Grondrechten

2021, (Forthcoming as chapter 10 in: Kohl, U., & Eisler, J. (eds.), Data-Driven Personalisation in Markets, Politics and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Jütte, B.J., Quintais, J.

The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2021.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{QuintaisJutte2021,
title = {The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights},
author = {Quintais, J. and Jutte, B.J.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775599},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-02-18},
journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice},
abstract = {On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6). },
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).

Close

Cobbe, J., Janssen, H., Norval, C., Singh, J.

Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR

International Data Privacy Law, Forthcoming.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Janssen2021,
title = {Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR},
author = {Janssen, H. and Cobbe, J. and Norval, C. and Singh, J.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570895},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-04},
journal = {International Data Privacy Law},
abstract = {When it comes to online services, users have limited control over how their personal data is processed. This is partly due to the nature of the business models of those services, where data is typically stored and aggregated in data centres. This has recently led to the development of technologies aiming at leveraging user control over the processing of their personal data.
Personal Data Stores (“PDSs”) represent a class of these technologies; PDSs provide users with a device, enabling them to capture, aggregate and manage their personal data. The device provides tools for users to control and monitor access, sharing and computation over data on their device. The motivation for PDSs are described as (i) to assist users with their confidentiality and privacy concerns, and/or (ii) to provide opportunities for users to transact with or otherwise monetise their data.
While PDSs potentially might enable some degree of user empowerment, they raise interesting considerations and uncertainties in relation to the responsibilities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). More specifically, the designations of responsibilities among key parties involved in PDS ecosystems are unclear. Further, the technical architecture of PDSs appears to restrict certain lawful grounds for processing, while technical means to identify certain category data, as proposed by some, may remain theoretical.
We explore the considerations, uncertainties, and limitations of PDSs with respect to some key obligations under the GDPR. As PDS technologies continue to develop and proliferate, potentially providing an alternative to centralised approaches to data processing, we identify issues which require consideration by regulators, PDS platform providers and technologists.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Cobbe, J., Janssen, H., Singh, J.

Personal Data Stores: a user-centric privacy utopia?

Internet Policy Review, Forthcoming.

BibTeX

Appelman, N., Blom, T., van Duin, A., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Steel, M., Stringhi, E., van Hoboken, J., Zarouali, B.

WODC-onderzoek: Voorziening voor verzoeken tot snelle verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content

2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Dommering, E.

Annotatie bij Rb. Den Haag 5 februari 2020 (NJCM c.s. / Staat der Nederlanden - SyRI-wetgeving)

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (45), pp. 6792-6795, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Angelopoulos, C., Senftleben, M.

The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market

2020, (Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law & Cambridge: Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@techreport{Senftleben2020e,
title = {The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market},
author = {Senftleben, M. and Angelopoulos, C.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-10-29},
abstract = {EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content \textendash no matter how specifically it is defined \textendash must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied \textendash in the light of applicable CJEU case law \textendash as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.},
note = {Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law & Cambridge: Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

Close

EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.

Close

Senftleben, M.

Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability

Florida International University Law Review, 14 (2), pp. 299-328, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Senftleben2020,
title = {Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability},
author = {Senftleben, M.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565175
https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/11/},
doi = {10.25148/lawrev.14.2.11},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-10-20},
journal = {Florida International University Law Review},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {299-328},
abstract = {Algorithmic copyright enforcement \textendash the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet \textendash has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Algorithmic copyright enforcement – the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet – has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.

Close

Ausloos, J., Helberger, N., Strycharz, J.

Data Protection or Data Frustration? Individual perceptions and attitudes towards the GDPR

European Data Protection Law Review, 6 (3), pp. 407-421, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Yakovleva, S.

Privacy and Data Protection in the EU- and US-led Post- WTO Free Trade Agreements

pp. 95-115, 2020, (Chapter in: Coherence and Divergence in Services Trade Law, ed. R.T. Hoffmann & M. Krajewski).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Yakovleva, S.

Personal Data Transfers in International Trade and EU Law: A Tale of Two ‘Necessities’

The Journal of World Investment & Trade, pp. 1-39, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Arnbak, A., Geursen, W., Yakovleva, S.

Kaleidoscopic data-related enforcement in the digital age

Common Market Law Review, 57 (5), pp. 1461-1494, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Helberger, N., Huh, J., Milne, G., Strycharz, J.

Macro and Exogenous Factors in Computational Advertising: Key Issues and New Research Directions

Journal of Advertising, 49 (4), pp. 377-393, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Eskens, S.

Opinie: De wettelijke mogelijkheden voor online proctoring door universiteiten zijn zeer beperkt

Tijdschrift voor Internetrecht, (4), pp. 141-143, 2020.

Links | BibTeX

Dommering, E.

Annotatie HvJ EU 2 oktober 2018 (Ministerio Fiscal)

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (28), pp. 3753-3754, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Ausloos, J., Mahieu, R.

Harnessing the collective potential of GDPR access rights: towards an ecology of transparency

Internet Policy Review, 2020, (Opinion).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Eskens, S., Helberger, N., Möller, J., Monzer, C.

User Perspectives on the News Personalisation Process: Agency, Trust and Utility as Building Blocks

Digital Journalism, 8 (9), pp. 1142-1162, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Arnbak, A., Geursen, W,W,, Yakovleva, S.

Drie mogelijke boetes van mededingings-, consumenten- en persoonsgegevensautoriteiten voor hetzelfde datagebruik

Tijdschrift Mededingingsrecht in de Praktijk, (2), pp. 30-37, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Appelman, N., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Leerssen, P., McGonagle, T., van Eijk, N., van Hoboken, J.

Het juridisch kader voor de verspreiding van desinformatie via internetdiensten en de regulering van politieke advertenties

2020, (Rapport voor het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Amsterdam, december 2019).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@techreport{vanHoboken2020b,
title = {Het juridisch kader voor de verspreiding van desinformatie via internetdiensten en de regulering van politieke advertenties},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R. and Leerssen, P. and McGonagle, T. and van Eijk, N. and Helberger, N.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Rapport_desinformatie_december2019.pdf
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Kamerbrief_desinformatie.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-14},
abstract = {Het onderzoek, uitgevoerd in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, analyseert het juridisch kader van toepassing op de verspreiding van desinformatie via online diensten. Het rapport biedt een uitgebreid overzicht van de relevante Europese en Nederlandse normen en doet aanbevelingen voor de verbetering van dit juridisch kader. Het onderzoek bevat daarnaast ook een analyse van het relevant wettelijke kader in de V.S., het V.K, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Canada en Zweden.
Het rapport maakt duidelijk hoe de vrijheid van meningsuiting als rode draad door het wettelijke kader loopt. Dit fundamentele recht vormt zowel de buitenste grens voor regulering als een basis voor nieuwe maatregelen, bijvoorbeeld voor de bescherming van pluralisme. Het wettelijk kader van toepassing op desinformatie blijkt zeer breed, bevat verschillende reguleringsniveaus, verschuift afhankelijk van de specifieke context en omvat vele al bestaande normen voor de regulering van specifieke typen desinformatie. Verder blijkt het toezicht op dit wettelijk kader vrij gefragmenteerd te zijn. Op basis van deze analyse komt het rapport tot aan aantal aanbevelingen. De aanbevelingen hebben onder andere betrekking op het gebruik van de term desinformatie als beleidsterm, het omgaan met de spanningen op de verschillende beleidsniveaus, de regulering van internettussenpersonen door middel van transparantie verplichtingen en de samenwerking tussen de verschillende toezichthouders.
Voorafgaand aan deze eindrapportage is in eind 2019 het interim-rapport gepubliceerd. Dit rapport focuste op de relatie tussen desinformatie en online politieke advertenties. Beide studies zijn onderdeel van het onderzoeksproject ‘Digital Transition of Decision-Making at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam’ dat zich buigt over vraagstukken gerelateerd aan kunstmatige intelligentie en publieke waarden, data governance, en online platforms. },
note = {Rapport voor het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Amsterdam, december 2019},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

Close

Appelman, N., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Leerssen, P., McGonagle, T., van Eijk, N., van Hoboken, J.

The legal framework on the dissemination of disinformation through Internet services and the regulation of political advertising

2020, (A report for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Amsterdam, December 2019).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@techreport{vanHoboken2020c,
title = {The legal framework on the dissemination of disinformation through Internet services and the regulation of political advertising},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R. and Leerssen, P. and McGonagle, T. and van Eijk, N. and Helberger, N.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Report_Disinformation_Dec2019-1.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-14},
abstract = {The study, commissioned by the Dutch government, focusses on the legal framework governing the dissemination of disinformation, in particular through Internet services. The study provides an extensive overview of relevant European and Dutch legal norms relating to the spread of online disinformation, and recommendations are given on how to improve this framework. Additionally, the study includes an analysis of the relevant legal framework in 6 different countries (U.K., U.S., France, Germany, Sweden and Canada).
The report makes clear how the freedom of expression runs as a central theme through the legal framework, both forming the outer limit for possible regulation and a legal basis to create new regulation (e.g. protecting pluralism). The legal framework governing disinformation online is shown to be very broad, encompassing different levels of regulation, shifting depending on the context and already regulating many different types of disinformation. Further, oversight seems to be fragmented with many different supervisory authorities involved but limited cooperation. Based on this analysis, the report offers several recommendations, such as on the use of disinformation not as a legal term but a policy term, on negotiating the tensions on the different policy levels, on the regulation of internet intermediaries including transparency obligations and on increased cooperation between the relevant supervisory authorities.
Previously, the interim report focussing on political advertising was published in late 2019. Both these studies have been carried out in the context of the research initiative on the Digital Transition of Decision-Making at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam, focussing on questions related to AI and public values, data governance and online platforms.},
note = {A report for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Amsterdam, December 2019},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

Close

McGonagle, T., Voorhoof, D.

Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

2020, (IRIS Themes - Volume III (5th edition), European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Dreier, T., Derclaye E., Geiger, C., Griffiths, J., Hilty, R., Hugenholtz, P., Metzger, A., Riis, T., Rognstad, O.A., Senftleben, M., Strowel, A.M., Synodinou, T., Xalabarder, R.

Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law – Comment of the European Copyright Society

2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Metzger2020,
title = {Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law \textendash Comment of the European Copyright Society},
author = {Metzger, A. and Senftleben, M. and Derclaye E. and Dreier, T. and Geiger, C. and Griffiths, J. and Hilty, R. and Hugenholtz, P. and Riis, T. and Rognstad, O.A. and Strowel, A.M. and Synodinou, T. and Xalabarder, R.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589323},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-05-07},
abstract = {The national implementation of Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) poses particular challenges. Article 17 is one of the most complex \textendash and most controversial \textendash provisions of the new legislative package which EU Member States must transpose into national law by 7 June 2021. Seeking to contribute to the debate on implementation options, the European Copyright Society addresses several core aspects of Article 17 that may play an important role in the national implementation process. It deals with the concept of online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) before embarking on a discussion of the licensing and content moderation duties which OCSSPs must fulfil in accordance with Article 17(1) and (4). The analysis also focuses on the copyright limitations mentioned in Article 17(7) that support the creation and dissemination of transformative user-generated content (UGC). It also discusses the appropriate configuration of complaint and redress mechanisms set forth in Article 17(9) that seek to reduce the risk of unjustified content removals. Finally, the European Copyright Society addresses the possibility of implementing direct remuneration claims for authors and performers, and explores the private international law aspect of applicable law \textendash an impact factor that is often overlooked in the debate.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Irion, K., Yakovleva, S.

Pitching trade against privacy: reconciling EU governance of personal data flows with external trade

International Data Privacy Law, 10 (3), pp. 201-221, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.

Strengthening legal protection against discrimination by algorithms and artificial intelligence

The International Journal of Human Rights, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Eskens, S.

The personal information sphere: An integral approach to privacy and related information and communication rights

JASIST, 71 (9), pp. 1116-1128, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

McGonagle, T.

Much ado about judges: perspectieven van het EHRM

Mediaforum, (1), pp. 2-6, 2020.

Links | BibTeX

Korthals Altes, W.

Rechter en uitingsvrijheid – een actueel thema

Mediaforum, (1), pp. 1, 2020, (Opinie).

Links | BibTeX

Janssen, H.

An approach to a fundamental rights impact assessment to automated decision-making

International Data Privacy Law, 10 (1), pp. 76-106, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Janssen2020,
title = {An approach to a fundamental rights impact assessment to automated decision-making},
author = {Janssen, H.},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipz028},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-03-06},
journal = {International Data Privacy Law},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {76-106},
abstract = {Companies and other private institutions see great and promising profits in the use of automated decision-making (‘ADM’) for commercial-, financial- or efficiency in work processing purposes. Meanwhile, ADM based on a data subjects’ personal data may (severely) impact its fundamental rights and freedoms. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides for a regulatory framework that applies whenever a controller considers and deploys ADM onto individuals on the basis of their personal data. In the design stage of the intended ADM, article 35 (3)(a) obliges a controller to apply a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), part of which is an assessment of ADM’s impact on individual rights and freedoms. Article 22 GDPR determines under what conditions ADM is allowed and endows data subjects with increased protection.

Research among companies of various sizes has shown that there is (legal) insecurity about the interpretation of the GDPR (including the provisions relevant to ADM). The first objective of the author is to detect ways forward by offering practical handles to execute a DPIA that includes a slidable assessment of impacts on data subjects’ fundamental rights. This assessment is based on four benchmarks that should help to assess the gravity of potential impacts, i.e. i) to determine the impact on the fundamental right(s) at stake, ii) to establish the context in which the ADM is used, iii) the establishment of who is beneficiary of the use of personal data in the ADM and iv) the establishment who is in control over the data flows in the ADM. From the benchmarks an overall fundamental rights impact assessment about ADM should arise. A second objective is to indicate potential factors and measures that a controller should consider in its risk management after the assessment. The proposed approach should help fostering fair, compliant and trustworthy ADM and contains directions for future research.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

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Bastian, M., Drunen, M. van, Eskens, S., Helberger, N., Möller, J.

Implications of AI-driven tools in the media for freedom of expression

2020, (Council of Europe, September 2019).

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Dommering, E.

Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 5 november 2019 en Hoge Raad 3 december 2019

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (10), pp. 1368-1369, 2020.

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Yakovleva, S.

Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy

University of Miami Law Review, 74 (2), pp. 416-519, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Yakovleva2020,
title = {Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy},
author = {Yakovleva, S.},
url = {https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss2/5/},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-02-27},
journal = {University of Miami Law Review},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {416-519},
abstract = {Countries spend billions of dollars each year to strengthen their discursive power to shape international policy debates. They do so because in public policy conversations labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy debates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the power of discourse used in international negotiations, and in the interpretation and application of international trade policy and rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(digital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using the same term, those trading partners advance utterly different discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both economic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are equally important (European Union). Second, based on a detailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital protectionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is coming to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protectionism” has already resulted in the adoption of international trade rules in recent trade agreements further restricting domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the distinction between privacy and personal data protection and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves noneconomic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion should not be about what “protectionism” means but about how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and political values.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Countries spend billions of dollars each year to strengthen their discursive power to shape international policy debates. They do so because in public policy conversations labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy debates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the power of discourse used in international negotiations, and in the interpretation and application of international trade policy and rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(digital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using the same term, those trading partners advance utterly different discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both economic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are equally important (European Union). Second, based on a detailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital protectionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is coming to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protectionism” has already resulted in the adoption of international trade rules in recent trade agreements further restricting domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the distinction between privacy and personal data protection and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves noneconomic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion should not be about what “protectionism” means but about how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and political values.

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van Hoboken, J.

The Privacy Disconnect

Chapter in: Human Rights in the Age of Platforms, ed. R.F. Jørgensen, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2019., pp. 255-284, 2020, ISBN: 9780262039055.

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