| Introduction
“New technologies breathe new
value into old content.” [1]
The history of the media provides many illustrations of this
simple truism. The break-through of television broadcasting in
the 1950's and 1960's created huge secondary markets for
existing cinematographic works. The proliferation of video
recorders in the 1980's gave new life to popular television
programs (e.g. Monty Python's Flying Circus), and further
increased the commercial life-span of movies, new and old. With
the introduction of each new medium, a new shackle is added to
the existing 'chain of exploitation'. For a major film this
chain will typically comprise cinema distribution, subscriber
and hotel television, video release and rental, primary
broadcast television, second-run broadcast television
('syndication'), cable retransmission, et cetera. Increasingly,
successful films are also 'serialised' (adapted for television),
'novelised' (transformed into novels) or 'theatricised' (turned
into plays). In addition, film characters or props (e.g. the
legendary Batmobile) are subjected to all sorts of
merchandising.
In the digital revolution that
is currently taking place, history repeats itself again.
Authors, producers, publishers and broadcasters are discovering,
as they did in 'analogue' times, that existing 'content' can be
put to new, sometimes profitable secondary uses. Archived
television news items may serve as input to multimedia
encyclopedias; film clips may become part of computer games or
educational software; newspaper articles may be republished on
Internet web sites, or archived on commercial CD-ROMs.
Not surprisingly, the rapidly
emerging market for secondary electronic uses of existing works
of authorship has led to disputes over the ownership of
so-called electronic rights. Who owns the rights to reuse
in electronic form an article originally written for a
newspaper; a television program originally produced for
broadcast television; or a film originally made for the screen?
Is it the journalist or the newspaper publisher; the television
producer or the broadcasting company; the film producer or the
distributor? In recent years, a number of disputes over the
ownership of electronic rights, mostly involving the works of
newspaper journalists, have been decided by the courts. This
article provides an overview of the most interesting case law to
emerge from Europe and the United States. Some of the cases have
been previously reported, in summary form, in this journal;
others have only recently surfaced.
Austria
The first
'electronic rights' case to be decided by a highest-level
national court was litigated in Austria.
[2] In a publishing
contract concluded in 1984, the widow of an author of literary
works had assigned the exclusive publishing rights in the works
to a publisher. Under the contract, exclusive rights had been
granted, inter alia, for the reproduction and commercial
distribution of the work, for reproduction on microfilm, and for
uses in compilations. In 1997, another publisher had used parts
of the author's works in an art catalogue (on the 'Wiener
Gruppe') for the Venice Biennale art festival, to be published
both in printed form, on CD-ROM, and over the Internet. The
publisher, however, had failed to secure the right owner's prior
permission.
Before the
courts, the defendant (the publisher of the art catalogue)
argued that the grant of rights in the publishing contract was
limited to print media, and did not extend to uses in electronic
form. The Austrian Supreme Court agreed. The language in the
publishing agreement suggested that the plaintiff had acquired
only such rights as were necessary for exploiting the work in
printed form. At the time of contracting (in 1984), Internet and
CD-ROM were either unknown media, or uses of which the author
could not have foresees their economic impact. In sum, the Court
concluded, no electronic rights had been granted to the
publisher. Thus, no such rights of the plainttiff's could have
been infringed.
Belgium
Belgium boasts the first case
on electronic rights to be decided anywhere in the world.
[3] Ten publishers of
newspapers and magazines had founded Central Station, an
online database containing a cross-section of news articles
published in various print media. The articles were sent to
Central Station when ready for print, and were put online on a
daily basis. The Belgian Union of Journalists alleged that
Central Station needed the permission of the journalists (both
freelance and employed) for such electronic uses of their works.
The Brussels Court of first
instance held that the then new Belgian Copyright Act (Act of 20
June 1994) applied to the contracts the freelance journalists
had entered into. The 1994 Act requires a written contract of
transfer, and provides that both the scope of the grant and the
means of exploitation need to be narrowly interpreted. However,
Central Station could not produce any written permission of the
freelance journalists, and therefore lacked the authority to
disseminate the articles electronically.
In respect of the employed
journalists, the Court applied the old Copyright Act of 1886.
The Court considered that in order to determine the scope of the
grant of their copyrights, it had to be established whether the
dissemination of the articles on the Internet strictly
corresponded with the publishers' principal activities; whether
the “distribution is the natural complement of the written
press” (“si cette diffusion est le complément naturel de la
presse écrite”). The Court noted several important differences
between print and electronic publication: putting the articles
online requires certain manipulations; online audiences are
generally larger and more international than readership of print
publications; the Central Station database allows one to select
articles by subject matter from a variety of newspapers; et
cetera. For all these reasons, the Court held that the rights
under dispute were not implicitly granted.
Central Station lodged an
appeal against the decision concerning the employed journalists.
The Brussels Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court, albeit for completely different reasons. The contractual
relationship between the publishers and the journalists was held
to be a contract 'intuitu personae', i.e. a contract imposing
personal obligations that cannot be assigned to third parties.
According to the Court, a journalist of the printed press who
has an oral employment agreement has merely granted to the
publisher the right to render his ideas typographically - ideas
which he has translated into an article for a specific
publication in a particular newspaper or magazine. The Court
concluded that the journalists' refusal to have their work
exploited on the Internet was justified by Central Station's
refusal to offer appropriate remuneration.
France
French courts have produced
more than a handful of interesting decisions on electronic
rights. In the case of Plurimédia
[4] a number of journalists
and their trade unions brought legal action, not against 'their'
newspaper publisher, but directly against the provider of the
online information service concerned (Plurimédia). The case
concerned the online dissemination of news items, both from
printed sources (the newspaper Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace),
and from television (news programmes broadcast by channel FR3).
The newspaper publisher and the television station had given
Plurimédia prior permission to re-use the printed and televised
news on the Internet. Permission of the (employed) journalists
had not been sought.
The Strasbourg Court decided
(in the form of an ordonnance de référé, in summary
proceedings) that in both cases the reproduction right was
implicated. According to the Court, a newspaper qualifies as a
collective work under article L 113-5 of the Intellectual
Property Code. Consequently, the publisher of the newspaper is
the owner of the copyright in the newspaper. On the basis of
article L 761-9 of the Employment Code and article 7 of the
collective bargaining agreement for journalists, however, a
grant of rights is limited to first publication; the right to
publish a work in more than one newspaper or magazine needs to
be agreed upon expressly, and the express agreement needs to
define the conditions for reproduction. The Court considered the
medium of a newspaper in print to be different from the medium
of an online newspaper, because online distribution requires
certain technical manipulations; the online product is different
from a newspaper, and a new means of communication is involved.
Therefore, there had been publication in more than one newspaper
or magazine. The collective agreement for journalists was
concluded in 1983, at which time Internet uses could not have
been foreseen. Therefore, no express agreement was found, and
the online reproduction of articles previously published in the
newspaper was subject to the journalists' prior permission. In
respect of the televised news items, the Court came to similar
conclusions, even though the journalists' employment agreements
with FR3 did not contain any relevant provisions. The Court
concluded that the journalists could not have granted the rights
required because Internet use was unknown at the time the
employment agreements were entered into.
After the decision, the
journalists and the newspaper publisher reached an agreement.
The appeal, [5] therefore,
merely concerned the reuse of televised news items, which had
been an experiment of only six months, and had been terminated
at the time the appeal was heard. Even though the Court adopted
the arguments of the court in first instance, the decision was
overturned on procedural grounds. The Court held that there was
no obviously illicit interference in a legal position nor
imminent damage (préjudice). In consequence, no reason to issue
an ad interim injunction existed.
The Figaro case was
decided by a 'juge de fond'. [6]
Le Figaro, a major French daily newspaper, offered to the public
the possibility of consulting its electronic archives containing
news articles published in the past two years, and to obtain
copies thereof. Journalists and a trade union complained that Le
Figaro had not asked their permission. The Court prohibited the
service, and awarded damages on grounds that echo the
Plurimédia decision. In the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary, the journalists' grant of reproduction rights
only covers the first publication in the form agreed upon by the
parties. “Since publication in more than one newspaper or
magazine, that is on another support of the same kind, is
prohibited, this applies a fortiori to the reproduction
of articles on a new support resulting from recent technology.”
Journalists of newspaper Le
Progrès, supported by the national union of journalists
(SNJ), took the newspaper publisher to court for putting their
articles on the Internet and on Minitel without their consent.
[7] Contrary to the lower
court, the Court of Appeals considered the newspaper to be a
collective work. It nevertheless upheld the decision of the
lower court, once again invoking the Employment Code and the
collective bargaining agreement for journalists. Moreover, the
Court noted that article L 121-8 of the Intellectual Property
Code stipulates that an author of a work which has been
published in a newspaper or magazine reserves the right to
reproduce and exploit his work in whatever form, provided that
the reproduction or exploitation does not compete with that
newspaper or magazine, and unless an agreement to the contrary
has been concluded.
The Court held that online
publication and archiving on a server “cannot be considered an
extension of the distribution on paper, particularly since the
typographic layout and the presentation of an article in a
publication corresponding to a current of ideas upheld by its
author at the time the contract was concluded, disappear;
readership is extended and the duration of publication is
different.” Absent the express agreement of the employed
journalists, the re-use of the journalists' articles on the
Internet and on Minitel was prohibited.
Germany
Germany has produced some
important case law on electronic rights as well. In 1997, the
District Court of Hamburg decided that the use of photographic
works in an annual CD-ROM compilation of news magazine Der
Spiegel did not infringe the rights of freelance
photographers. [8]
The annual CD-ROM, which contained the full texts and
illustrations of the printed volumes (not including
advertisements), started to appear in the spring of 1993. No
express permission for electronic uses had been granted by the
photographers. According to FreeLens, an association of some 70
freelance news photographers, the licences previously granted by
its members to Der Spiegel, either in oral or in written form,
did not extend to re-uses on CD-ROM.
In this context two
'author-friendly' provisions of the German Copyright Act ('GCA')
were of particular importance. Article 31(4) GCA declares null
and void any obligation in respect of uses (i.e. any independent
means of exploitation) that were unknown at the time a licence
was granted. Obviously, under the rule of article 31 (4) the
moment of knowledge of a novel use is crucial in determining the
scope of a license. In 1982 the German Federal Supreme Court
decided that television broadcasting was a known use since 1939.
[9] The secondary
exploitation of films on video was considered unknown in 1968
[10] , but a known use as
from 1971 [11] . In respect
of digital uses, the Court of Appeal of Duesseldorf held that
the reproduction of musical works on digital media (CD, DAT,
DCC) was still unknown in 1971.
[12]
Another import provision is
Article 31(5) GCA, that codifies the so-called
'purpose-of-grant' rule ('Zweckübertragungsregel'). Whenever the
terms of a contract do not specifically enumerate the uses for
which rights are granted, the author is deemed to have granted
no more rights than are required by the purpose of the contract.
Surprisingly, the Hamburg Court
held for defendant Der Spiegel. The Court left open the question
of whether re-use on CD-ROM constitutes an independent means of
use for the purpose of article 31(4). According to the Court, at
the time the licences were granted (in 1989 or later) CD-ROM was
a known use, even if market success for the new medium came only
later. Thus, the photographers could not invoke article 31(4).
In interpreting the licences,
the Court noted that the photographers had never previously
objected to republication of their works in printed
compilations, or in microfilm versions of the same. Accepting
Der Spiegel's argument, the Court observed that the CD-ROM
edition was merely a substitute for previous paper or microfilm
editions. Thus, the licences were deemed to include the right to
republish the photographs on CD-ROM.
On appeal, the FreeLens
decision was overturned. [13]
The Court of Appeals considered that the CD-ROM, compared to the
magazine, the bound volume and the microfilm, constituted a new
independent means of exploitation. According to the Court, a
CD-ROM allows for a more intensive use, and is not merely a new
technique for transmission. Moreover, consumers perceive CD-ROM
as a medium different from print or microfilm. A CD-ROM not only
looks different, but, more importantly, has faster search
capabilities; is more easily manageable; takes up less space;
does not wear (out); and is easier to reproduce - digital data
can be distributed directly over international networks such as
the Internet. The Court further observed that, once an image has
been digitised, further distribution without any loss of quality
is possible, with obvious (negative) consequences for the rights
of the authors.
In another decision involving
the rights of photographers, a daily newspaper and the editor of
the newspaper's web site were ordered to stop publishing photos
online without the photographer's permission.
[14] Providing online
access to photographs was held to be a technically and
economically separate and independent form of exploitation.
Therefore, a separate license for the use of the photographs on
the Internet was required. According to the Court, no such
permission was ever granted, either expressly or implicitly. The
mere fact that the photographer had continued his business
relationship with the publisher, without protesting, could not
be taken to imply that he had agreed to the use of his works on
the Internet. [15]
In a case involving the
unauthorised Internet use of an item broadcast on television,
the Munich District Court [16]
confirmed that such use constitutes an independent means of
exploitation. No permission could be inferred from the
production contract. Only television broadcast rights had been
expressly granted; the contract did not contain any language to
suggest that items might also be used in other media, such as
the Internet. Even today, the Court continued, the possibility
of watching television programmes on the Internet is very
limited; only few television stations offer their programs
online.
There are several more German
cases involving electronic rights, but in the framework of this
article only one more will be mentioned briefly. In December
1999, the Court of Appeals of Cologne granted a temporary
injunction against a service providing electronic press reviews
via e-mail. The Court considered that electronic press reviews
are far more harmful for copyright owners than their 'paper'
equivalents. The use of computers providing direct access to
information stored allows for a different and more rapid use of
articles, as compared to press reviews in paper form. According
to the Court, individual contributions put online can be freely
used by anyone, and the circle of users is not as limited as is
the case in respect of traditional press reviews.
[17]
The Netherlands
A Dutch case pitting three
prominent freelance journalists against De Volkskrant,
publisher of a major daily newspaper, has attracted considerable
attention. [18] For several
years, De Volkskrant had posted a selection of articles from its
printed version on its Internet web site, and had produced
quarterly CD-ROM compilations containing all newspaper copy in
full-text - without securing the journalists' permission. Were
the rights of the journalists infringed?
Unlike its neighbouring
countries Germany and Belgium, Dutch law does not contain any
'author-friendly' provisions dealing with publishing agreements
or copyright contracts in general - with a single notable
exception. The exception is article 2 of the Dutch Copyright Act
('DCA'). Article 2 (2) limits the scope of any transfer to such
rights as are specifically mentioned in the contract, or are
necessarily implied by the nature or purpose of the agreement.
Even if the wording of this provision is similar to article 31
(5) of the German Copyright Act, controversy in Dutch legal
doctrine persists as to whether the purpose-of-grant rule has
effectively been codified in the Dutch Act. Whatever the
eventual outcome of this debate, it is clear that article 2 (2)
calls for a restrictive interpretation of copyright transfers.
In the De Volkskrant
case, no rights had been transferred at all. Apart from the
occasional letter, no contracts in writing were ever concluded
between the journalists and the commissioning newspaper
publisher. According to plaintiffs, the (implied) licenses
granted by the journalists included only one-time print rights;
no electronic uses were implied.
The Amsterdam District Court
held for the plaintiffs. According to the Court, the
unauthorised republication of articles on CD-ROM and over the
World Wide Web amounted to copyright infringement. Such
electronic uses constitute restricted acts, subject to the right
holders' prior authorisation.
According to the Court, both
the CD-ROM compilations and the web site differ substantially,
qua content and lay-out, from the original printed version of
the newspaper. In respect of the CD-ROM publication the Court
observed “that the CD-ROM consists of a compilation of separate
articles that appear in the newspaper, by which circumstance the
cohesion which makes these articles a newspaper in the paper
edition is lacking in the CD-ROM.”
Similarly, the Court identified
multiple differences between the De Volkskrant web site and its
paper counterpart, e.g. the web site's hyperlinks and its global
reach. The Court concluded that the CD-ROM and Internet versions
of De Volkskrant are not simply extensions or substitutes of
existing archival or documentary media. CD-ROM and web site
constitute independent means of reproduction and communication
to the public in different media, for which additional
permissions must be secured.
The Court then focused on the
scope of the licences granted by the journalists. Did the print
licences imply a right of electronic re-use? Tacitly applying
the rule of article 2 (2), the Court rejected the principal
argument put forward by De Volkskrant, that the journalists had
implicitly granted permission for electronic uses, by submitting
their articles for publication in the journal. In the 1980's,
when the licences where initially granted, plaintiffs could not
have foreseen their contributions would be included in a CD-ROM
or web site.
In sum, the Court held for the
plaintiffs. Interestingly, the Court found infringement not only
of the authors' pecuniary rights, but of their moral rights as
well. The Court ruled that the authors' moral right of first
publication ('droit de divulgation') effectively covers first
publication in every separate (new) medium. In other words, the
journalists had the moral right to decide over electronic
republication.
In a recent follow-up decision
[19] involving the amount
of compensation, the Amsterdam Court ordered De Volkskrant to
pay 3 % of the journalists' annual honorarium for each initial
year of web site republication, and 1,5 % for each subsequent
year. For CD-ROM uses the percentages were set at 4 % and 2 %
respectively.
United States
The much-publicised case of
Tasini v. The New York Times e.a.
[20] involved six freelance
authors who had written articles for publication in The New York
Times, Newsday and Sports Illustrated. The contents of these
periodicals were then sold to companies for inclusion in their
electronic databases, such as NEXIS. As a result, the articles
became available to the public through electronic databases, and
could be retrieved individually or in combination with other
pieces originally published in different editions of the
periodical or in different periodicals.
Before the court of first
instance, the Federal District Court, the publishers did not
dispute that the authors owned the copyright in their individual
works. Rather, they argued that the publishers owned the
copyright in the 'collective works' that they produced, and were
subsequently protected by the privilege, under section 201(c) of
the U.S. Copyright Act ('USCA'), of “reproducing and
distributing” the individual works in “any revision of that
collective work”.
According to Section 201 (c)
USCA, “copyright in each separate contribution to a collective
work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a
whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In
the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work
is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing
and distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any
later collective work in the same series.” Section 101 USCA
defines 'collective work' as “a work, such as a periodical
issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in
themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”
The District Court accepted the
publishers' argument, and ruled in favour of the defendants.
According to the Court, the electronic databases at hand were,
indeed, simply 'revisions' of the individual periodical issues
from which the articles had been taken. The Court of Appeals
(Second Circuit) disagreed. The higher court held that the
copyright law does not permit the publishers to licence
individually copyrighted works for inclusion in electronic
databases. The Court rejected the argument, embraced by the
District Court, that each database constitutes a 'revision' of
the particular collective work in which each author's individual
contribution first appeared. Each database comprises thousands
or millions of individually retrievable articles taken from
hundreds or thousands of periodicals. It can hardly be deemed a
'revision' of each edition of every periodical that it contains.
In holding for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals emphasised
that its decision focuses entirely on the facts of the case,
i.e. a situation where no (express) transfer of copyrights had
occurred. Thus, publishers and authors would be free to contract
around the statutory framework.
Conclusion
“The seismic explosion of
digitised information systems appears to drive myriad splinters
into copyright contracting”. Professor Cornish's introductory
words to the ALAI Conference in Montebello (1997) have proven to
be prophetic. [21] Indeed,
the digitalization of the information industry has had, and is
still having, far-reaching consequences for the law of copyright
contracts. In this process, media convergence plays an important
role – a development already begun in analogue times, but
progressing at a dazzling pace through the digitalization of the
production, distribution and consumption of information products
and services. The traditional borderlines between print
publishing, sound recording, film production, broadcasting and
so-called 'new media' are rapidly evaporating.
As we have seen
from the case law summarized in this article, Round 1 of the
'Electronic Rights War' has been won, quite convincingly, by the
original authors of the works reused. All over the world courts
seem to agree that, absent clear contractual language to the
contrary, authors have granted only one-time, single-medium
rights in their works, and have retained all rights in respect
of any subsequent uses in new media. Even if courts (and market
players) still appear to struggle with questions of rights
valuation (what is the market value of web site republication,
when web sites only rarely generate additional income?), the
message the courts have delivered is clear: additional licenses,
presumably for payment, are required - even in cases of works
created under employment. Publishers or broadcasters that embark
on 'digital adventures' without properly clearing electronic
rights, run serious legal risks.
However, the
rights war is far from over. The court decisions discussed in
this article have inspired media companies world-wide to redraft
their standard publishing or production contracts in such a way
as to secure electronic rights for the future. In many cases,
revised standard contracts effectively strip the authors of
their pecuniary rights entirely. More often than not, authors
who do not wish to sign the amended agreements will no longer be
commissioned for future work.
Not
surprisingly, this development is causing great anxiety among
the authors and their representatives. Organisations of authors
would prefer to draft model contracts bilaterally with
organisations of publishers, broadcasters or producers, so as to
achieve an equitable allocation of rights between the authors
and their counterparts. From their part, publishers,
broadcasters and producers might argue that in this emerging
world of multimedia their 'mission' has become
media-independent, and that it would be inefficient to leave
rights for unknown uses with the authors. Producers would be
forced to track down and negotiate with authors (or their heirs)
each time a novel use would become reality.
Perhaps the
case law described in this article, and the contractual
countermeasures it has provoked, might inspire both authors and
producers (in the widest sense of the term) to rethink their
future interrelationship, particularly in the light of the
digital environment. Is the author of the future an independent
creator, willing and able to market each 'slice' of the
copyright 'cake' individually, or perhaps collectively? Is the
publisher or broadcaster of the future truly capable of
exploiting works 'in all media now known or to be developed in
the future', as some particularly author-unfriendly contractual
provision might have it? Will the future really bring us
'multimedia publishers', or will separate media-specific
companies exploit rights in different media, much in the same
way as in the past?
Whatever the
outcome of the ongoing 'rights war', and the interesting debates
it inspires, much can be said in favour of harmonisation, both
on the European and the international level, of existing
statutory law governing copyright contracts. From country to
country, there are astounding differences in the ways the
copyright law deals with questions of contract formation and
interpretation. In view of the ongoing process of globalisation
of the information and entertainment markets, these divergences
create additional unwanted complexities - problems exacerbated
by the fuzzy state of private international law ruling conflicts
of law. For the lawmakers of the world, much work still remains
to be done.
* * * * * |
[1] E. Atwood Gailey, 'Who own digital rights?',
Communications and the Law, March 1996, Vol. 18, no. 1, p.
13.
[2] Wiener Gruppe, Austrian Supreme Court
(österreichisch Oberste Gerichtshof), 12 August 1998, Multimedia
und Recht 1999, p. 275.
[3] Central Station, Brussels Court of First
Instance, 16 October 1996, Auteurs & Media 1996, p. 426;
Brussels Court of Appeals, 28 October 1997, Auteurs & Media
1997, p. 383.
[4] Plurimédia, Regional Court Strasbourg, 3 February
1998, Légipresse 149-I, p. 19 and 149-III, p. 22.
[5] Plurimédia, Court of Appeals Colmar, 15 September
1998, Légipresse 157-I, p. 148 and 157-III, p. 172.
[6] Le Figaro, Tribunal de grand instance Paris, 14
April 1999, Légipresse 162-I, p. 69 and 162-III, p.81.
[7] Le Progrès, Tribunal de grand instance Lyon, 21
July 1999, Légipresse 166-I, p. 132 and 166-III, p. 156;
Court of Appeals Lyon, 9 December 1999, Légipresse 168-I,
p. 9 and 168-III, p. 7.
[8] FreeLens, District Court Hamburg (Landgericht),
19 August 1997, Multimedia und Recht 1998, p. 44.
[9] Altverträge, Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof), 13 May 1982, GRUR 1982, p. 727.
[10]
Videozweitauswertung I, Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtsho f ), 11 October 1990, GRUR 1991,
p. 133, English translation in IIC 1991, p. 574.
[11]
Videozweitauswertung III, Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof), 26 January 1995, GRUR 1995, p. 212.
[12] Court of Appeal
(Oberlandesgericht) Duesseldorf, NJW-RR 1996, p. 420.
[13] FreeLens, Court
of Appeals Hamburg (Oberlandesgericht), 5 November 1998,
Multimedia und Recht 1999, p. 225.
[14] Regional Court Berlin
(Landgericht), 14 October 1999, case no. 16 O 26/99.
[15] Apparently, the
publisher had compiled a blacklist of photographers who would no
longer be commissioned because they had objected to the online
re-use of their work.
[16] District Court Munich
(Landgericht), 10 March 1999 (21 O 15039/98).
[17] Regional Court of
Appeals Cologne (Oberlandesgericht Köln), 30 December 1999, case
no. 6 U 151/99.
[18] De Volkskrant,
District Court of Amsterdam, 24 September 1997,
Informatierecht/AMI 1997, p. 194.
[19] District Court
Amsterdam, 22 December 1999, case no. H 99.1468.
[20] Tasini v. The New
York Times e.a, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, decided 24 September 1999, amended 25 February
2000.
[21] William R. Cornish,
'General Report. Individual Contracts of Authors and Artists:
Practices in the Digital Environment', in: ALAI Conference
1997 Montebello (note 23), p. 382.
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