| This is an in-depth
report on the deliberations of a recent OSCE Meeting on
Freedom of Expression. The three main themes of the meeting
were: legal and non-legal frameworks, including criminal
defamation laws; the role of free speech in advancing the
objectives of the OSCE and broadening access to new
information technologies. The report also sets the meeting in
context by outlining the OSCE’s commitments to various aspects
of freedom of expression.
I INTRODUCTION
The first of the three OSCE
Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings scheduled for 2001 was
held in Vienna on 12-13 March. Its theme was 'Freedom of
Expression: New and Existing Challenges'. The meeting was
organized under the auspices of the Romanian Chairmanship of
the OSCE, with the collaboration of the OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the
office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.
II STRUCTURE OF THE
SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING
The format of this meeting
differed from that of previous Supplementary Human Dimension
Meetings by its extended duration (two days instead of one).
The desired informality of the proceedings was reinforced by
the absence of any system of advance inscription of speakers.
This facilitated free-flowing discussion between participants
at the working sessions. The stated objectives of the meeting
were to:
- Explore the central issue
of freedom versus regulation in the exercise of the
fundamental right to freedom of expression, consistent with
OSCE human dimension commitments.
- Examine the various
linkages between exercise of the right to freedom of
expression and other issues that are the subject of OSCE
commitments, aims and activities.
- Initiate a discussion
within OSCE human dimension forums about freedom of
expression and other OSCE commitments as they relate to
expanding access to new technologies, including the
Internet.
In pursuit of these
objectives, the programme provided for three distinct working
sessions which were spread over the two days of the meeting.
Each working session dealt with a separate issue. The first
session concentrated on legal and non-legal frameworks,
including criminal defamation laws; the second addressed the
role of free speech in advancing the objectives of the OSCE,
while the third focused on broadening access to new
information technologies.
The customary disclaimers to
Recommendations adopted at OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension
Meetings apply here as well. The Recommendations lack official
status; are not consensual and do not necessarily reflect the
views or policies of the Organization. The OSCE cannot
implement all of the Recommendations. The value of the
Recommendations is that they emerged from a consultative
exercise involving a broad spectrum of interested parties from
throughout the OSCE participating States. As such, they are
likely to prove instructive in the formulation of future
priorities, policies and strategies, as well as furnishing the
Organization with a useful catalogue of issues to be addressed
in its follow-up procedures to the Vienna meeting.
III LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS, INCLUDING CRIMINAL DEFAMATION LAWS (WORKING
SESSION 1)
(i) OSCE Commitments
The shortage of specific OSCE
commitments to the legal protection of freedom of expression
is partially compensated for by references to existing
international law standards in this domain. Such references
can be found in the Helsinki Final Act, 1975;
[1] the CSCE Vienna
Follow-up Meeting, 1986; [2]
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (CSCE Summit), 1990;
[3] the Cracow Symposium on
Cultural Heritage of the CSCE participating States, 1991;
[4] the Moscow Meeting of
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991
[5] and the Mandate of the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 1997.
[6] A further,
unacknowledged reference to international freedom of
expression standards is made in the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990.
[7] The language used in
the relevant section of this document is unmistakably redolent
of relevant international legal norms.
[8] This is also true of
some of the language employed in the CSCE Seminar of Experts
on Democratic Institutions, Oslo Report to the CSCE Council,
1991. [9] While there is an
abundance of other references to the importance of, and OSCE
participating States' (continued) commitment to, freedom of
expression, and to a lesser extent, freedom of information,
there are no specific references to defamation or to criminal
defamation.
(ii) Issues raised
The first major vector of the
discussion was the professional development of the media,
particularly in transitional democracies. The training of
journalists, the espousal of professional ethics, the
elaboration of guidelines governing election coverage and the
adherence of media professionals to balanced reporting in
general, were all identified as priority issues. The issue of
self-regulation of the media was mooted and elicited
contrasting opinions from a number of participants. The merits
of pluralism and diversity in the media sector, both in terms
of sources of information and of ownership, were dwelt upon
too. It was argued that public service broadcasting, despite
its intrinsic importance to fostering diversity of media
output, is of itself, an insufficient guarantee of the same. A
mixed media environment, in which public broadcasting entities
and private broadcasting enterprises co-exist, is required.
The replication of such diversity in other media spheres was
also countenanced. The usefulness of international involvement
in efforts to stimulate the so-called “creation of media
space” in individual participating States was referred to
approvingly. The synergic effects of such a compact between
national and international players were adverted to.
The desirability of economic,
judicial and legal reforms for the promotion of free and
effective media was explored from various angles. In the
discussion of possible legal reforms, there was a discernible
focus on the public official / ordinary citizen divide. The
need for proportionality of remedies for successful defamation
actions was illustrated by way of reference to the capability
of excessive financial penalties to bankrupt media companies.
Thus, a plea was entered for remedies to be proportionate to
the harm caused by statements found to be defamatory, and not
to the means of the publisher of the statement. Similarly, the
discussion on the usefulness of legislation for the protection
of sources was coloured by the fear that the disclosure of
factual information could, on occasion, easily lead to the
divulgence of sources, thus reducing the likelihood of
individuals cooperating with the media. Such a climate of
caution and non-cooperation with the media could conceivably
prevent the emergence of information of public concern and
thereby thwart rigorous public debate.
Structural censorship by
governments, in all of its many tendrils, was roundly
condemned by participants (see Recommendations infra).
Attention also turned to more drastic forms of covert and
indirect censorship: the intimidation and harassment of media
professionals. The innovative approach to such problems
adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), The FreeMedia Help
Line, was documented. Established in November 1999 and
overseen by the OSCE's Department of Media Affairs, the Help
Line “serves as a confidential point of contact for BiH
journalists and media professionals who feel threatened,
intimidated, or physically in danger as a direct result of
their work.” [10] This
is, in essence, the first objective of the Help Line. The
second is “to gather information on the treatment of
journalists in BiH”. [11]
In furtherance of these two aims, assistance is provided to
journalists who have experienced intimidation and the
information gathered is stored in a special database.
A brief résumé of ARTICLE
19's Defining Defamation: Principles on Freedom of
Expression and Protection of Reputation
[12] was offered, the
central principles of which include: the outright abolition of
criminal defamation (with its replacement, only where
necessary, for example as an interim measure in states in
transition, with appropriate civil defamation laws); the onus
of proof must be beyond all reasonable doubt; the allegation
must be false to the knowledge of the person making the
statement; there must be intent to defame on the part of the
maker of the statement; public officials are not entitled to
higher levels of protection than ordinary citizens and
criminal sanctions, such as prison sentences, including
deferred sentences, should never be applied. It was argued
that the traditional malleability of defamation laws in many
countries should be curbed. For instance, the distinction
between defamation and public order was explained and
described as being of major importance: these are entirely
different concerns and the same legal provisions should not be
stretched in order to render them applicable to each. Nor
should defamation laws ever be used to stifle legitimate
criticism or to prevent questions about allegations of
corruption from being raised. It was further argued that
flags, symbols and countries ought to be denied protection
under defamation laws. The submission by one participant that
journalists prefer criminal defamation to civil defamation out
of the fear that the latter could give rise to higher
financial penalties than those negotiated in the commutation
of criminal defamation cases, proved contentious.
(iii) Recommendations
The first Recommendation to
emerge concerning general legislative frameworks was for
participating States to ensure the full compliance of their
domestic legislation with international standards such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). States should be particularly
attentive to the scope of the limitation clauses contained in
these treaties, as well as the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights. Any restriction on freedom of
expression must be prescribed by law and narrowly defined. The
law should be precise and assessable (sic) and there ought to
be an onus on the Government to demonstrate the validity of
any restriction. Such restrictions should be subject to
independent judicial review. The enhancement of judicial
independence, in the interest of an equitable application of
the law, formed the kernel of another recommendation. Judicial
training was one suggested means of achieving this aim. The
provision of unhindered access to information by State
authorities was identified as necessary for ensuring optimal
transparency in their activities. Only restrictions on access
to information that are absolutely necessary in a democratic
society should be allowed.
As the ability to express
oneself and impart information is contingent on the ability to
access information, participating States were exhorted to
ensure the existence of legal guarantees of freedom of access
to information. Governments should not resort to structural
censorship or harassment of the independent media. This
Recommendation would preclude the use of tax audits or
limitations on access to materials or licensing regulations
for obstructionist purposes. The need to avoid excessive
concentrations of media ownership was also stressed, as was
the need to accord “censorship by killing” greater
condemnatory publicity.
The Recommendations addressed
to participating States in the matter of defamation laws are
extensive. Defamation laws should only be used when they are
true to their genuine purpose and effect, i.e. the protection
of the reputation of individuals against injury. They should
not be used for the prevention of legitimate criticism of
public officials or the exposure of official wrongdoing or
corruption. Laws criminalizing defamation should only be used
when absolutely necessary and some participants avered that
they should be abolished completely. Under no circumstances
should prison sentences or suspended sentences be meted out as
sanctions in a defamation action – notwithstanding the
allegation by one participant that criminal defamation laws
are preferred by journalists for being less severe than the
financial penalties imposed by civil defamation suits.
Several participants were of
the view that public officials should not benefit from higher
levels of protection than ordinary citizens under defamation
laws. Other participants, however, favoured maintaining a
distinction between the level of protection for public
officials in the discharge of their duties and that to which
ordinary citizens are entitled. The party alleging defamation
should be obliged to prove the defamatory character of the
impugned statement(s) beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
plaintiff should additionally have to prove that the statement
in question was false; known to be false and that there was
intent to defame. Journalists should not be compelled to
disclose their sources in defamation actions and protection of
confidentiality legislation could, in a more general context,
provide necessary girding for the protection of sources. The
truth of a statement of fact should be an ultimate defence in
defamation actions, whereas liability should not be incurred,
under defamation law, for the expression of an opinion.
Symbols of the State and public authority do not enjoy a right
to good reputation, as such, and consequently should not be
entitled to protection under defamation law.
Persons charged with
defamation should be entitled to legal aid and remedies for
defamation should be proportionate to the damage caused. In
this connection, it was suggested that the payment by the
plaintiff of a deposit of 10% of the damages sought could help
to reduce the level of damages.
It was recommended that the
OSCE, through its institutions and field missions, assist
governments (i) with the drafting of suitable legislation in
the domain of freedom of expression, and (ii) with the
application of existing legislation. Support for the further
development of NGO capacity was also called for. OSCE backing
for the institutionalization of media helplines, along the
lines of the one already in place in BiH (described supra)
was advocated. In the same vein, it was observed that many
instances of intimidation of journalists take place outside of
major metropolitan centres. The OSCE was requested to take due
cognizance of this reality in its monitoring activities.
IV THE ROLE OF FREE SPEECH
IN ADVANCING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE OSCE (WORKING SESSION 2)
(i) OSCE Commitments
There is a noticeable
recurrence of pledges to protect and promote freedom of
expression (and information) in the corpus of OSCE
documents. One of these references distinguished itself from
the bulk of the others by (i) its focus on the actual
implementation of existing commitments in the realm of freedom
of expression, and (ii) its forceful tone. Paragraph 11 of the
OSCE Summit Declaration in Lisbon, 1996, reads: “…There is a
need to strengthen the implementation of OSCE commitments in
the field of the media, taking into account, as appropriate,
the work of other international organizations…” This statement
prefaced a call for the elaboration of a mandate for the
appointment of an OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.
Other expressions of
commitment to freedom of expression, in particular for the
advancement of the goals of the OSCE, can be found, inter
alia, in the following documents: the Helsinki Final Act,
1975; [13] the CSCE
Vienna Follow-up Meeting, 1986;
[14] the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,
1990; [15] the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe, CSCE Summit, 1990;
[16] the Cracow Symposium
on Cultural Heritage of the CSCE participating States, 1991;
[17] the Moscow Meeting
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991;
[18] the CSCE Seminar of
Experts on Democratic Institutions, Oslo Report to the CSCE
Council, 1991; [19]
Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, 1993;
[20] Towards a Genuine
Partnership in a New Era, CSCE Summit in Budapest, 1994;
[21] the Mandate of the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 1997;
[22] the Istanbul Summit
Declaration, 1999 [23]
and the Charter for European Security, 1999.
[24]
Specific references to the
improvement of journalists' working conditions (especially in
a transfrontier context) also feature regularly: the Helsinki
Final Act, 1975; [25] the
Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, 1983
[26] and the CSCE Vienna
Follow-up Meeting, 1986. [27]
A shift of emphasis is noticeable in subsequent documents: the
protection of journalists from harassment and attacks begins
to take precedence over the elimination of administrative
obstacles to the practice of journalism. This sea-change in
priorities is evidenced by provisions in: the Moscow Meeting
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991
[28] and Towards a
Genuine Partnership in a New Era, the CSCE Summit in Budapest,
1994. [29]
(ii) Issues raised
At the very outset of this
working session, stress was laid on the cardinal importance of
freedom of expression for ensuring that early warning signals
of potential or nascent conflict situations reach those
possessing the wherewithal to effectuate change and pre-empt
the outbreak of hostilities. Numerous contexts in which the
right to freedom of expression plays a vital role were then
listed: confidence-building measures in situations of ethnic
tension; conflict resolution and the promotion of peace; the
securing of the rights of national minorities, in particular
their linguistic rights and their right of access to the
media; the enhancement of good governance; the upholding of
the rule of law and the protection of the environment,
especially in the context of the UN/ECE Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998.
[30] The corrective
properties of freedom of expression, it was heard, are
indispensable for bringing to light bad governance,
corruption, murder, disappearances, harassment and attacks.
The discussion sifted through
other issues, such as the mainstreaming of human rights into
working practices of the media and other bodies, primarily
through education. Encouragement was expressed for improved
relations between information gatherers and the general
public, the sharing of best journalistic practices, greater
protection for journalists, as well as demonstrations of
greater openness and outreach by all ramifications of the
OSCE. The objective of creating an environment in which the
rights of journalists would be secured was raised by a number
of participants. This would entail conducting effective
investigations into attacks and threats against journalists so
as to bring an end to the climate of impunity that prevails in
some Participating States in this regard.
The negative role that can be
played by the media in fomenting enmity and intolerance did
not escape scrutiny either. The exploitation of the media for
terrorist and extremist designs was condemned, although a note
of caution was sounded by some participants concerning the
usage of loose appellation, which often involves subjective
judgments. The suggestion to introduce a ban on the
propagation of certain ideologies throughout the OSCE area
failed to achieve consensus. Participants were alerted to the
omission from OSCE freedom of expression commitments and from
media commentary generally, of any reference to the
trafficking of women and children.
Another pertinent suggestion
to be mooted involved the drawing-up and implementation of
self-regulatory codes by journalists themselves. Such models
of self-regulation could be equated with journalistic
self-responsibility. This suggestion drew opposition from some
quarters, based on the tendency of self-regulation to form
part of a rhyming couplet with self-censorship. Legislation,
according to one participant, should allow for diversity of
opinion and the consequent flourishing of civil society:
minority viewpoints would not be rendered inaudible by a
diversity of voices, the argument runs. Another suggestion,
somewhere in between the antipodal standpoints which dominated
the debate, was that to instil a greater sense of professional
responsibility amongst journalists would allow an evolution of
self-regulation in a way that would prevent it from donning
the mantle of censorship.
The lot of national
minorities was acknowledged to be an item of ever-increasing
urgency on the international agenda. That the contiguous
rights to study one's mother tongue and to use it in dealings
with State authorities are not always honoured in practice
proved a source of concern. Support was expressed for the
dissemination of official documents and information in the
native language of national minorities. Governmental
reluctance to give full effect to the entire spectrum of
internationally-recognized minority rights was explored. It
was observed that the assertion of their rights by national
minorities is often interpreted by governments as having
onerous budgetary implications and even as amounting to a
challenge to political stability. Tensions could be alleviated
or even avoided by the careful balancing of individual
(linguistic) preferences and the objective of social
integration, it was claimed.
Some participants perceived
it to be incumbent on journalists to play a role in the
promotion of tolerance and the prevention of
conflict-escalation. This perception was disputed by others,
who took the line that the duty of the media was to inform
through reporting and not to expressly encourage either ethnic
ententes or conflict resolution.
The OSCE should be mandated
to protect the independence of media outlets from political
and proprietary influence, according to one participant. The
involvement of the Representative on Freedom of the Media
therein was similarly encouraged. It was also maintained that
additional guarantees of media pluralism are needed. In the
same vein, it was submitted that any attempts to counter
trends of increased monopolization and concentration of
financial control ought to follow the guidance offered by
existing Council of Europe and European Union documents on the
matter.
The participants were
informed that in his first report to the Permanent Council of
the OSCE, the Organization's Representative on Freedom of the
Media, Mr Freimut Duve, adverted to two reasons why freedom of
expression is fundamental to democracy: “the great tradition
of the struggle for human rights” and previous experience of
“what happens to societies and economies that do not allow for
the necessary corrective function of public criticism.”
[31] Infringements of the
right to freedom of expression are often a precursor to, or
alarm signal for, the overall deterioration of human rights in
society; a symptom of a fever in the body politic.
Nevertheless, the importance of freedom of expression is not
restricted to preventive strategies. Its centrality to
post-conflict rehabilitation was also emphasized. Deference to
this perceived goal of freedom of expression is shown by the
In Defence of the Future Series, a series of
collections of essays published by the Office of the
Representative on Freedom of the Media.
[32] It was also
announced that a new, associated initiative involving a Mobile
Cultural Container was scheduled to commence in May 2001. This
project, which shares the in defence of the future theme, was
described as “a multi-functional, moveable structure which
will be set up in towns affected by the tragic conflicts in
post-Yugoslavia as a place for young people to reflect, to
debate their future, to produce their own newspapers, to see
exhibitions, to listen to music, to dance, to take part in
theatrical evenings or to relax in an Internet café.”
[33]
Freedom of information is a
prerequisite for democracy and it has a special resonance
during election campaigns and for the discussion of
environmental concerns, as is evidenced by the provisions of
the UN/ECE Aarhus Convention, 1998 (supra). Reference
was made to ARTICLE 19's The Public's Right to Know:
Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation
[34] and a brief synopsis
was offered of the key standards set out in that document. It
was argued that the disclosure of information held by public
bodies was crucial to the avoidance of conflict. A fundamental
principle of governmental policy on official information
should be that of maximum disclosure. Information should
actively be brought to the attention of citizens. The few
acceptable exceptions to this rule would have to comprise a
core legitimacy for non-disclosure and this core should not be
expanded unduly. A decision not to disclose information should
be open to appeal before an administrative authority and the
process should be quick and easy to access. In all cases, the
criterion of public interest should be paramount.
It was pointed out that one
salient shortcoming of the mandate of the OSCE Representative
on Freedom of the Media is its non-inclusion of freedom of
information. In this respect, it differs from other comparable
international mandates. [35]
OSCE Participating States adopted the Mandate of the
Representative on Freedom of the Media by consensus at the end
of 1997. [36] Criticism
was also directed at the implementation of the Mandate: it
emerged that some participants felt that the potential of the
Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media was being
underutilized; that greater proactiveness should define the
Representative's approach to issues within his sphere of
competence and that the very position of the Office within
OSCE structures should be reassessed. The annual Yearbook
Freedom and Responsibility of the OSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media details the activities of the Office over
the preceding 12 months. [37]
An array of measures to
improve the effectiveness of the OSCE's preventive offices
were explored. These included: regular and structured
exchanges of information between OSCE field missions and
journalists' organizations; more studious analysis of reports
and other communiqués of specialized NGOs and the bolstering
of early-warning devices with a commitment to take prompt
responsive action. The need for the training of lawyers in
media law and in international human rights law was raised, as
was the need to ensure greater awareness amongst journalists
of their rights. On a financial level, calls for increased
funding and greater coordination of donor strategies, won
support among participants. The natural symbiosis between
international and local players for the purposes of
project-work was also highlighted.
(iii) Recommendations
Provision ought to be made
for the regular exchange of information about misuse of the
media for the propagation of terrorism or ethnic intolerance.
Tolerance in inter-ethnic relations should be fostered and the
adoption of relevant policies to further this aim should be
encouraged. The promotion of greater standards of
professionalism and a keener sense among media professionals
of the responsibilities that are par for the course were also
recommended. So too was the provision of special training for
journalists on reporting from conflict situations.
The mainstreaming of freedom
of expression issues into the culture of government at both
national and local levels should be ensured through the
appropriate education of officials and the implementation of
other measures. Cooperative initiatives involving government
and civil society could help to sensitize the broader public
to the importance and relevance of freedom of expression.
Journalistic freedom and the
guaranteeing of legal and economic conditions facilitating the
free flow of information should be given due attention. It
will also be necessary to safeguard the independence of the
media in the face of growing concentrations of media ownership
and monopolization. In this regard, there should be
encouragement of state involvement in public service
broadcasting, on the proviso that the editorial independence
of the public media be guaranteed.
A broadening of the mandate
of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was called
for, as was the coordination of donor strategies and the
increased funding of media projects. There was support for the
OSCE institutions to ensure greater inter-organizational
cooperation with international bodies and NGOs operating at
the regional level. Enhanced technical support for NGOs and
media outlets was also favoured. Other suggested forms of
assistance to the media included media law training, analysis
of media laws, financial assistance and the promotion of
self-regulation by the media themselves.
Special emphasis was placed
on early warning mechanisms and on prompt responses thereto as
complementary tools of conflict prevention. To this end,
pertinent information should be given due publicity and
careful consideration in order to help pre-empt the emergence
of new conflicts. Regular exchanges of information and
consistent co-operation between interested parties were also
recognized as being crucial to the OSCE's overall preventive
strategies. In addition, it was advocated that greater powers
ought to be vested in OSCE field missions to enable them to
respond expeditiously to violations of freedom of the media.
The importance of upholding
the rights and freedoms of national minorities, in particular
their right to unimpeded access to the media, was underlined.
Further, the securing of the linguistic rights of national
minorities should involve joint monitoring exercises by the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the ODIHR, the
High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE field
presences.
V BROADENING ACCESS TO NEW
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES (WORKING SESSION 3)
(i) OSCE Commitments
Prior to the present
Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting in Vienna, the entire
corpus of OSCE instruments lacked any specific reference
to new information technologies. Given this flagrant void in
the status quo ante, it can only be presumed that other
freedom of expression commitments, especially insofar as they
related to the print and electronic media, would have been
applied analogously to the new information technologies. Of
particular relevance would have been those provisions ensuring
(a) equality of access to the (mass) media, and (b) diversity
of information / content in the material disseminated by the
(mass) media.
The former can be found in
the Helsinki Final Act, 1975;
[38] the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, 1983;
[39] the CSCE Vienna
Follow-up Meeting, 1986; [40]
the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, 1990;
[41] the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in
Geneva, 1991; [42] the
Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, 1991; [43] the Oslo
Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National
Minorities, 1998 [44] and
the OSCE Istanbul Summit - Charter for European Security,
1999. [45]
The latter, diversity and
independence in the media, are contained in the Helsinki Final
Act, 1975; [46] the
Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, 1983;
[47] the CSCE Vienna
Follow-up Meeting, 1986; [48]
the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, 1990;
[49] the Cracow Symposium on Cultural Heritage of the CSCE
participating States, 1991;
[50] the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in
Geneva, 1991; [51] the
Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, 1991; [52] the CSCE
Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, Oslo Report to
the CSCE Council, 1991; [53]
Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, 1993;
[54] Towards a Genuine
Partnership in a New Era (CSCE Summit, Budapest), 1994;
[55] the Mandate of the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 1997;
[56] the Oslo
Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National
Minorities, 1998 [57] and
the OSCE Istanbul Summit - Charter for European Security,
1999. [58]
(ii) Issues raised
A broad range of issues were
canvassed at this working session, the majority of which
concerned access to, and the regulation of, new information
technologies. The wider adoption of the practice in some
States of systematically creating access points to Internet
and other new information services in public places was
encouraged. This would help to offset de facto
inequality of access to such technologies. In many of the OSCE
participating States, there is an uneven socio-economic
distribution of access to new information services. The cost
of access is high and the availability of such technology is
often limited to capital cities and major metropolitan
centres. The Internet should be an instrument of empowerment
for all citizens, including disadvantaged groups.
Although the advent of the
Internet and other new information technologies has
revolutionized the communications industry, the potential
which these unprecedented developments carry is not always
positive. The so-called “dark side of the new diversity”
[59] is a cauldron of
socially-noxious forms of expression, including racism and
xenophobia; paedophilia and pornography and other strains of
cyber-crime. Article 10, ECHR,
[60] and the
jurisprudence that has grown up around it could offer valuable
guidance for any attempts to regulate new technologies in
order to prevent the dissemination of illegal and harmful
forms of expression, such as those alluded to above. Such
forms of expression would ordinarily be beyond the pale of
protected speech under Article 10.
However, the very need for
regulation of Internet remained a moot point. Various
approaches were suggested and commanded differing levels of
endorsement: government regulation; self-regulation by
operators and Internet Service Providers and involving a
system of classification or labelling of information;
so-called 'co-regulation' at the European level and a
minimalist approach to regulation. The pragmatics of
regulation were also considered, in particular with reference
to the control of access points such as digital gateways,
decoders and electronic programme guides (EPGs).
Regulation is, however, only
one example of governmental involvement in shaping the
contours of the development of new technologies. There ought
to be a responsibility on governments to initiate training
programmes to facilitate broader access to such technologies.
Furthermore, governments should lead by example by enhancing
their own operational efficiency and transparency through
increased reliance on Internet and other innovations in the
administration of the State. Concern was voiced at a more
insidious ramification of governmental control over the
Internet: the dangers of State security or intelligence
services interfering with electronic communications.
(iii) Recommendations
Foremost amongst the
recommendations addressed to the OSCE participating States was
an insistence that access to new information technologies, in
particular the Internet, be democratized. To this end, it was
urged that access be developed in public places, such as
libraries, universities and post offices. Proactive policies
should be devised and implemented to promote the use of
Internet services and the development of new technologies.
These policies could be consolidated by the necessary training
of individuals. Diversity of content, especially in cultural
and linguistic terms, should also be ensured. Good governance
should be enhanced by the continued ascendancy of new
technologies and the appropriate training of officials would
form an integral part of this redoubled espousal of open
government.
Equality of access to all
operators was recommended, as was the limitation of risks of
control through proprietary technology. The issue of
regulation of the Internet gave rise to divergent
recommendations. Some participants advocated regulating
information available on the Internet in accordance with the
guiding principles of Article 10, ECHR. Others favoured
co-regulation, which is joint action between Internet Service
Providers and Governments to stop banned content and to
prevent access of minors to unsuitable material. Many
participants also recommended that only the end-user should be
entitled to regulate content. It was also suggested that the
Internet could play a role in the promotion of inter-ethnic
relations in post-conflict situations.
The fulcrum of the
recommendations addressed to the OSCE institutions and field
presences was the exploitation of the Internet's potential for
enhancing democracy and promoting human rights.
Standard-setting with a view to preventing the existence of
national monopolies of both incoming and outgoing
communication was also called for. It was recommended that all
OSCE instruments be published online and that the
Representative on Freedom of the Media should disseminate all
reviews of freedom of information legislation and perhaps
create a database of such information. A crucial
recommendation was for OSCE field presences to provide legal
and technical training for NGOs and other interested parties
in new technologies. Central Asia was singled out as a
priority area for the provision of such training.
VI CONCLUSION
The OSCE Supplementary Human
Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Expression in Vienna was
overambitious. It sought to trawl through a vast ocean of
issues, but owing to time and other procedural constraints,
only succeeded in skimming the surface of most issues.
Nevertheless, the extended duration of the meeting, its
thematic division into three sessions and the informality of
the deliberative process undoubtedly did enable a large number
of subjects to be broached. The discussions centred on topical
concerns in the realm of freedom of expression; a realm of
uncertain boundaries due to the relentless advances of
technology in recent times. The diversity of participants,
drawn from the entire OSCE region, ensured an exchange of
views that was both informative and instructive. Similarly,
the contributions of representatives of the NGO sector served
to complement and to counterpoise those of official state
representatives.
Other criticisms of the
meeting are not so much focused on the meeting itself as on
the OSCE and its modus operandi. The Organization lacks
consistency in its approach to the issue of freedom of speech.
This is particularly evident in OSCE documentation on the
subject. The elaboration, over time, of a coherent body of
commitments to freedom of expression would greatly facilitate
a more effective approach to the protection and promotion of
this fundamental freedom. It would also facilitate the
implementation of follow-up measures to Recommendations and
moreover, the OSCE would be well-advised to re-examine,
recalibrate and revamp its currently under-effective follow-up
practices as a matter of priority. Furthermore, the fact that
the Recommendations adopted at the end of meetings such as
this one are not consensus-based, deprives them of the
necessary (moral) authority that would earn them greater
respect from participating States. The political character of
the Recommendations equally detracts from their
enforceability.
Finally, the Mandate of the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media is not without
shortcomings, both in theory and in practice. As observed in
the course of the Vienna meeting, the Mandate could be
considered restrictive. Freedom of information, which is
inextricably linked to freedom of expression, does not fall
within the ambit of the Representative's responsibilities.
Nor, it is submitted, does the Mandate leave much scope for
proactive endeavours in the name of freedom of expression and
corollary freedoms. The political (as opposed to judicial)
and, in practice, diplomatic nature of the Representative's
activities are determinative considerations. However, this
problem is compounded by the under-utilization of the
potential that does exist. Greater emphasis could, for
example, be placed on outreach and follow-up policies and
practices. Legal and professional training programmes could be
multiplied, especially in areas where the need for such
training is most acute. If implemented, many of the
recommendations wrought from the Vienna meeting would help to
enhance the credibility of the Office of the Representative on
Freedom of the Media. Of particular relevance here are the
Recommendations aiming to secure the anchorage of diverse and
independent media in fledgling democracies, as well as the
democratization of access to new information technologies.
APPENDIX 1
Final Report, OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting -
Freedom of Expression: New and Existing Challenges
Vienna, 12-13 March 2001
Available at: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/info/vie12mar2001_fr.html>
APPENDIX 2
Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, Freedom of
Media
CSCE/OSCE Main Provisions 1975-1999
FOM.GAL/11/00, 5 July 2000
Available at: <http://www.osce.org/fom/publications.htm>
APPENDIX 3
Mandate of the OSCE Representation on Freedom of the Media
OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 193, 5 November 1997
Available at: <http://www.osce.org/fom/mandate.htm> |
[1] Declaration on
Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States:
Section VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief.
[2] Para. 34.
[3] In the 'Human Rights,
Democracy and Rule of Law' Section.
[4] Paras. 6, 6.1.
[5] Paras. 26, 26.1, 28.9.
[6] Decision No. 193 of the
Permanent Council of the OSCE of 5 November 1997. See, in
particular, para. 1.
[7] Para. 9.1.
[8] See further, paras. 10,
10.1.
[9] See, for example,
Section II.26.
[10] OSCE FreeMedia Help
Line Issues Annual Report, Press Release of 10 April 2001,
available at:
http://www.oscebih.org/pressreleases/april2001/10-04-helpline2000.htm;
FreeMedia Help Line Summary Report for 2000, available at:
http://www.oscebih.org/oscebih_eng.asp.
[11] The website of the
FreeMedia Help Line:
http://www.oscebih.org/mediaaffairs/eng/media-affairs-helpline.htm.
[12] ARTICLE 19, London,
July 2000. These Principles are also available online at:
http://www.article19.org.
[13] Section IV, Chapter
II, Information.
[14] Co-operation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields, Information, Para. 34.
[15] Paras. 7.8, 9.1, 10,
10.1.
[16] Human Rights,
Democracy and Rule of Law.
[17] Para. 6.
[18] Para. 26.
[19] Section II.26.
[20] Section IV.6.
[21] Para. 36.
[22] Decision No. 193 of
the Permanent Council of the OSCE of 5 November 1997. See, in
particular, paras. 1 – 3, 6.
[23] Para. 27.
[24] Para. 26.
[25] Section IV, Chapter
II, Information: (c) Improvement of Working Conditions for
Journalists.
[26] Co-operation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields, Information.
[27] Co-operation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields, Information, paras. 34; 39-44.
See also, the Mandate of the Representative on Freedom of the
Media, para. 2.
[28] Para. 34. See also
para. 28.9.
[29] Para. 37.
[30] Drawn up in Aarhus,
Denmark, on 25 June 1998, available at:
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm.
[31] First Report of the
Representative on Freedom of the Media to the OSCE Permanent
Council, 15 January 1998, available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/staffreports/pc.15ja98.htm.
[32] See further, the
shortened preface to The Caucasus – Defence of the Future
(Folio, Vienna, 2000), available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/publications/yearbook0001/I/021.html.
Publication and other details are available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/future_book.htm. Information about
In Defence of the Future – Searching in the Minefield
(Folio, Vienna-Bolzano, 1999) is available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/publications/yearbook9900/I/015.html.
[33] Diana Moxhay (Senior
Advisor, Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the
Media), The Role of Free Speech in Advancing the Objectives
of the OSCE, Presentation of 12 March 2001, FOM.GAL/6/01.
[34] ARTICLE 19, London,
June 1999. These Principles are also available online at:
http://www.article19.org.
[35] For a more in-depth
comparative analysis of the mandates of the UN Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, see: Report on the
Second International Seminar on Promoting Freedom of
Expression With the Three Specialised International Mandates
(ARTICLE 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, London,
February 2001). The Report is available at:
http://www.article19.org.
[36] Mandate of the OSCE
Representation on Freedom of the Media, OSCE Permanent Council
Decision No. 193, 5 November 1997, available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/mandate.htm.
[37] The third annual
Yearbook 2000/2001 Freedom and Responsibility of the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was launched on 4
April 2001. See further the Press Release of the
Representative on Freedom of the Media, available at:
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1602. The
two previous Yearbooks are available at:
http://www.osce.org/fom/publications.htm.
[38] Section IV, Chapter
II Information: (a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access
to, and Exchange of Information, and (b) Co-operation in the
Field of Information.
[39] First two
paragraphs.
[40] Paras. 34-36.
[41] Paras. 7.8, 9.1,
10.1.
[42] Section VII.2.
[43] Paras. 26.1, 26.2.
[44] Paras. 8-11. The
Oslo Recommendations are not included in Appendix 1, but are
available at:
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/oslo/osleng.html.
[45] Para. 26.
[46] Section IV, Chapter
II Information: (a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access
to, and Exchange of Information, (b) Co-operation in the Field
of Information, and indirectly, (c) Improvement of Working
Conditions of Journalists.
[47] Section entitled
'Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields Information'
(sic).
[48] Paras. 34-38.
[49] Paras. 7.8, 9.1,
10.1.
[50] Paras. 6.1, 6.2.
[51] Section VII.2.
[52] Paras. 26, 26.1,
26.2, 28.9.
[53] Sections II.26,
II.27.
[54] Section IV.6.
[55] Para. 36.
[56] Para. 5.
[57] Paras. 8-11. The
Oslo Recommendations are not included in Appendix 1, but are
available at:
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/oslo/osleng.html.
[58] Para. 26.
[59] D. Goldberg, T.
Prosser & S. Verhulst, Regulating the Changing Media
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 16.
[60] Article 10 – Freedom
of expression
1. Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these
freedom, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
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