The European Harmonisation of Intermediairy Civil Liability for Online Copyright Infringement

2021, (Forthcoming as chapter 10 in: Kohl, U., & Eisler, J. (eds.), Data-Driven Personalisation in Markets, Politics and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Ausloos, J., Sax, M.

Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential

Interactive Entertainment Law Review, 4 (1), 2021.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{SaxAusloos2021,
title = {Getting under your skin(s): A legal-ethical exploration of Fortnite’s transformation into a content delivery platform and its manipulative potential},
author = {Sax, M. and Ausloos, J.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764489},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-03-01},
journal = {Interactive Entertainment Law Review},
volume = {4},
number = {1},
abstract = {This paper investigates the ethical and legal implications of increasingly manipulative practices in the gaming industry by looking at one of the currently most popular and profitable video games in the world. Fortnite has morphed from an online game into a quasi-social network and an important cultural reference point in the lifeworld of many (young) people. The game is also emblematic of the freemium business model, with strong incentives to design the game in a manner which maximises microtransactions. This article suggests that to properly understand Fortnite’s practices \textendash which we predict will become more widely adopted in the video game industry in the near future \textendash we need an additional perspective. Fortnite is not only designed for hyper-engagement; its search for continued growth and sustained relevance is driving its transformation from being a mere video game into a content delivery platform. This means that third parties can offer non game-related services to players within Fortnite’s immersive game experience. In this paper, we draw on an ethical theory of manipulation (which defines manipulation as an ethically problematic influence on a person’s behaviour) to explore whether the gaming experience offered by Fortnite harbours manipulative potential. To legally address the manipulative potential of commercial video game practices such as the ones found in Fortnite, we turn to European data protection and consumer protection law. More specifically, we explore how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can provide regulators with tools to address Fortnite’s manipulative potential and to make Fortnite (more) forthright.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Jütte, B.J., Quintais, J.

The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2021.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{QuintaisJutte2021,
title = {The Pelham Chronicles: Sampling, Copyright and Fundamental Rights},
author = {Quintais, J. and Jutte, B.J.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775599},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab040},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-02-18},
journal = {Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice},
abstract = {On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6). },
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

On 29 July 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) rendered its long-awaited judgment in Pelham. This judgement was published together, but not jointly, with those on Spiegel Online and Funke Medien. A bit less than a year later, on 30 April 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), which had referred the cases to Luxembourg, rendered its judgments in all three cases. There are obvious parallels between these judgments, and their combined relevance for the interpretation of European copyright law in the light of EU fundamental rights cannot be understated.

This article focuses on Pelham, or the “Metall auf Metall” saga, as it is known in Germany. It analyses the relevant aspects and impact of Pelham in EU copyright law and examines how the BGH implemented the guidance provided by the CJEU. Where relevant, we draw the parallels to Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. Pelham gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the related right of reproduction of phonogram producers in art. 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). The question whether such right enjoys the same scope of protection as the reproduction right for authorial works had made its way through the German courts for a remarkable two decades. This saga included a constitutional complaint, which in 2016 answered the question in the affirmative. The BGH’s preliminary reference to the CJEU was particularly important because on the back of the reproduction question it sought to clarify issues with fundamental rights implications, in particular the scope of the quotation right or defence and its application to musical creativity in the form of sampling.

This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, we briefly revisit the Pelham saga in its journey through the German and European courts, providing he context to the underlying legal issues (2). We then turn to the interpretation of the scope of the reproduction and distribution rights for phonograms (3) before examining the CJEU’s assessment of the systematic nature of exceptions and limitations (E&Ls) (4). We then discuss the wider implications of Pelham on the role of fundamental right in copyright law (5). We conclude with some doctrinal and practical observations on the wider implications of the “Metall auf Metall”-saga (6).

Close

Husovec, M., Quintais, J.

How to License Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms under the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive

GRUR International - Journal of European and International IP Law, 4/2021 , 2021.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Gervais, D.J., P.B. Hugenholtz, Quintais, J.

Trends And Developments In Artificial Intelligence: Challenges To Patent Law

Kluwer Patent Blog 2021.

Links | BibTeX

Irion, K.

AI Regulation in the European Union and Trade Law: How can accountability of AI and a high level of consumer protection prevail over a trade law discipline on source code?, study commissioned by the Vzbv, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, 2021

2021.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Cobbe, J., Janssen, H., Singh, J.

Personal Data Stores: a user-centric privacy utopia?

Internet Policy Review, Forthcoming.

BibTeX

Cobbe, J., Janssen, H., Norval, C., Singh, J.

Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR

International Data Privacy Law, Forthcoming.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Janssen2021,
title = {Decentralised Data Processing: Personal Data Stores and the GDPR},
author = {Janssen, H. and Cobbe, J. and Norval, C. and Singh, J.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570895},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-04},
journal = {International Data Privacy Law},
abstract = {When it comes to online services, users have limited control over how their personal data is processed. This is partly due to the nature of the business models of those services, where data is typically stored and aggregated in data centres. This has recently led to the development of technologies aiming at leveraging user control over the processing of their personal data.
Personal Data Stores (“PDSs”) represent a class of these technologies; PDSs provide users with a device, enabling them to capture, aggregate and manage their personal data. The device provides tools for users to control and monitor access, sharing and computation over data on their device. The motivation for PDSs are described as (i) to assist users with their confidentiality and privacy concerns, and/or (ii) to provide opportunities for users to transact with or otherwise monetise their data.
While PDSs potentially might enable some degree of user empowerment, they raise interesting considerations and uncertainties in relation to the responsibilities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). More specifically, the designations of responsibilities among key parties involved in PDS ecosystems are unclear. Further, the technical architecture of PDSs appears to restrict certain lawful grounds for processing, while technical means to identify certain category data, as proposed by some, may remain theoretical.
We explore the considerations, uncertainties, and limitations of PDSs with respect to some key obligations under the GDPR. As PDS technologies continue to develop and proliferate, potentially providing an alternative to centralised approaches to data processing, we identify issues which require consideration by regulators, PDS platform providers and technologists.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Sax, M.

Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments

Ethics and Information Technology, 2021, (Preprint available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3752597).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@article{Sax2021,
title = {Optimization of what? For-profit health apps as manipulative digital environments},
author = {Sax, M.},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-020-09576-6},
doi = {10.1007/s10676-020-09576-6},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-03},
journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
abstract = {Mobile health applications (‘health apps’) that promise the user to help her with some aspect of her health are very popular: for-profit apps such as MyFitnessPal, Fitbit, or Headspace have tens of millions of users each. For-profit health apps are designed and run as optimization systems. One would expect that these health apps aim to optimize the health of the user, but in reality they aim to optimize user engagement and, in effect, conversion. This is problematic, I argue, because digital health environments that aim to optimize user engagement risk being manipulative. To develop this argument, I first provide a brief analysis of the underlying business models and the resulting designs of the digital environments provided by popular for-profit health apps. In a second step, I present a concept of manipulation that can help analyze digital environments such as health apps. In the last part of the article, I use my concept of manipulation to analyze the manipulative potential of for-profit health apps. Although for-profit health can certainly empower their users, the conditions for empowerment also largely overlap with the conditions for manipulation. As a result, we should be cautious when embracing the empowerment discourse surrounding health apps. An additional aim of this article is to contribute to the rapidly growing literature on digital choice architectures and the ethics of influencing behavior through such choice architectures. I take health apps to be a paradigmatic example of digital choice architectures that give rise to ethical questions, so my analysis of the manipulative potential of health apps can also inform the larger literature on digital choice architectures.},
note = {Preprint available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3752597},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

Close

Hugenholtz, P.

Artikel 18-23 DSM-richtlijn: Exploitatiecontracten

AMI, 2020 (6), pp. 187-192, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Gervais, D.J., Hugenholtz, P., Quintais, J.

Trends and Developments in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges to Copyright

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2020.

Links | BibTeX

Antal, D., Bodó, B., Puha, Z.

Can scholarly pirate libraries bridge the knowledge access gap? An empirical study on the structural conditions of book piracy in global and European academia

PLoS ONE, 15 (12), 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Irion, K.

Panta rhei: A European Perspective on Ensuring a High-Level of Protection of Digital Human Rights in a World in Which Everything Flows

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2020, (38), 2020.

Links | BibTeX

Allan, J., Gervais, D.J., Hartmann, C., Hugenholtz, P., Quintais, J.

Trends and Developments in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges to the Intellectual Property Rights Framework: Final Report

2020, (Report written for the European Commission by P.B. Hugenholtz, D. Gervais, J.P. Quintais, C. Hartmann & J. Allan, completed September 2020. ISBN: 97892762244488).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@techreport{Hugenholtz2020f,
title = {Trends and Developments in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges to the Intellectual Property Rights Framework: Final Report},
author = {Hugenholtz, P. and Quintais, J. and Gervais, D.J. and Hartmann, C. and Allan, J.},
url = {https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/394345a1-2ecf-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Trends_and_Developments_in_Artificial_Intelligence-1.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-11-27},
abstract = {This report examines copyright and patent protection in Europe for AI-assisted outputs in general and in three priority domains: science (in particular, meteorology), media (journalism), and pharmaceutical research. It comprises an assessment of the state of the art of uses of AI in the three focus areas, and a legal analysis of how IP laws currently apply to AI-assisted creative and innovative outputs. The report concludes that the current state of the art in AI does not require or justify immediate substantive changes in copyright and patent law in Europe. The existing concepts of copyright and patent law are sufficiently abstract and flexible to meet the current challenges from AI. In addition, related rights regimes potentially extend to ‘authorless’ AI productions in a variety of sectors, and the sui generis database right may offer protection to AI-produced databases resulting from substantial investment. However, taking into account the practical implications of AI technologies, the report identifies specific avenues for future legal reform (if justified by empirical evidence), offers recommendations for improvements in the application of existing rules (e.g. via guidelines), and highlights the need to study the role of alternative IP regimes to protect AI-assisted outputs, such as trade secret protection, unfair competition and contract law.},
note = {Report written for the European Commission by P.B. Hugenholtz, D. Gervais, J.P. Quintais, C. Hartmann & J. Allan, completed September 2020. ISBN: 97892762244488},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

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Senftleben, M.

Intermediary Liability and Trade Mark Infringement - Proliferation of Filter Obligations in Civil Law Jurisdictions?

pp. 381-403, 2020, (Chapter in: Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, G.F. Frosio (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@inbook{Senftleben2020g,
title = {Intermediary Liability and Trade Mark Infringement - Proliferation of Filter Obligations in Civil Law Jurisdictions?},
author = {Senftleben, M.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Intermediary_Liability_and_Trade_Mark_Infringement.pdf
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3736919
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837138.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198837138},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-11-26},
pages = {381-403},
abstract = {The erosion of the safe harbour for hosting in the EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive) leads to a remarkable climate change in the field of EU copyright law and the civil law jurisdictions of continental EU Member States. Inevitably, it raises the question of potential repercussions on the safe harbour for hosting and filtering standards in trademark cases. Even though online marketplaces are explicitly exempted from the new copyright rules and the CDSM Directive is not intended to neutralize the safe harbour for hosting in trademark cases, the adoption of a more restrictive approach in copyright law may quicken the appetite of trademark proprietors for similar measures in trademark law.
The extension of the new copyright approach to trademark cases, however, is unlikely to yield satisfactory results.Due to the different conceptual contours of trademark rights, a system mimicking the filtering obligations following from the CDSM Directive would give trademark proprietors excessive control over the use of their trademarks in the digital environment. Such an overbroad system of automated, algorithmic filtering would encroach upon the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression and freedom of competition. It is likely to have a chilling effect on legitimate descriptive use of trademarks, comparative advertising, advertising by resellers, information about alternative offers in the marketplace, and use criticizing or commenting upon trademarked products.
As a result, consumers would receive less diverse information on goods and services and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market would be curtailed. The reliability of the internet as an independent source of trademark-related information would be put at risk. The analysis, thus, leads to the insight that a proliferation of the new filtering obligations in copyright law is undesirable and should be avoided.},
note = {Chapter in: Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, G.F. Frosio (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}

Close

Senftleben, M.

Signs Eligible for Trademark Protection - Dysfunctional Incentives and a Functionality Dilemma in the EU

pp. 209-225, 2020, (Chapter in: Cambridge Handbook on International and Comparative Trademark Law, I. Calboli & J.C. Ginsburg (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020.).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@inbook{Senftleben2020f,
title = {Signs Eligible for Trademark Protection - Dysfunctional Incentives and a Functionality Dilemma in the EU},
author = {Senftleben, M.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717753
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Signs_Eligible_for_Trademark_Protection.pdf
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399456.014},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-11-26},
pages = {209-225},
abstract = {In the European Union (EU), the criteria for determining a sign’s eligibility for trademark protection are harmonized to a large extent. On the one hand, the trademark legislation and office practices in EU Member States have to keep within the harmonized legal framework set forth in the EU Trade Mark Directive (TMD). On the other hand, the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) provides for a set of eligibility criteria that apply to European Union Trade Marks (EUTM) with equal effect throughout the EU territory. As the rules in the Regulation are in line with those in the Directive, the two legislative instruments constitute a robust body of harmonized norms informing the decision on the registration of a sign as a trademark. The harmonizing effect is enhanced by the fact that national courts have to refer questions relating to the application and interpretation of eligibility criteria to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
As in other regions of the world, the criteria applied to determine eligibility for trademark protection are quite flexible in the EU. The open-ended definition of protectable subject matter leaves room for the extension of trademark protection to non-traditional types of marks, such as shape, sound and colour marks. Trademark offices applying EU trademark law have also accepted, for instance, abstract colours and colour combinations, motion and multimedia marks, melodies and sounds, taste marks, hologram marks and position marks.
The analysis of the trend to register non-traditional marks in the EU outlines the legal framework which the CJEU developed to assess the eligibility of non-traditional types of source identifiers for trademark protection. On this basis, it discusses the objective to safeguard freedom of competition and the legal instruments which the CJEU employs for this purpose: the requirement of providing evidence of the acquisition of distinctive character through use in trade and the categorical exclusion of functional signs from trademark protection. Drawing conclusions, it will become apparent that the basic requirement of distinctive character plays an ambiguous role in the regulation of access to trademark protection for non-traditional marks. It is both an obstacle to trademark protection and an incentive for enhanced investment in non-traditional types of marks.},
note = {Chapter in: Cambridge Handbook on International and Comparative Trademark Law, I. Calboli & J.C. Ginsburg (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}

Close

In the European Union (EU), the criteria for determining a sign’s eligibility for trademark protection are harmonized to a large extent. On the one hand, the trademark legislation and office practices in EU Member States have to keep within the harmonized legal framework set forth in the EU Trade Mark Directive (TMD). On the other hand, the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) provides for a set of eligibility criteria that apply to European Union Trade Marks (EUTM) with equal effect throughout the EU territory. As the rules in the Regulation are in line with those in the Directive, the two legislative instruments constitute a robust body of harmonized norms informing the decision on the registration of a sign as a trademark. The harmonizing effect is enhanced by the fact that national courts have to refer questions relating to the application and interpretation of eligibility criteria to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
As in other regions of the world, the criteria applied to determine eligibility for trademark protection are quite flexible in the EU. The open-ended definition of protectable subject matter leaves room for the extension of trademark protection to non-traditional types of marks, such as shape, sound and colour marks. Trademark offices applying EU trademark law have also accepted, for instance, abstract colours and colour combinations, motion and multimedia marks, melodies and sounds, taste marks, hologram marks and position marks.
The analysis of the trend to register non-traditional marks in the EU outlines the legal framework which the CJEU developed to assess the eligibility of non-traditional types of source identifiers for trademark protection. On this basis, it discusses the objective to safeguard freedom of competition and the legal instruments which the CJEU employs for this purpose: the requirement of providing evidence of the acquisition of distinctive character through use in trade and the categorical exclusion of functional signs from trademark protection. Drawing conclusions, it will become apparent that the basic requirement of distinctive character plays an ambiguous role in the regulation of access to trademark protection for non-traditional marks. It is both an obstacle to trademark protection and an incentive for enhanced investment in non-traditional types of marks.

Close

Quintais, J.

CIPIL Evening Webinar: 'Article 17 and the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms'

2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@online{Quintais2020d,
title = {CIPIL Evening Webinar: 'Article 17 and the New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms' },
author = {Quintais, J.},
url = {https://youtu.be/f1tGV_IdueQ },
year = {2020},
date = {2020-11-17},
abstract = {This presentation addresses the hottest topic in EU copyright law and policy: Article 17 of the new Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM) Directive (2019/790). The CDSM Directive is the culmination of a controversial political and legislative process at EU level. None of its provisions has caused greater debate than Article 17, which introduces a new liability regime for "online content-sharing service providers". These include most user-generated content platforms hosting copyright-protected content accessed daily by millions of individuals in the EU and across the globe. Even before the CDSM Directive is implemented into national law, the issues surrounding Article 17 have already spilled out to the policy and judicial arenas. At the policy level, the debates taking place in a number of Commission-led Stakeholder Dialogues have laid bare many of the unresolved challenges ahead for national legislators and courts. At the judicial level, the Polish government has filed an action for annulment with the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU, focusing on the most problematic aspects of Article 17. This presentation will first place Article 17 into its broader EU policy context of the discussion on the responsibilities of online platforms \textendash from the agenda on "Tackling Illegal Content Online" to the Digital Services Act \textendash and the narrow copyright context regarding the liability of intermediary platforms for third-party content they host. This will be followed by an explanation of the complex mechanics of Article 17 and an identification of some of its fundamental problems. Finally, some tentative proposals will be advanced for how to begin to address such problems, focusing on the core issues of licensing mechanisms and fundamental rights safeguards.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {online}
}

Close

Appelman, N., Blom, T., van Duin, A., Fahy, R., Helberger, N., Steel, M., Stringhi, E., van Hoboken, J., Zarouali, B.

WODC-onderzoek: Voorziening voor verzoeken tot snelle verwijdering van onrechtmatige online content

2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Keller, P.

CJEU hearing in the Polish challenge to Article 17: Not even the supporters of the provision agree on how it should work

Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2020.

Links | BibTeX

Dommering, E.

Annotatie bij Rb. Den Haag 5 februari 2020 (NJCM c.s. / Staat der Nederlanden - SyRI-wetgeving)

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (45), pp. 6792-6795, 2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Appelman, N., Ausloos, J., Drunen, M. van, Helberger, N.

News Recommenders and Cooperative Explainability: Confronting the contextual complexity in AI explanations

2020.

Links | BibTeX

Hugenholtz, P., Poort, J., Schumacher, L.D., van Gompel, S., Visser, D.

Evaluatie Wet Auteurscontractenrecht: Eindrapport

2020.

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Appelman, N., Fahy, R.

Netherlands/Research

pp. 164-175, 2020, (Chapter in: Report Automating Society 2020, Chiusi, F., Fischer, S., Kayser-Bril, N. & Spielkamp, M. eds., Berlin: AlgorithmWatch, October 2020.).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

Angelopoulos, C., Senftleben, M.

The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market

2020, (Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law & Cambridge: Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law).

Abstract | Links | BibTeX

@techreport{Senftleben2020e,
title = {The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market},
author = {Senftleben, M. and Angelopoulos, C.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-10-29},
abstract = {EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content \textendash no matter how specifically it is defined \textendash must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied \textendash in the light of applicable CJEU case law \textendash as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.},
note = {Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law & Cambridge: Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}

Close

EU law provides explicitly that intermediaries may not be obliged to monitor their service in a general manner in order to detect and prevent the illegal activity of their users. However, a misunderstanding of the difference between monitoring specific content and monitoring FOR specific content is a recurrent theme in the debate on intermediary liability and a central driver of the controversy surrounding it. Rightly understood, a prohibited general monitoring obligation arises whenever content – no matter how specifically it is defined – must be identified among the totality of the content on a platform. The moment platform content must be screened in its entirety, the monitoring obligation acquires an excessive, general nature. Against this background, a content moderation duty can only be deemed permissible if it is specific in respect of both the protected subject matter and potential infringers.

This requirement of 'double specificity' is of particular importance because it prevents encroachments upon fundamental rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has shed light on the anchorage of the general monitoring ban in primary EU law, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, and the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Due to their higher rank in the norm hierarchy, these legal guarantees constitute common ground for the application of the general monitoring prohibition in secondary EU legislation, namely Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive ('ECD') and Article 17(8) of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('CDSMD').

With regard to the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), this result of the analysis implies that any further manifestation of the general monitoring ban in the DSA would have to be construed and applied – in the light of applicable CJEU case law – as a safeguard against encroachments upon the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. If the final text of the DSA does not contain a reiteration of the prohibition of general monitoring obligations known from Article 15(1) ECD and Article 17(8) CDSMD, the regulation of internet service provider liability, duties of care and injunctions would still have to avoid inroads into the aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms and observe the principle of proportionality. The double specificity requirement plays a central role in this respect.

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Hugenholtz, P.

Annotatie bij HvJ EU 29 juli 2019, C-469/17 (Funke), C-516/17 (Spiegel) & C-4476/17 (Pelham)

Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, (43), pp. 6068-6073, 2020.

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Senftleben, M.

Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability

Florida International University Law Review, 14 (2), pp. 299-328, 2020.

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@article{Senftleben2020,
title = {Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement - The Pros and Cons of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability},
author = {Senftleben, M.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565175
https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/11/},
doi = {10.25148/lawrev.14.2.11},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-10-20},
journal = {Florida International University Law Review},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {299-328},
abstract = {Algorithmic copyright enforcement \textendash the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet \textendash has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

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Algorithmic copyright enforcement – the use of automated filtering tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet – has a deep impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Instead of presuming that user-generated content ("UGC") does not amount to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is suspicious and that copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the sharing of information online. If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom of companies to run their business as they wish. If, however, copyright legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (“DSM Directive”) follows this path and requires the employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized protected content does not populate UGC platforms. The new EU rules on UGC licensing and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads.
To provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering tools may emerge in the EU. Against this background, the analysis shows that the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance on automated filtering mechanisms.

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Ausloos, J., Helberger, N., Strycharz, J.

Data Protection or Data Frustration? Individual perceptions and attitudes towards the GDPR

European Data Protection Law Review, 6 (3), pp. 407-421, 2020.

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Ausloos, J., Leerssen, P., Menezes Cwajg, C.

Transparency Rules in Online Political Advertising: Mapping Global Law and Policy

2020, (This report has been prepared by Carolina Menezes Cwajg. It was written under the academic guidance of Dr. Jef Ausloos and Paddy Leerssen, at IViR and the Information, Communication & the Data Society (ICDS) Initiative at the University of Amsterdam.).

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