020,
title = {Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law \textendash Comment of the European Copyright Society},
author = {Metzger, A. and Senftleben, M. and Derclaye E. and Dreier, T. and Geiger, C. and Griffiths, J. and Hilty, R. and Hugenholtz, P. and Riis, T. and Rognstad, O.A. and Strowel, A.M. and Synodinou, T. and Xalabarder, R.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589323},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-07},
abstract = {The national implementation of Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) poses particular challenges. Article 17 is one of the most complex \textendash and most controversial \textendash provisions of the new legislative package which EU Member States must transpose into national law by 7 June 2021. Seeking to contribute to the debate on implementation options, the European Copyright Society addresses several core aspects of Article 17 that may play an important role in the national implementation process. It deals with the concept of online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) before embarking on a discussion of the licensing and content moderation duties which OCSSPs must fulfil in accordance with Article 17(1) and (4). The analysis also focuses on the copyright limitations mentioned in Article 17(7) that support the creation and dissemination of transformative user-generated content (UGC). It also discusses the appropriate configuration of complaint and redress mechanisms set forth in Article 17(9) that seek to reduce the risk of unjustified content removals. Finally, the European Copyright Society addresses the possibility of implementing direct remuneration claims for authors and performers, and explores the private international law aspect of applicable law \textendash an impact factor that is often overlooked in the debate.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability

Senftleben, M.

Florida International University Law Review, 14 , Forthcoming.

@article{Senftleben2020,
title = {Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability},
author = {Senftleben, M.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565175},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-04-09},
journal = {Florida International University Law Review},
volume = {14},
abstract = {Algorithmic copyright enforcement \textendash the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet \textendash has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Algorithmic copyright enforcement – the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet – has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.

Pitching trade against privacy: reconciling EU governance of personal data flows with external trade

Irion, K., Yakovleva, S.

International Data Privacy Law, 2020.

Strengthening legal protection against discrimination by algorithms and artificial intelligence

Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.

The International Journal of Human Rights, 2020.

The personal information sphere: An integral approach to privacy and related information and communication rights

Eskens, S.

JASIST, 2020.

Much ado about judges: perspectieven van het EHRM

McGonagle, T.

Mediaforum, (1), pp. 2-6, 2020.

Rechter en uitingsvrijheid – een actueel thema

Korthals Altes, W.

Mediaforum, (1), pp. 1, 2020, (Opinie).

Implications of AI-driven tools in the media for freedom of expression

Bastian, M., Drunen, M. van, Eskens, S., Helberger, N., Möller, J.

2020, (Council of Europe, September 2019).

Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 5 november 2019 en Hoge Raad 3 december 2019

Dommering, E.

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (10), pp. 1368-1369, 2020.

Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy

Yakovleva, S.

University of Miami Law Review, 74 (2), pp. 416-519, 2020.

@article{Yakovleva2020,
title = {Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy},
author = {Yakovleva, S.},
url = {https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss2/5/},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-02-27},
journal = {University of Miami Law Review},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {416-519},
abstract = {Countries spend billions of dollars each year to strengthen their discursive power to shape international policy debates. They do so because in public policy conversations labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy debates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the power of discourse used in international negotiations, and in the interpretation and application of international trade policy and rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(digital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using the same term, those trading partners advance utterly different discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both economic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are equally important (European Union). Second, based on a detailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital protectionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is coming to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protectionism” has already resulted in the adoption of international trade rules in recent trade agreements further restricting domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the distinction between privacy and personal data protection and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves noneconomic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion should not be about what “protectionism” means but about how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and political values.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Countries spend billions of dollars each year to strengthen their discursive power to shape international policy debates. They do so because in public policy conversations labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy debates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the power of discourse used in international negotiations, and in the interpretation and application of international trade policy and rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(digital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using the same term, those trading partners advance utterly different discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both economic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are equally important (European Union). Second, based on a detailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital protectionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is coming to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protectionism” has already resulted in the adoption of international trade rules in recent trade agreements further restricting domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the distinction between privacy and personal data protection and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves noneconomic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion should not be about what “protectionism” means but about how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and political values.

van Hoboken, J.

The Privacy Disconnect

Chapter in: Human Rights in the Age of Platforms, ed. R.F. Jørgensen, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2019., pp. 255-284, 2020, ISBN: 9780262039055.