| THE
FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
(...)
8. The aim of the applicant
association is the protection of animals, with particular emphasis on animal
experiments and industrial animal production.
9. As a reaction to various
television commercials of the meat industry, the applicant association prepared
a television commercial lasting 55 seconds and consisting of two scenes.
10. The first scene of the film
showed a sow building a nest for her piglets in the forest. Soft orchestrated
music was played in the background, and the accompanying voice referred, inter
alia, to the sense of family which sows had. The second scene showed a noisy
hall with pigs in small pens, gnawing nervously at the iron bars. The
accompanying voice stated, inter alia, that the rearing of pigs in such
circumstances resembled concentration camps, and that the animals were pumped
full with medicaments. The film concluded with the exhortation: "eat less
meat, for the sake of your health, the animals, and the environment!".
11. On 3 January 1994 the applicant
association, wishing this film to be broadcast in the programme of the Swiss
Radio and Television Company (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft),
sent a video-cassette to the then Commercial Television Company (AG für das
Werbefernsehen, now called Publisuisse) responsible for television
advertising.
12. On 10 January 1994 the
Commercial Television Company informed the applicant association that it would
not broadcast the commercial in view of its "clear political
character". The Company pointed out that it would be possible as an
alternative in a film to emphasise an adequate rearing of animals and to inform
viewers that they were free to inquire into the origin of the meat which they
were buying.
13. By letter of 10 January 1994 the
applicant association requested a decision against which it could file an
appeal. On 13 January 1994 the Commercial Television Company replied that it was
not an official authority giving decisions which could be contested. On the
other hand, it would be willing to convene a meeting to discuss other
possibilities in the presence of a legal adviser.
14. By letter of 14 January 1994 the
applicant association stated that it was not prepared to accept changes to its
commercial. It requested a statement of the reasons for the decision and
information as to the supervisory authority where an appeal could be filed.
15. By letter of 24 January 1994,
the Commercial Television Company declined the applicant association's requests
as follows:
“As you have refused the discussion which we
have proposed, we see no reason to enter into your propositions of your letters
of 14 and 20 January 1994. We regret this development of events as it serves
neither you nor us. We confirm that we cannot broadcast your commercial in the
proposed form as it breaches S. 14 of the Radio and Television Ordinance (Radio-
und Fernsehverordnung) as well as our General Conditions of Business (Allgemeine
Geschäftsbedingungen). In addition, the Commercial Television Company
cannot be obliged to broadcast commercials which damage its business interests
and involve its editors' rights.”
16. On 4 February 1994 the applicant
association filed a complaint with the Independent Radio and Television Appeal
Board (Unabhängige Beschwerdeinstanz für Radio und Fernsehen),
complaining of the refusal to broadcast the commercial. The latter informed the
applicant association on 10 February 1994 that it could only deal with appeals
complaining about programmes which had already been broadcast, though it
transmitted the complaint to the Federal Office of Communication (Bundesamt
für Kommunikation). The Office informed the applicant association on 25
April 1994 that within the framework of the broadcasting provisions the
Commercial Television Company was free to purchase commercials and choose their
contractual partners as they wished. The Office further stated that it
considered the complaint as a disciplinary report, and that it saw no reason to
proceed against the Swiss Radio and Television Company.
17. On 6 July 1994 the applicant
association filed a complaint with the Federal Department for Transport and
Energy (Eidgenössisches Verkehrs- und Energiewirtschaftsdepartement)
which was dismissed on 22 May 1996. In its decision, the Department found, inter
alia, that the Swiss Radio and Television Company was the sole institution
to provide information in respect of home news (Inlandberichterstattung).
In respect of commercial broadcasts, however, the Company stood in competition
with local, regional and foreign broadcasters, and the applicant was not obliged
to have his commercial broadcast over the channels of the Company. Moreover, the
Company acted in matters of advertising as a private entity and did not fulfil a
duty of public law when it broadcast commercials. The Department concluded that
the Swiss Radio and Television Company could not be ordered to broadcast the
commercial at issue.
18. The applicant association's
administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwerde), filed by a
lawyer and dated 18 June 1996, was dismissed by the Federal Court (Bundesgericht)
on 20 August 1997. The Court noted, with reference to Article 13 of the
Convention, that the Federal Office for Communication should have afforded the
applicant association formally the opportunity to institute complaint
proceedings which, if necessary, could have remedied the matter. As the case was
ready for decision, the Federal Court itself undertook the decision. It then
balanced the various issues at stake.
19. The judgment proceeded to
explain the position of the Swiss Radio and Television Company in Swiss law. The
latter no longer enjoyed a monopoly and was increasingly subjected to foreign
competition. However, this did not alter the fact that, according to the
applicable law, the Swiss Radio and Television Company continued to act in the
area of programmes within the framework of public law duties transferred upon
it. The law itself granted it a licence for the broadcasting of national and
linguistic regional programmes.
20. The Federal Court further
considered that S. 55bis § 3 of the Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung;
in the version applicable at that time) ensured the independence of radio and
television broadcasting as well as the autonomy of the programmes. However,
advertising fell outside the programme obligations of the Swiss Radio and
Television Company, the programme presupposing an assessment of information by
an editor. Only the programme activities were covered by S. 55bis of the Federal
Constitution and S. 4 of the Federal Radio and Television Act (Bundesgesetz
über Radio und Fernsehen). The viewers should not be influenced in their
opinions by one-sided or unobjective or insufficiently varied contributions
which disregarded duties of journalistic care. Commercials, on the other hand,
were by their very nature one-sided as they were in the interest of the offering
party, and were inherently excluded from a critical assessment for which reason,
pursuant to S. 18 § 1 of the Federal Radio and Television Act, they had to be
clearly separated from the programme and to be marked as such. Indeed, the
Federal Radio and Television Act dealt with matters of advertising together with
those of financing, rather than with the programme. There was furthermore no
right to broadcast a commercial based on the principle of the diversity of the
programme and that a competitor had already been admitted with his contribution.
The judgment continued:
“Until 1964 (advertising) was completely
prohibited for radio and television. Subsequently, they were admitted on
television, though they were subjected to interferences in the interests of an
optimal implementation of the duty of programme and to protect other important
public interests (youth, health, diversity of the press). S. 18 of the
Federal Radio and Television Act today assumes in principle that advertising is
admissible but subject to certain limitations. Thus, S. 18 § 5 of the Federal
Radio and Television Act prohibits religious and political advertising as well
as advertising for alcoholic beverages, tobacco and medicaments. The Federal
Council may enact further prohibitions of advertising for the protection of
juveniles and the environment. ... On this basis, S. 18 of the Federal Radio and
Television Act was enacted in a more concrete form in SS. 10 et seq. of
the Radio and Television Ordinance. These provisions contain no obligation
whatsoever to broadcast commercials, and also do not declare that advertising is
a public law duty of the broadcaster.”
21. In respect of the applicant
association's complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, the Federal Court
found that the prohibition of political advertising stated in S. 18 § 5 of the
Federal Radio and Television Act served various purposes:
“It should prevent financially powerful
groups from obtaining a competitive political advantage. In the interest of
democratic process it intends to protect the formation of public opinion from
undue commercial influence and to bring about a certain equality of opportunity
among the different forces of society. The prohibition contributes towards the
independence of the radio and television broadcasters in editorial matters,
which could be endangered by powerful political advertising sponsors. According
to the Swiss law on communication the press remains the most important means for
paid political advertising. Already there financially powerful groups are in a
position to secure themselves more space; admitting political advertising to
radio and television would reinforce this tendency and substantially influence
the democratic process of formation of opinion - all the more so as it is
established that television with its dissemination and its immediacy will have a
stronger effect on the public than the other means of communication ... The
reservation in respect of political advertising in favour of the print media
assures these a certain part of the advertising market and thereby contributes
to their financing which in turn counteracts an undesirable concentration of the
press and thus indirectly contributes towards the pluralistic system of media
required under Article 10 of the Convention ...”
22. The Federal Court observed that
the applicant association had other means of disseminating its political ideas,
for instance in foreign programmes which were broadcast into Switzerland, or in
the cinema and the press. The Commercial Television Company had offered the
applicant association other possibilities and was also willing to convene a
meeting to discuss them with the applicant association in the presence of a
legal adviser.
23. In respect of the applicant
association's complaint about discrimination, the Federal Court found that the
applicant association was complaining of two situations which were not
comparable with each other. Promotions by the meat industry were economic in
nature in that they aimed at increasing the turnover and were not related to
animal protection. On the other hand, the applicant association's commercial,
exhorting reduced meat consumption and partly containing shocking pictures, was
directed against industrial animal production. The applicant association had
repeatedly become active in the media in order to pursue its aims. In 1992 the
applicant association had filed a disciplinary complaint in this respect with
the Swiss Federal Parliament. The matter became a political issue early in 1994
when the Swiss Federal Council commented on the matter.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND
PRACTICE
A. General regulations on radio
and television
24. S. 55bis of the Swiss Federal
Constitution in the version applicable at the relevant time provided:
“1. Legislation on radio and
television ... appertains to the Confederation.
2. Radio and television shall
contribute to the cultural development, to the free expression of opinions as
well as to the entertainment of the audience. They shall consider the
particularities of the country and the requirements of the Cantons. They shall
describe the facts objectively and adequately reflect the variety of views.
3. Within the framework of § 2,
the impartiality of radio and television as well as the autonomy in the creation
of programmes shall be guaranteed. ...”
25. These provisions have been
enshrined in S. 93 of the Federal Constitution currently in force.
26. The Federal Radio and Television
Act, referring to S. 55bis, requires in principle a licence to broadcast radio
and television programmes. S. 26 grants the licence for national and linguistic
regional programmes to the Swiss Radio and Television Company. S. 4 of the Act
stipulates the objectivity of programmes which shall adequately reflect the
plurality of events and opinions.
27. This Company has transferred all
aspects of the acquisition and organisation of television advertising to the
Commercial Television Company (now called “Publisuisse”) which is a
company established under private law and whose activities do not depend on a
licence.
B. Regulations on television
advertising
28. Commercials are broadcast in
between programmes at various times during the day. The Federal Radio and
Television Act provides in respect of advertising as follows:
“S. 18 Advertising
1. Advertising shall be clearly
separated from the rest of the programme and shall be clearly recognisable as
such. Permanent programme staff of the broadcaster shall not participate in the
broadcasting of commercials ...
5. Religious and political
advertising is prohibited, furthermore advertising for alcoholic beverages,
tobacco and medicaments. The Federal Council may enact further prohibitions of
advertising for the protection of juveniles and the environment.”
29. In its message (Botschaft)
to the Swiss Parliament of 28 September 1987, the Federal Council explained that
the prohibition of political advertising “should prevent that financially
strong groups obtain a competitive advantage in politics” (Bundesblatt
[Feuille fédérale] 1987 III 734).
30. S. 15 of the Radio and
Television Ordinance provides as follows:
“S. 15 Inadmissible advertising
There shall be prohibited:
a. religious and political advertising;
b. advertising for alcoholic beverages and
tobacco;
c. advertising for medicaments in respect of
which public advertising is not admitted by medical law;
d. untrue or misleading advertising or
advertising which corresponds with unfair competition;
e. advertising which profits from the natural
credulity of children or the lack of experience of youth or abuses their
feelings of attachment;
f. subliminal advertising ...”
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTION
31. The Government claimed, as they
had before the Commission, that the applicant association had abused its right
to petition within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Thus, when
introducing its application it had stated that an administrative law appeal was
not open; yet at the same time it had filed precisely such an appeal with the
Federal Court which in fact led to that court's decision of 20 August 1997.
32. The Court notes that the
applicant association filed its application with the Commission on 13 July 1994,
complaining of the refusal to broadcast a commercial. Shortly before, on 18 June
1994, it raised essentially the same complaint by means of an administrative law
appeal before the Federal Court which handed down its decision on 20 August
1997.
33. The Court recalls its case-law
according to which it is not excluded that supplements to an initial application
may relate in particular to the proof that the applicant has complied with the
conditions of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, even if he has done so after
the lodging of the application, as long as he does so before the decision of
admissibility (see the Ringeisen v. Austria judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A
no. 13, p. 38, §§ 89-93). The Court finds no reason to reconsider these
issues.
34. It follows that the Government's
preliminary objection must be rejected.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10
OF THE CONVENTION
35. The applicant association
complained that the refusal to broadcast its commercial had infringed Article 10
of the Convention, which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms,
since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary."
36. The Government contested that
submission.
A. Responsibility of the
respondent State
37. Before the substance of the
matter can be examined, the Court must consider whether responsibility can be
attributed to the respondent State.
1. Parties' submissions
38. The applicant association
submitted that the State is not permitted to delegate functions to private
persons in such a way that fundamental rights are undermined by the resulting
“privatisation”. As radio and television programmes in Switzerland can
always only be broadcast under a licence granted by the State, the latter is
obliged when drafting the law governing such licences to ensure respect for
freedom of expression. This view was already enshrined, at the time, as part of
unwritten Swiss constitutional law. The Government have not been released from
the obligation to try to ensure that freedom of information can be implemented
in this particular area.
39. The applicant association
further argued that the different legal bases governing activities of the Swiss
Radio and Television Company, on the one hand, and of the Commercial Television
Company, on the other, did not sufficiently ensure respect for its right to
freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The
separation of private and public law took too insufficient account of the fact
that in certain cases freedom of expression gave a person the right to voice an
opinion on social issues in the part of a television programme paid for by
advertisers, that is to say the so-called “commercial break”. With reference
to the case of Artico v. Italy, the applicant association pointed out that the
Convention was intended to guarantee, not rights that were theoretical or
illusory, but rights which were practical and effective (see the judgment of 13
May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 16, § 33).
40. The Government submitted that
Article 10 of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. The
question arose whether this provision encompassed a right of “antenna”, i.e.
of access to a particular media controlled by a third person. Even if this were
to be the case, the Commercial Television Company's refusal to broadcast the
commercial did not bring about the responsibility of the Swiss authorities. The
latter exercised no supervision over the Commercial Television Company which was
a company established under and governed by private law, and they did not
prevent the Company from broadcasting commercials. Moreover, S. 18 § 5 of the
Federal Radio and Television Act could not serve as a basis to establish the
responsibility in the present case of the Swiss authorities. Thus, the reasons
given by the Company in its letter of 24 January 1994 when refusing the
commercials were of a personal nature, namely that it could not be obliged to
broadcast commercials which damage its business interests and involve its
editors' rights. With reference to the Gustafsson v. Sweden case, the Government
considered that the present case involved relations between private
associations, the Company and the applicant association (see judgment of 25
April 1996, Reports 1996-II, p. 658, § 60). Even if Article 10 of the
Convention were applicable, the Swiss authorities would only be responsible in
respect of its positive obligations under this provision.
41. The Government further submitted
that the Swiss Radio and Television Company exercised no public service when
broadcasting advertising and could in this respect invoke the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of commerce as well as of contractual freedom. This was not
altered by the fact that that Company had delegated the acquisition of
advertising to the Commercial Television Company, though regard had to be had to
international and domestic law, including the provisions on the prohibition of
advertising in the Federal Radio and Television Act. Both companies were
governed by private law. As a result, under private law the question arose as to
any positive obligation of the Swiss authorities effectively to ensure the
freedom of expression among private persons. Under public law the issue arose as
to the compatibility with Article 10 of the Convention of the prohibition of
advertising under Article 18 § 5 of the Federal Radio and Television Act.
42. In respect of the public law
issue of the present case, the Government considered that the requirements under
Article 10 of the Convention were fulfilled. Attention was drawn to the Federal
Court's decision of 20 August 1997 according to which the applicant association
could invoke before it the rights under Article 10 of the Convention., though
there was no right to broadcast, i.e. to an “antenna”. The Federal Court did
indeed examine the applicant association's complaints under Article 10, inter
alia, in the light of the Strasbourg case-law.
43. In respect of the issue under
private law, the Government pointed out the exemplary case-law of the Federal
Court according to which constitutional as well as Convention rights shall also
apply “horizontally” in the relations between private persons. This case-law
had meanwhile been enshrined in S. 35 of the Swiss Federal Constitution
currently in force. Thus, individuals' rights were guaranteed judicially and by
legislation. In the present case, the Federal Court found that the matter was
first to be resolved on the level of private law. In fact, the refusal of the
Commercial Television Company fell to be examined by an antitrust commission
which undoubtedly would have examined the “horizontal” effects of basic
rights between private persons.
2. The Court's assessment
44. It is not in dispute between the
parties that the Commercial Television Company is a company established under
Swiss private law. The issue arises, therefore, whether the Company's refusal to
broadcast the applicant association's commercial fell within the respondent
Government's jurisdiction. In this respect, the Court notes in particular the
respondent Government's submission according to which the Commercial Television
Company, when deciding on whether or not to acquire advertising, was acting as a
private party enjoying contractual freedom.
45. Under Article 1 of the
Convention, each Contracting State “shall secure to everyone within [its]
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”. As the
Court stated in the case of Marckx v. Belgium (judgment of 13 June
1979, Series A no. 31, p. 15, § 31; see also the Young, James and Webster v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 20,
§ 49), in addition to the primarily negative undertaking of a State to
abstain from interference in Convention guarantees, “there may be positive
obligations inherent” in such guarantees. The responsibility of a State may
then be engaged as a result of not observing its obligation to enact domestic
legislation.
46. The Court does not consider it
desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory concerning the
extent to which the Convention guarantees should be extended to relations
between private individuals inter se.
47. Suffice it to state that in the
instant case the Commercial Television Company and later the Federal Court in
its decision of 20 August 1997, when examining the applicant association's
request to broadcast the commercial at issue, both relied on S. 18 of the Swiss
Federal Radio and Television Act which prohibits “political advertising”.
The domestic law, as interpreted in last resort by the Federal Court, therefore
made lawful the treatment of which the applicant association complained (see the
Marckx and the Young, James and Webster judgments cited above). In effect,
political speech by the applicant association was prohibited. In the
circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the responsibility of the
respondent State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention for any
resultant breach of Article 10 of the Convention may be engaged on this basis.
B. Whether there was an
interference with the applicant association's rights under Article 10 of the
Convention
48. The responsibility of the
respondent State having been established, the refusal to broadcast the applicant
association's commercial amounted to an “interference by public authority”
in the exercise of the right guaranteed by Article 10.
49. Such an interference will
infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of
Article 10. It is therefore necessary to determine whether it was “prescribed
by law”, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that
paragraph, and “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve them.
C. Whether the interference was
“prescribed by law”
50. The applicant association
submitted that there was no sufficient legal basis for the interference in its
rights by the Commercial Television Company. The commercial which it intended to
broadcast could not be considered as “political”. It merely contained
pictorial information without any linguistic elements explaining how pigs
behaved in natural surroundings and how, in contrast to this, they were kept by
human beings in cramped pens. At most, this information qualified as
information. The fact that such information could lead to political consequences
did not make it political advertising. The primary task of information was to
enlighten and to disseminate knowledge that ultimately led to the correct
political decisions.
51. The Government contended that
any interference with the applicant association's rights was “prescribed by
law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention in that it
was based on S. 18 § 5 of the Federal Radio and Television Act, the latter
having been duly published and, therefore, accessible to the applicant
association. While the term “political” was somewhat vague, absolute
precision was unnecessary, and it fell to the national authorities to dissipate
any doubts as to the interpretation of the provisions concerned. In the present
case, the Federal Court in its decision of 20 August 1997 considered that the
commercial at issue, denouncing the meat industry, was not of a commercial
character and in fact had to be placed in the more general framework of the
animal association's militantism in favour for the protection of animals.
52. The Court recalls its case-law
according to which the expression “in accordance with the law” requires not
only that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also
refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be
accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Amann
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECHR 1999-II). However, it is primarily
for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply
domestic law (see the Kopp v. Switzerland judgment of 25 March 1998,
Reports 1998-II, p. 541, § 59; and the Kruslin v. France judgment
of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, p. 21 et seq., § 29).
53. In the present case, the Federal
Court in its judgment of 20 August 1997 relied as a legal basis for the refusal
to broadcast the applicant's commercial on S. 18 § 5 of the Federal Radio and
Television Act prohibiting “political advertising”. S. 15 § 1 (e) of the
Radio and Television Ordinance reiterates this prohibition.
54. It is not in dispute between the
parties that these laws, duly published, were accessible to the applicant
association. The issue arises, however, whether the rules were foreseeable as to
their effects.
55. The Court reiterates that a norm
cannot be regarded as a “law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless
it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need
be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Again, whilst
certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law
must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws
are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague
and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see, for
example, the Hertel v. Switzerland judgment of 25 August 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, p. 2325, § 35; the Malone v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, pp. 31-32, § 66).
56. In the present case, it falls to
be examined whether the term “political advertising” in S. 18 § 5 of the
Federal Radio and Television Act was formulated in a manner such as to enable
the applicant association to foresee that it would serve to prohibit the
broadcasting of the proposed television commercial. The latter depicted pigs in
a forest as well as in pens in a noisy hall. The accompanying voice compared
this situation with concentration camps and exhorted television viewers to “eat
less meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the environment”.
57. In the Court's opinion the
commercial indubitably fell outside the regular commercial context in the sense
of inciting the public to purchase a particular product. Rather, with its
concern for the protection of animals, expressed partly in drastic pictures, and
its exhortation to reduce meat consumption, the commercial reflected
controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general and also lying at
the heart of various political debates. Indeed, as the Federal Court pointed out
in its judgment of 20 August 1997 (see above, § 23), the applicant association
had in respect of these matters filed a disciplinary complaint with the Swiss
Federal Parliament.
58. As such, the commercial could be
regarded as “political” within the meaning of S. 18 § 5 of the Federal
Radio and Television Act. It was, therefore, “foreseeable” for the applicant
association that its commercial would not be broadcast on these grounds. It
follows that the interference was, therefore, “prescribed by law” within the
meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
D. Whether the interference
pursued a legitimate aim
59. The applicant association
further maintained that there was no legitimate aim which justified the
interference with its rights.
60 . The Government submitted that
the refusal to broadcast the commercial at issue aimed at enabling the formation
of a public opinion protected from the pressures of powerful financial groups,
while at the same time promoting equal opportunities to the different components
of society. The refusal also assured to the press a segment of the advertising
market, thus contributing towards its financial autonomy. In the Government's
opinion, therefore, the measure was justified “for the protection of the ...
rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
61. The Court notes the Federal
Council's message to the Swiss Parliament in which it was explained that the
prohibition of political advertising in S. 18 § 5 of the Swiss Radio and
Television Act served to prevent financially strong groups from obtaining a
competitive advantage in politics. The Federal Court in its judgment of 20
August 1997 considered that the prohibition served to ensure, in addition, the
independence of the broadcaster; to spare the political process from undue
commercial influence; to provide for a certain equality of opportunity between
the different forces of society; and to support the press which remained free to
publish political advertisements.
62. The Court is, therefore,
satisfied that the measure aimed at the “protection of the ... rights of
others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
E. Whether the interference was
“necessary in a democratic society”
63. The applicant association
submitted that the measure had not been proportionate, as it did not have other
valid means at its disposal to broadcast the commercials at issue. The
television programmes of the Swiss Radio and Television Company were the only
ones that were broadcast and could be seen throughout Switzerland. The evening
news programme and the subsequent national weather forecasts had the highest
ratings, namely between 50% and 70% of all viewers. Even with the use of
considerable financial resources it would not be possible to reach so many
persons via the regional private channels or the foreign stations which could be
received in Switzerland.
64. The Government considered that
the measure was proportionate as being “necessary in a democratic society”
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It was not up to
the Court to take the place of the national authorities, and indeed Contracting
States remained free to choose the measures which they considered appropriate,
and the Court could not be oblivious of the substantive or procedural features
of their respective domestic laws (see the Worm v. Austria judgment of 29 August
1997, Reports 1997-V, p. 1551, § 49). In the present case, the Federal Court in
its judgment of 20 August 1997 was called upon to examine concurring interests
protected by the same basic right: namely the freedom of the applicant
association to broadcast its ideas, and the freedom of the Commercial Television
Company, and the Swiss Radio and Television Company, to communicate information.
To admit the applicant association's point of view would be to grant a “right
to an antenna”, which right would substantially interfere with the rights of
the Commercial Television Company and the Swiss Radio and Television Company to
decide which information they chose to bring to the attention of the public. In
fact, Article 10 would then oblige a third party to broadcast information which
it did not wish to do. Finally, the public had to be protected from untimely
interruptions in the television programmes by means of commercials.
65. In this respect the Government
pointed out the various other possibilities open to the applicant association to
broadcast the information at issue, namely by means of local radio and
television stations, the written press, and internet. Moreover, the Commercial
Television Company had offered the applicant association the possibility of
discussing the conditions for broadcasting its commercials, though this had been
categorically refused by the applicant association.
66. The Court recalls that freedom
of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is
applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.
As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions. Such
exceptions must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any
restrictions must be established convincingly, particularly where the nature of
the speech is political rather than commercial (see, inter alia, the
Hertel v. Switzerland judgment cited above, p. 2329, § 46, and the Handyside v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23,
§ 49).
67. Under the Court's case-law, the
adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the
existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain
margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand
in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the
decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is
therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is
reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
68. The Court's task, in exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national
authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered
pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision
is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion
reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at
the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine
whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the
reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and
sufficient” (see the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) judgment
of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 29, § 50). In doing so, the Court has
to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that
they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see the Hertel v.
Switzerland judgment cited above).
69. It follows that the Swiss
authorities had a certain margin of appreciation to decide whether there was a
“pressing social need” to refuse the broadcasting of the commercial. Such a
margin of appreciation is particularly essential in commercial matters,
especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that of advertising (see the
markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany judgment of 20 November
1989, Series A no. 165, p. 19, § 33; and the Jacubowski v. Germany judgment of
23 June 1994, Series A no. 291-A, p. 14, § 26).
70. However, the Court has just
found that the applicant association's film fell outside the regular commercial
context in the sense of inciting the public to purchase a particular product.
Rather, it reflected controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in
general (see above, § 57). The Swiss authorities themselves regarded the
content of the applicant association's commercial as being “political”
within the meaning of 18 § 5 of the Federal Radio and Television Act. Indeed,
it cannot be denied that in many European societies there was, and is, an
ongoing general debate on the protection of animals and the manner in which they
are reared.
71. As a result, in the present case
the extent of the margin of appreciation is reduced, since what is at stake is
not a given individual's purely “commercial” interests, but his
participation in a debate affecting the general interest (see the Hertel v.
Switzerland judgment cited above).
72. The Court will consequently
carefully examine whether the measures in issue were proportionate to the aim
pursued. In that regard, it must balance the applicant association's freedom of
expression, on the one hand, with the reasons adduced by the Swiss authorities
for the prohibition of political advertising, on the other, namely to protect
public opinion from the pressures of powerful financial groups and from undue
commercial influence; to provide for a certain equality of opportunity between
the different forces of society; to ensure the independence of the broadcasters
in editorial matters from powerful sponsors; and to support the press.
73. It is true that powerful
financial groups can obtain competitive advantages in the areas of commercial
advertising and may thereby exercise pressure on, and eventually curtail the
freedom of, the radio and television stations broadcasting the commercials. Such
situations undermine the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a
democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular
where it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the
public is moreover entitled to receive. Such an undertaking cannot be
successfully accomplished unless it is grounded in the principle of pluralism of
which the State is the ultimate guarantor. This observation is especially valid
in relation to audio-visual media, whose programmes are often broadcast very
widely (see the Informationsverein Lentia and others v. Austria judgment of 24
November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 16, § 38).
74. In the present case, the
contested measure, namely the prohibition of political advertising as in
S. 18 § 5 of the Federal Radio and Television Act, was applied only to
radio and television broadcasts, and not to other media such as the press. The
Federal Court explained in this respect in its judgment of 20 August 1997
that television had a stronger effect on the public on account of its
dissemination and immediacy. In the Court's opinion, however, while the domestic
authorities may have had valid reasons for this differential treatment, a
prohibition of political advertising which applies only to certain media, and
not to others, does not appear to be of a particularly pressing nature.
75. Moreover, it has not been argued
that the applicant association itself constituted a powerful financial group
which, with its proposed commercial, aimed at endangering the independence of
the broadcaster; at unduly influencing public opinion; or at endangering the
equality of opportunity between the different forces of society. Indeed, rather
than abusing a competitive advantage, all the applicant association intended to
do with its commercial was to participate in an ongoing general debate on animal
protection and the rearing of animals. The Court cannot exclude that a
prohibition of “political advertising” may be compatible with the
requirements of Article 10 of the Convention in certain situations.
Nevertheless, the reasons must be “relevant” and “sufficient” in respect
of the particular interference with the rights under Article 10. In the present
case, the Federal Court in its judgment of 20 August 1997, discussed at length
the reasons in general which justified a prohibition of “political advertising”.
In the Court's opinion, however, the domestic authorities have not demonstrated
in a “relevant and sufficient” manner why the grounds generally advanced in
support of the prohibition of political advertising, also served to justify the
interference in the particular circumstances of the applicant association's
case.
76. The domestic authorities did not
adduce the disturbing nature of any particular sequence, or of any particular
words, of the commercial as a ground for refusing to broadcast it. It therefore
mattered little that the pictures and words employed in the commercial at issue
may have appeared provocative or even disagreeable.
77. Insofar as the Government
pointed out that there were various other possibilities to broadcast the
information at issue, the Court observes that the applicant association, aiming
at reaching the entire Swiss public, had no other means than the national
television programmes of the Swiss Radio and Television Company at its disposal,
since these programmes were the only ones broadcast throughout Switzerland. The
Commercial Television Company was the sole instance responsible for the
broadcasting of commercials within these national programmes. Regional private
television channels and foreign television stations cannot be received
throughout Switzerland.
78. The Government have also
submitted that admitting the applicant's claim would be to accept a “right to
an antenna” which in turn would substantially interfere with the rights of the
Commercial Television Company to communicate information. Reference was further
made to the danger of untimely interruptions in the television programmes by
means of commercials. The Court recalls that its judgment is essentially
declaratory. Its task is to determine whether the Contracting States have
achieved the result called for by the Convention. Various possibilities are
conceivable as regards the organisation of broadcasting television commercials;
the Swiss authorities have entrusted the responsibility in respect of national
programmes to one sole private company. It is not the Court's task to indicate
which means a State should utilise in order to perform its obligations under the
Convention (see the de Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A
no. 86, p. 29, § 35).
79. In the light of the foregoing,
the measure in issue cannot be considered as “necessary in a democratic
society”. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13
OF THE CONVENTION
80. In the applicant association's
submissions, it had no effective remedy at its disposal to complain about the
refusal to broadcast its commercial. It relied on Article 13 of the Convention
which states:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity."
81. The Government replied that the
Federal Court as the highest domestic instance had dealt with the applicant
association's complaint.
82. The Court notes that, upon the
applicant association's administrative law appeal, the Federal Court in its
decision of 20 August 1997 dealt extensively and in substance with the
complaints which it raised before the Court. The applicant association therefore
had at its disposal a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.
83. It follows that there was no
breach of Article 13 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
OF THE CONVENTION
84. The applicant association also
complained under Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 10,
of discrimination in that its commercial had not been broadcast, whereas the
meat industry was regularly permitted to broadcast commercials. Article 14 of
the Convention states:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status."
85. The Government submitted that
the situations complained of were not comparable. Otherwise, for every
commercial propagating one product, another commercial for another product would
have to be broadcast. The difficulties would even be greater in the political
area.
86. Under the Court's case-law,
Article 14 safeguards individuals, or groups of individuals, placed in
comparable situations, from all discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms set forth in the other normative provisions of the Convention and
Protocols (see the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26 April 1979,
Series A no. 30, p. 43, § 70).
87. In the present case, the Court
notes the decision of the Federal Court of 20 August 1997 according to which
promotions of the meat industry were economic in nature in that they aimed at
increasing the turnover, whereas the applicant association's commercial,
exhorting reduced meat consumption, was directed against industrial animal
production and related to animal protection.
88. As a result, the applicant
association and the meat industry cannot be considered to be “placed in
comparable situations” as their commercials differed in their aims.
89. There has thus been no violation
of Article 14 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
(…)
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Dismisses the Government's
preliminary objection;
2. Holds that there has been a violation
of Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been no
violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there has been no
violation of Article 14 of the Convention;
(…)
Varkens in Noot
Jan
Kabel
1. De VGT wil op de privaatrechtelijke
Zwitserse reclamezender Publisuisse in het programma van een Zwitserse omroep
(Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft) een ideële reclameboodschap
laten uitzenden die als afbrekend tegenover de vleesindustrie kan worden
gekwalificeerd. De spot toont eerst een varkensparadijsje (geen Animal Farm) en
vervolgens de werkelijkheid van de varkensindustrie. Die werkelijkheid wordt in
de spot uitdrukkelijk gekwalificeerd als een concentratiekamp. Men herinnere
zich de gelijksoortige uitspraken van Robert Long (Pres. Rb. Amsterdam 30
november 2000, Elro AA8696 ; zie ook Schuijt in: Onrechtmatige Daad
, VII, aant. 72). De uitsmijter luidt: eet minder vlees.
2. Publisuisse weigert de spot uit te zenden
vanwege haar duidelijk politieke karakter. Zij baseert die weigering op art. 18
lid 5 van de Zwitserse Federale Radio en Televisiewet dat religieuze en
politieke reclame verbiedt, op haar contractvoorwaarden, op haar zakelijke
belangen en op haar redactionele rechten.
3. Daarna breekt een Kafkaiaanse procedure
doolhof aan. Op het protest tegen de weigering deelt Publisuisse mee dat zij
geen instantie is die voor beroep vatbare beslissingen kan geven. Een klacht bij
de Onafhankelijke Bezwaarschriftencommissie voor radio en televisie wordt
terzijde gelegd, omdat deze commissie alleen oordeelt over reeds uitgezonden
programma's. De commissie verwijst de klacht naar het Bundesamt für
Kommunikation dat meedeelt dat Publisuisse vrij is om een spot al dan niet uit
te zenden. Een volgende klacht bij het Ministerie voor Transport en energie, op
basis van mededingingsrechtelijke aspecten, wordt afgewezen omdat Publisuisse
geen monopolie positie heeft maar moet concurreren met andere reclamezenders en
bovendien op haar geen publiekrechtelijke plicht rust om reclameboodschappen uit
te zenden. Het administratief beroep tegen de beslissing van het Bundesamt wordt
door het Bundesgericht verworpen. Dat overweegt echter dat, gelet op artikel 13
van het EVRM, het Bundesamt nalatig is geweest klager een behoorlijke
procedurele mogelijkheid te bieden. Het Bundesgericht beoordeelt dan de zaak
zelf en oordeelt dat op basis van de Zwitserse radio- en televisiewetgeving er
geen verplichting bestaat voor de Zwitserse omroep om reclameboodschappen uit te
zenden. De vraag of het reclameverbod van artikel 18 lid 5, dat nader is
uitgewerkt in artikel 15 van het Radio en televisiebesluit, in strijd komt met
artikel 10 EVRM wordt negatief beantwoord. Het verbod van politieke reclame acht
het gerecht een juist middel om tegen te gaan dat financieel sterke politieke
groeperingen een concurrerend politiek voordeel kunnen behalen, het waarborgt de
onafhankelijkheid van het redactionele programma en de advertentiebelangen van
de gedrukte media en daarmee de mede door artikel 10 EVRM gewaarborgde
pluriformiteit van de media. Bovendien staan de VGT andere middelen ter
beschikking om haar boodschap uit te dragen (buitenlandse zenders, de pers of de
bioscoop). Dat de vleesindustrie wel reclame mag maken en de VGT niet, ziet het
gerecht niet als ongelijke behandeling omdat commerciële reclame en ideële
reclame nu eenmaal niet met elkaar te vergelijken zijn. VGT houdt zich inderdaad
bezig met een politiek issue; dat blijkt wel uit het feit dat zij de zaak bij
het Zwitsers parlement heeft aangekaart.
4. Het belang van deze zaak ligt allereerst in
de vraag naar de horizontale werking van het grondrecht van vrijheid van
meningsuiting. Publisuisse, de Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft en
VGT zijn privaatrechtelijke rechtspersonen. De Zwitserse regering verweert zich
dan ook met het argument dat zij niet verantwoordelijk kan worden gesteld voor
de weigering. Haar opvatting is dat het om een privaatrechtelijke kwestie gaat
die mededingingsrechtelijk kan worden uitgevochten. Dat argument gaat in de
Nederlandse rechtspraak op, althans wanneer het om concurrentieverhoudingen
gaat. Zie Pres. Rb. Den Haag 10 juli 1998, KGK 1998, 1487 (ACSI Internationale
Campinggids B.V. tegen ANWB) en daarover Kabel, in: Praktijkboek Reclamerecht
XIIB, nr. 1). De president oordeelde eiser wiens advertentie door ANWB's blad de
Autokampioen werd geweigerd, niet ontvankelijk omdat de Mededingingswet een met
voldoende waarborgen omklede rechtsgang bevatte. De vraag is of dit een juiste
uitspraak is; in kort geding kan immers ook de Mededingingswet aan de orde
worden gesteld (zie Pres. Rb. Breda 13 december 2000, Elro AA9060).
Wanneer het niet gaat om concurrentieverhoudingen, zoals in dit geval, ligt de
zaak in ieder geval anders. Zie Pres. Rb. Amsterdam 1 mei 1998, Mediaforum
1998-7/8: 237-239 met ann. Schuijt (Centrum Democraten tegen SBS6).
5. Het Hof maakt korte metten met het argument
van de Zwitserse regering. Terecht oordeelt het dat het niet nodig is om een
algemene theorie over horizontale werking te ontwikkelen – dat zouden
wetenschappers zich ook wel eens mogen aantrekken (zie aldus al Bloembergen H.N.J.V.
1969: 55). Het is voldoende dat de weigering berust op de uitleg van een
wettelijke regeling; voor die regeling is de Zwitserse Staat verantwoordelijk.
6. Het gaat hier om een weigering door een
privaatrechtelijke instantie en om een bevestiging van die weigering door een
rechterlijke instantie. De laatste handeling valt niet weg te denken, omdat
betrokkene anders niet bij het Hof terecht komt. Niettemin doet zich dan toch de
vraag voor of weigering of veroordeling achteraf van reclameboodschappen door
een privaatrechtelijke instantie met het argument dat de desbetreffende
boodschap in strijd is met de wet, vatbaar is voor toetsing aan artikel 10 EVRM.
Wij kennen zo een artikel in artikel 2 NRC: reclameboodschappen mogen niet in
strijd zijn met de wet. Het is verdedigbaar dat juist in die gevallen de RCC,
ook al is zij een zelfreguleringinstantie, zich iets zou moeten aantrekken van
een beroep op artikel 10 EVRM en niet, zoals zij thans doet, zou moeten oordelen
dat een dergelijke toetsing een zaak is van de burgerlijke rechter.
7. Kennen wij ook een regeling die politieke
reclameboodschappen verbiedt? Niet meer. Sinds 1998 volgt de STER de
commerciële omroepen die enige tijd daarvoor hun beleid op dit punt hadden
gewijzigd en voortaan ook spots van politieke partijen accepteerden. Voorheen
bevatte artikel 20 van de Voorschriften voor de Nederlandse etherreclame de
verplichting voor STER om boodschappen te weigeren van levensbeschouwelijke, of
politieke aard of herkomst (zie Kabel, 'Weigering van politieke advertenties', Auteursrecht/AMR
1993-1: 8). De motivering daarvoor lag waarschijnlijk in de wens het
reclamescherm vrij te houden van mogelijk irriterende factoren die de beoogde
werking van commerciële reclameboodschappen alleen maar zou kunnen frustreren.
Dat artikel verviel met de inwerkingtreding van de Mediawet maar werd door de
STER privaatrechtelijk gehanteerd in haar Algemene Voorwaarden. Wij hadden in
die tijd dus geen wettelijke regeling, zoals de Zwitsers; de vraag of een
weigering gebaseerd op de Algemene Voorwaarden van de STER de toets aan artikel
10 EVRM zou kunnen doorstaan, lijkt, mede gelet op deze uitspraak, wat
moeilijker denkwerk te vereisen, maar is toch eenvoudig te beantwoorden. Een
kort geding procedure tegen STER op basis van een weigering is uiteraard
mogelijk en heeft zich inderdaad al een paar keer voorgedaan (Pres. Rb.
Amsterdam 9 mei 1985, KG 1985, 152 (Volkskrant tegen STER), bevestigd
door Hof Amsterdam 28 november 1985, KG 1986, 12; Pres. Rb. Amsterdam 14
december 1990, KG 1991, 29 (Regionale Omroep Utrecht tegen STER); Pres.
Rb. Amsterdam 14 februari 1992, Mediaforum 1992-4: B25 (Sky Radio tegen
STER; Pres. Rb. Amsterdam 29 april 1993, KG 1993, 209 (AVRO tegen STER)).
Een bevestigende uitspraak op basis van een onrechtmatige daadsactie in kort
geding is te beschouwen als een vorm van overheidsinmenging in de zin van
artikel 10 EVRM en daarmee is allerlei getheoretiseer over horizontale werking
van de baan.
8. De beperking wordt door het Hof
gekwalificeerd als een beperking ter bescherming van de rechten van anderen, en
het neemt betrekkelijk achteloos de motivering dienaangaande van het Zwitserse
gerecht over, te weten dat het gaat om bescherming van de onafhankelijkheid van
omroepen, de bescherming van het politieke proces tegen onwenselijke
commerciële invloeden en om ondersteuning van de pers; het rept daarbij niet
van het pluriformiteitsbeginsel dat door de Zwitserse rechter min of meer als
algemeen motief wordt genoemd. Kennelijk ligt dat beginsel toch ten grondslag
aan de kwalificatie, omdat op zichzelf bezien de pers geen zelfstandig recht op
ondersteuning kan claimen op grond van artikel 10 EVRM en het bij de beperkingen
niet alleen kan gaan om economische motieven. Dat wordt later ook bevestigd (zie
par. 73).
9. De hamvraag zit hem natuurlijk in de vraag
naar de noodzakelijkheid van de beperking. Het Hof oordeelt dat de beperking in
dit geval niet noodzakelijk was. Het volgt daarbij de inmiddels klassieke
redenering: het gaat hier om het publieke debat, dat houdt in dat het Hof de
argumenten over en weer volledig kan toetsen en de vrijheid van meningsuiting
dient af te wegen tegen het belang dat met de beperking is gediend, daarbij
rekening houdend met alle omstandigheden van het geval (Hertel/Zwitserland) en
met het gegeven dat de vrijheid van meningsuiting ook van toepassing is op
mogelijk shockerende uitlatingen (Handyside/UK).
10. In concreto zijn de volgende factoren van
belang:
a. Een beperking die alleen maar geldt voor
bepaalde media en niet voor andere lijkt bepaald niet dwingend noodzakelijk.
b. Het motief voor de beperking, waarborging
van pluralisme in de media, is op de adverteerder niet van toepassing: het
betreft hier immers geen financieel sterke groepering.
c. De weigering is niet gebaseerd op de
concrete vormgeving van de spot.
d. Dat er alternatieven zijn voor de
adverteerder is niet relevant, omdat het Zwitserse omroepbestel nu eenmaal zo is
georganiseerd dat uitzending via de desbetreffende omroep de enige manier is in
Zwitserland om het gehele omroeppubliek te bereiken.
e. Dat er op deze wijze een soort van
afdwingbaar toegangsrecht wordt geschapen ( right to an antenna ) kan
waar zijn, maar dat is juist mede het gevolg van de manier waarop in Zwitserland
de nationale omroep is georganiseerd (zie d.). Het is echter niet aan het Hof om
een oordeel te geven over de manier waarop een nationale omroep is
georganiseerd.
11. De beleidsvrijheid van een reclamezender
die de enige is met een nationaal bereik is dus veel minder groot dan die van de
redactie van het gewone omroepprogramma van zo'n zender. Het lijkt tenminste
niet goed voorstelbaar dat de redactie van zo'n programma verplicht zou kunnen
worden een item uit te zenden zonder voorafgaande concrete rechtsgrond
(rectificatieplicht, weerwoord, e.d. naar aanleiding van een eerder uitgezonden
programma). In de Nederlandse rechtspraak geldt ten aanzien van de weigering van
politieke reclame de Boycot Outspan regel: collectieve weigering door
persmedia van ideële reclameboodschappen om redenen van fatsoen en goede smaak
is alleen dan rechtmatig indien de reclameboodschap naar de in ons land, althans
bij de overgrote meerderheid van de bevolking levende opvattingen, in ernstige
mate wansmakelijk of onfatsoenlijk zou zijn, en de lezers afkerig zou maken van
het blad of het tijdschrift waarin zij is geplaatst (Hof Amsterdam 30 oktober
1981, NJ 1981, 422). Die regel biedt m.i. meer weigeringmogelijkheden dan
de Handy Side regel die het Hof in deze zaak gebruikt en dat dus nu ten
onrechte.
12. De RCC lijkt zich intussen al niets aan te
trekken van de Boycot Outspan regel. Zij veroordeelde wegens strijd met het
fatsoen en zonder veel motivering een advertentie van de Stichting Wakker Dier
met als tekst: “Biggen castreren? Gehoorbeschermers op en ga erbij zitten! De
arbeidsinspectie controleert de veiligheid op uw bedrijf.” (RCC 6 september
2000, Uitspraken 2000: 332). Met deze ironische tekst stelde de Stichting
de praktijk op veel bedrijven aan de kaak waarbij biggen zonder verdoving worden
gecastreerd omdat verdoving alleen door een dierenarts mag geschieden, maar
castreren kennelijk door de varkensboer zelf mag worden uitgevoerd. Een
dergelijke mededeling, gedaan door Robert Long werd door de Amsterdamse
President in de hierboven genoemde zaak niet onrechtmatig geacht. Toegevoegd
moet worden dat de RCC haar uitspraken in deze geeft in de vorm van een
zogenaamd vrijblijvend advies. Wat de materiele norm betreft, maakt dat echter
geen verschil.
13. Tenslotte: hoe zou het in ons land aflopen
met een weigering door STER van een door de Stichting Varkens in Nood aangeboden
spotje. Van toetsing aan een wettelijke regel is ten onzent geen sprake: wij
kennen geen verbod van politieke reclame op de STER of op andere reclamezenders.
De STER is een privaatrechtelijke organisatie. Toch ligt het bij de STER en bij
de andere reclamezenders van binnenlandse regionale en locale en commerciële
omroepen wat problematischer. Zij zijn namelijk verplicht zich aan te sluiten
bij het stelsel van de RCC (zie respectievelijk de artikelen 61a, 43b lid 2
Mediawet en 52b Mediabesluit). Dat hoeft nog niet te betekenen dat zij niet meer
de vrijheid hebben om een eigen, individueel beleid te voeren. Gelet op de
'Biggen castreren' lijn van de RCC, ligt een weigering echter voor de hand.
Indien die weigering inderdaad is gebaseerd op het beleid van de RCC bij welks
stelsel men wettelijk verplicht is zich aan te sluiten, dan ligt de vraag voor
de hand of dat zachte poldermodel voldoende vaste grond biedt om te spreken van
overheidsinmenging in de zin van artikel 10 EVRM. Toch blijft het belang van die
vraag wat in de lucht hangen. Natuurlijk zal een Nederlandse rechter,
geconfronteerd met een vordering tegen STER of IP het belang van de vrijheid van
meningsuiting laten meewegen. De exercities omtrent de vraag of het zachte
poldermodel gekwalificeerd moet worden als overheidsinmenging verbleekt bij die
afweging. En na zo'n afweging ligt in het geval van een bevestigend oordeel de
weg naar Straatsburg altijd open (zie boven). Daarbij is van belang dat in ons
land televisiereclame alternatieven bestaan: de STER is niet de enige nationale
reclamezender.
14. Pas wanneer collectief wordt geweigerd,
komt de vraag aan de orde of het Boycot Outspan criterium van het Amsterdamse
Hof de toets van artikel 10 lid 2 kan doorstaan. Zo'n geval heeft zich pas
voorgedaan bij radioreclame. STER, Sky Radio, Radio 358 en de regionale en
locale radiozenders hebben geweigerd een reclamespot van Milieudefensie uit te
zenden waarin wordt opgeroepen biologische appelmoes te bestellen bij Hak. Zo
moeten consumenten bewijzen dat er vraag is naar biologische producten. De
weigering is gebaseerd op het gegeven dat de spot Hak (en ook enkele andere
bedrijven zoals Iglo en Mona) in een negatief daglicht stelt ( Adformatie
3 december 2001). Nu hier concrete bedrijven worden genoemd, ligt m.i. de zaak
anders dan in het Zwitserse geval en zal een op het belang van die bedrijven
gebaseerde weigering gemakkelijker de toets aan artikel 10 EVRM kunnen
doorstaan.
15. Collectieve weigering van een
televisiereclamespot van de Stichting Varkens in Nood zal m.i. die toets in
beginsel echter niet kunnen doorstaan, na de uitspraak van het Hof. De boodschap
is in redactionele vorm al niet onrechtmatig geacht in de uitspraak over Robert
Long. Het criterium van het Amsterdamse Hof in de Boycot Outspan uitspraak is
als gezegd, gelet op de Handyside uitspraak van het Hof, te beperkend. Belangen
van de vleesindustrie en van de televisiereclamezender zijn door het Hof
weliswaar niet expliciet maar ongetwijfeld meegewogen. In par. 76 van 'sHof's
uitspraak ligt nog een klein addertje onder het gras. Wanneer de Zwitserse
overheid de weigering had gebaseerd op de concrete inhoud van de spot
(bijvoorbeeld op mogelijke inbreuk op rechten van anderen, te weten de reputatie
van de vleesindustrie) had het Hof wel een uitspraak moeten geven over de vraag
of vanwege het provocatieve en wansmakelijke karakter van de uiting de weigering
de toets aan artikel 10 EVRM had kunnen doorstaan.
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